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Abstract
This thesis sheds light on three questions in international macroeconomics. The first
chapter investigates why business cycle correlations are state-dependent and higher
in recessions than in expansions. I suggest a mechanism to explain why this is the
case. Therefore, I build an international real business cycle model with occasionally
binding constraints on capacity utilization which can account for state-dependent
cross-country correlations in GDP growth rates. Empirically, I successfully test for
the presence of capacity constraints using data from the G7 advanced economies in
a Bayesian threshold autoregressive (T-VAR) model. This finding supports capacity
constraints as a prominent transmission channel of cross-country GDP asymmetries
in recession compared to expansions. The second chapter is joint work with Mathias
Hoffmann and Sven Blank of the Deutsche Bundesbank. It analyzes how foreign
direct investment (FDI) influences optimal country portfolio diversification. In a
DSGE model that features the endogenous choice of firms to become internationally
active through either exports or foreign direct investment (FDI), we find that the
optimal equity holdings of agents are more biased towards domestic firms than
in a model without FDI. The third chapter explores under which circumstances
member countries of a monetary union will not find it optimal to bail each other
out. To investigate these circumstances, I build a model of cross-country holdings of
sovereign debt with the possibility of default, as well as the possibility to negotiate a
bailout for a struggling country. I show that if there is a representative household in
each individual member country, a bailout solution always exists. In a second version
of the model that involves heterogeneity in household wealth within the bailout
providing country, the utilitarian government of this country optimally refuses a
bailout in some states of the world.
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Chapter 1
International Co-movements in
Recessions
1.1 Introduction
This paper is motivated by the empirical finding that business cycle co-movements
across countries are higher during economic contractions than during economic ex-
pansions (e.g. Yetman, 2011; Antonakakis and Scharler, 2012, as well as my own
empirical evidence). In an international real business cycle framework I investi-
gate the reasons and potential mechanisms that cause co-movements of GDP across
countries to be state-dependent. In the data, I find that the average pairwise cor-
relation of GDP growth rates between 20 OECD countries in a quarterly sample
from Q1:1961 to Q4:2011 is between 5.4 and 22.7 percentage points higher during
recessions compared to expansions.1 The main purpose of the paper is to build a
framework in which country-specific shocks and their spillovers to other countries,
endogenously lead to higher cross-country co-movements in GDP during recessions.
To achieve this asymmetry, I am introducing a friction in the form of an occasionally
binding capacity utilization constraint in an otherwise standard 2-country, 2-goods
large-open economy model (e.g. Heathcote and Perri, 2002). The friction can be in-
terpreted as the maximum production capacity of the machines operated in a given
country. At least in the short-run, this maximum capacity cannot be increased.
The implication of the occasionally binding constraint is that following a sequence
of good shocks, a given country’s machines reach their maximum capacity and the
increase in production is dampened compared to an unconstrained economy. After
a sequence of bad shocks, machines can be left idle and the economy remains uncon-
strained. This introduces asymmetric responses to shocks in the sense that negative
shocks to one country have stronger effects on this country’s economy than positive
ones. The crucial feature of the mechanism to create state-dependent cross-country
correlations is that the asymmetries also spill over internationally and can even be
amplified by the presence of a similar occasionally binding constraint in the other
country. Countries are interlinked through trade in intermediary production goods,
1Since the latest financial crisis led to a historical high in cross-country GDP correlations, the
magnitude of the result depends on whether this time period is included in the sample or not.
Furthermore, different procedures to disentangle recessions and expansions are compared.
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as each country produces one of these intermediary goods and uses the domestic
as well as the foreign intermediary good in the production of a final consumption
good. Therefore, a positive (negative) shock to a given economy affects the pro-
duction of intermediary goods of both countries positively (negatively). Due to
the fact that negative shocks have higher effects than positive ones in this model
with occasionally binding capacity constraints recessions spill-over more intensively
than expansions between countries and this leads to state-dependent cross-country
correlations. I show that the proposed mechanism can match the differences in
cross-country GDP growth correlations between expansions and recessions observed
in the data if tradable intermediary goods are to a certain degree complementary.
Lastly, I find empirical evidence for threshold effects in the capacity utilization rate
of the US economy and use the resulting threshold estimates in a Bayesian thresh-
old autoregression (TVAR) to obtain asymmetric empirical responses of the G7
advanced economies’ variables to positive, as well as negative US TFP shocks. The
resulting impulse response functions not only mirror the impulse responses of the
theoretical model, but are also in line with the assumed complementarity between
Home and Foreign intermediary good. The necessity of such an extension of the
workhorse 2-countries, 2 goods model arises from the fact that the standard model
is not capable of producing asymmetries in cross-country correlations, because it is
absolutely symmetric and usually solved using linear perturbation methods. Taking
these asymmetries into account explicitly is relevant for economic policy conclusions
drawn from international real business cycle (RBC) models. Thus, economic pol-
icy conclusions drawn from linear and symmetric models might be misleading if in
the real world agents anticipate international asymmetries in the business cycle and
adjust their decisions to their expectations. The question of why business cycle co-
movements are significantly higher during recessions compared to expansions has to
the best of my knowledge not been investigated in the literature. Additionally, the
consequences of this fact on policy-making have not been explored either. There are
several empirical as well as theoretical papers in the literature related to this paper.
The empirical fact that business cycle co-movements across countries are increasing
in recessions has been pointed out by Yetman (2011). He takes the US cycle and
US recessions as reference data and shows that the co-movement of different coun-
try groups (G7, Europe, Asia-Pacific) with the US business cycle is only positive
and significantly different from zero if the US is in a recession. Using a dynamic
conditional correlations (DCC) approach, Antonakakis and Scharler (2012) find that
the cross-country correlations between a number of developed countries significantly
increases during US recessions in the years between 1960 and 2009. Moreover, there
are other references in the literature which find that business cycles in the G7 coun-
tries become more similar in recessions (for instance Canova et al., 2007) or that
individual countries’ cycles are more affected by the global cycle in global recessions
(e.g. Claessens et al., 2013; Helbling and Bayoumi, 2003). The mechanism put for-
ward in this paper as a cause of state-dependent co-movements in an international
real business cycle model is an occasionally binding constraint on capital utilization.
These types of constraints have already been used to explain within country busi-
ness cycle asymmetries, i.e. the fact that recessions are usually sharper and shorter
than expansions (e.g. Hansen and Prescott, 2005; Knueppel, 2014). In this paper,
I show that within-country asymmetries can also be a cause for international cor-
relations to become asymmetric between recessions and expansions. The threshold
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tests I perform on US utilization rates support this mechanism and the TVAR evi-
dence obtained using these test results are in line with the theoretical model results,
further strengthening the relevance of the proposed mechanism.
1.2 Empirical analysis
To establish the fact that business cycle co-movements are higher during recessions
than during expansions, I obtain quarterly data on GDP for the time span of Q1:1961
to Q4:2011 from the OECD’s Quarterly National Accounts database.2 Due to data
availability considerations, I restrict the analysis to 20 out of 34 OECD countries,
which I aggregate to the country groups EU-133, G7, NAFTA and Oceania. A list
of the countries included in these groups is given in section A.1 in the appendix.
All of the series are at constant 2005 prices (OECD reference year), seasonally
adjusted and converted to US dollar values. Furthermore, I also obtain annual
population data from the OECD.Stats database and normalize all observations of a
year by population to obtain per capita values and take logarithms of the series.4 To
assess the patterns in international co-movement in US recessions and expansions, I
calculate different measures of correlation and co-movement in the business cycles.
1.2.1 Disentangling expansions and recessions
Most of the empirical work on business cycle correlation during expansions and
recessions identify the US business cycle as a reference cycle for the analysis of co-
movement in recessions and expansions. Therefore, to identify recessions of the US
economy most authors in the literature use the NBER recession dates to disentangle
expansions and recessions. Because in this paper, I additionally investigate the
sources of asymmetries in business cycle correlations, I need a procedure that can
be applied to the empirical data as well as to the model generated data in the same
way. Therefore, to disentangle recessions and expansions, I use the turning point
algorithm developed by Harding and Pagan (2002). The algorithm identifies turning
points in the log-series of GDP. If a given observation is a maximum among the
previous and the following 2 observations, the algorithm identifies this observation
as a peak. Similarly, if a given observation is a minimum among the previous and
the following 2 observations, the algorithm identifies this observation as a trough.
Along the business cycle, expansions are defined as the time span between a trough
to a peak, while recessions are the time span between a peak to a trough. The
algorithm also performs validity check to ensure for instance that a trough is always
followed by a peak and vice versa. To see how the algorithm compares to the NBER
recession dates, table 1.1 shows the recession dates identified by the turning point
algorithm, as well as the NBER recession dates.
2I also obtain annual data for the same time period from the Annual National Accounts database
to perform some illustrations and robustness checks.
3Greece and Ireland had to be excluded from the EU-15 because of data availability.
4Since population data is only available at annual frequency and GDP data is quarterly, I use
linear interpolation to obtain population size for the quarters within a given year.
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Table 1.1 – Recession periods in the US, 1961-2011
NBER recessions TP recessions
Q1:1961
Q2:1962 - Q4:1964
Q2:1966 - Q4:1967
Q4:1969 - Q4:1970 Q2:1969 - Q4:1970
Q4:1973 - Q1:1975 Q3:1973 - Q1:1975
Q2:1976 - Q4:1976
Q1:1980 - Q3:1980 Q1:1979 - Q3:1980
Q3:1981 - Q4:1982 Q2:1981 - Q4:1982
Q4:1985 - Q1:1987
Q3:1990 - Q1:1991 Q2:1990 - Q4:1991
Q1:1993 - Q3:1993
Q1:1995 - Q1:1996
Q1:2001 - Q4:2001 Q3:2000 - Q1:2003
Q4:2005 - Q1:2006
Q4:2007 - Q2:2009 Q1:2008 - Q2:2009
The algorithm matches the dates and lengths of the NBER dated recessions well.
At the same time it identifies more recession periods than the dating comittee at
NBER. Most likely, these episodes are downturns that the NBER did not find severe
enough to term them recessions, but they do fulfill the dating criteria of the turning
point algorithm.5
1.2.2 Conditional Correlations
First, I calculate correlations of GDP growth rates between the identified country
blocks, as well as the individual G7 countries, conditional on the US being in an
expansionary or recession period. I also test the difference between correlation
coefficients using a Fisher r-z-transformation of the coefficients.6 The results are
shown in table 1.2. All the correlations within the country groups increase in US
recessions compared to expansions. This is true for recessions identified by both
NBER and the TP algorithm. These correlation differences are highly significant for
the EU-13 and the G7, mainly because there are more countries in these groups and
thus the sample size is larger. Moreover, the differences for expansions and recessions
identified by the TP algorithm tend to be more significant since the number of
expansion and recession (114 vs. 89) periods is more balanced than using the NBER
dates (169 vs. 35).7 Also for the individual countries in the G7 group all correlation
5To check robustness I increased the time span to identify peaks and troughs from ±2 periods
around a given observation to ±3 and ±4. Although, the identified recession episodes tend to get
shorter, the number of identified peaks and troughs does not change. Since ±2 is the number of
periods used by Harding and Pagan (2002) and this specification cover the NBER recession dates
best, I use this specification.
6This is necessary as correlation coefficients are defined on [−1, 1], while the test statistic on
the difference between coefficients is defined on (−∞,+∞).
7The balance of observations is not a driver of the observed differences, in a robustness exercise
I calculated the same measures for the same number of high growth periods (boom), as there are
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Table 1.2 – Conditional Correlations - GDP Q1:1961 - Q4:2011
NBER TP
Country Exp Contr C > E Exp Contr C > E
Individual G7
Canada 0.2910 0.4007 Yes 0.2795 0.4279 Yes
France 0.0332 0.3729 Yes* -0.0256 0.4270 Yes***
Germany 0.1244 0.2923 Yes 0.0026 0.2336 Yes
Italy 0.0031 0.2704 Yes 0.0935 0.3206 Yes*
Japan 0.1111 0.3705 Yes 0.1165 0.4382 Yes**
UK 0.0797 0.4580 Yes** 0.0742 0.4276 Yes***
Observations 169 35 114 89
Country Blocks
EU 13 0.1370 0.3805 Yes*** 0.1318 0.3871 Yes***
G7 0.2346 0.4521 Yes*** 0.2201 0.4678 Yes***
NAFTA 0.4552 0.5655 Yes 0.4209 0.5471 Yes
Oceania 0.3701 0.4620 Yes 0.3802 0.4458 Yes
Observations C*169 C*35 C*114 C*89
Average
All 20 0.1177 0.3413 0.2236*** 0.1096 0.3562 0.2466***
p-value (2s) 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 20*169 20*35 20*114 20*89
∗ ∗ ∗,∗∗ and ∗, indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, p < 0.1, respectively. The table shows cross-country
correlations of GDP growth rates between the given country or country block and the US during
expansions (Exp) and contractions (Contr). Expansions and contractions are found using the
NBER recession dates in the NBER columns and the Harding and Pagan (2002) turning point
algorithm in the TP columns. The columns titled C > E indicate if the correlation coefficient is
higher during contractions compared to expansions. For the country blocks, C is the number of
countries within a given country block, excluding the US. For EU13 C = 13, for G7 C = 6, for
NAFTA C = 2 and for Oceania C = 2.
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Table 1.3 – Conditional Correlations - GDP Q1:1961 - Q4:2006
NBER TP
Country Exp Contr C > E Exp Contr C > E
Individual G7
Canada 0.2890 0.2873 No 0.2332 0.3394 Yes
France 0.0263 0.2462 Yes -0.0562 0.3222 Yes***
Germany 0.1413 0.1134 No 0.0154 0.1140 Yes
Italy -0.0199 0.1669 Yes 0.0239 0.1905 Yes
Japan 0.0871 0.1946 Yes 0.0683 0.3172 Yes*
UK 0.0534 0.3791 Yes -0.0127 0.3187 Yes**
Observations 155 28 99 83
Country Blocks
EU 13 0.1267 0.2592 Yes** 0.0994 0.2775 Yes***
G7 0.2253 0.3411 Yes 0.1817 0.3717 Yes***
NAFTA 0.4595 0.4539 No 0.4107 0.4728 Yes
Oceania 0.3658 0.4660 Yes 0.3672 0.4338 Yes
Observations C*155 C*28 C*99 C*83
Average
All 20 0.1099 0.2145 0.1046** 0.0809 0.2516 0.1707***
p-value (2s) 0.0215 0.0000
Observations 20*155 20*28 20*99 20*83
∗ ∗ ∗,∗∗ and ∗, indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, p < 0.1, respectively. The table shows cross-country
correlations of GDP growth rates between the given country or country block and the US during
expansions (Exp) and contractions (Contr). Expansions and contractions are found using the
NBER recession dates in the NBER columns and the Harding and Pagan (2002) turning point
algorithm in the TP columns. The columns titled C > E indicate if the correlation coefficient is
higher during contractions compared to expansions. For the country blocks, C is the number of
countries within a given country block, excluding the US. For EU13 C = 13, for G7 C = 6, for
NAFTA C = 2 and for Oceania C = 2.
coefficients are larger in recessions compared to expansions. Calculating the average
correlation difference between all countries in the sample with the US during the
identified US business cycle states, I find differences of 22.4 percentage points using
the NBER recession dates and 24.7 percentage points using the TP algorithm. Both
of them are significantly different from zero at the 1% confidence level. As it is very
likely that the global recession of 2007-2009 has a large impact on the cross-country
correlations in recessions and expansions in the time period investigated here, I do
the same calculations as above, excluding the years 2007-2011 from the sample. The
results are shown in table 1.3. As expected, the differences decrease in general, but
overall correlations in recessions are still significantly higher than in expansions. For
the individual G7 countries this result is reversed for Canada and Germany when
recessions are identified by NBER dates, while for the country blocks it is reversed
for the NAFTA using NBER dates. For the other countries and country blocks the
main effect keeps its direction. Over the whole sample the average correlation are
10.5 percentage points higher during NBER dates and 17.1 percentage points higher
recession periods in the sample. Results do not change considerably.
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during TP recessions. Both are significantly different from zero at least at the 5%
confidence level.
1.2.3 Yetman Synchronization
The literature has also proposed alternatives to correlation measures. For instance
co-movement measures, i.e. indicators if business cycles are in the same phase, have
been proposed (see for instance Yetman (2011) or de Haan et al. (2007)). Here, I am
concentrating on a measure proposed by Yetman (2011). The co-movement measure
of Yetman (2011) is defined as the product of z-scores of annual GDP growth rates,
i.e
ρijt = zitzjt (1.1)
where
zit =
(yit − y¯i)√
1
T−1
∑T
t=1(yit − y¯i)2
(1.2)
and y are GDP growth rates. The z-score normalization thus ensures that positive
co-movement is indicated if both countries are growing above or below their mean
growth rate and negative co-movement is indicated if one country grows above its
mean growth rate while the other grows below its mean growth rate. Despite the
degree of freedom adjustment used in calculating the Yetman measure, the time av-
erage across co-movements corresponds to the uncorrected correlations. Thus, the
average Yetman measure is very similar to the correlations above. Therefore, I do
not state the results here explicitly. The advantage of the co-movement measure is
that it can be calculated at each point in time. Concentrating on the co-movement
between the European aggregate and the US, and using annual data for illustra-
tive purposes8, I follow Yetman (2011) and regress the co-movement measure of 13
European countries with the US reference cycle on country fixed effects and time
dummies such that the coefficients of the time dummies indicate an average estima-
tor of European co-movement with the US reference cycle at a given point in time
and the standard deviations of these estimators indicate their significant difference
from zero. Figure 1.1 shows that significantly positive spikes in the co-movement
measure in most cases coincide with the NBER recession dates of the US economy,
while co-movement is moderately positive the remaining time.
1.2.4 Average correlations of country pairs in US recessions
So far, the focus has only been on correlations of the countries and country blocks in
the sample with the US economy during US recessions. Now, I look at the average
cross-country GDP correlations of all these countries with each other during US
recession periods. To obtain a clear picture of the state-dependent correlations
in recessions and expansions of all country-pairs on average, table 1.4 shows the
average correlations across all country-pairs for both considered time spans, as well
as both recession identification methods. It shows that cross-country correlations
8Observations on the measure calculated with quarterly data is too frequent to create a nice
and clear plot.
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Figure 1.1 – Yetman synchronization - GDP 1972 - 2011
across all countries are significantly higher during US recessions compared to US
expansions. It also shows that the cross-correlations have increased due to the recent
global financial crisis, but that the most conservative measure still indicates that
cross-country correlations increased by at least 5.44 percentage points during US
recessions compared to US expansions if we exclude this recent crisis. In fact though,
the difference in correlations might have been as high as 22.7 percentage points,
if the recent financial crisis is considered a part of the underlying data generating
process of the global economy. Given the findings in this section, it is crucial that we
understand what might be driving differences in observed cross-country correlations
during expansions and contractions. In the following section, I propose a mechanism
which can account for these observed differences.
1.3 Theoretical Analysis
Why do we observe that business cycle co-movements are significantly higher during
recessions compared to expansions and what are the consequences of this fact on
the decisions of economic agents and policy-making? These questions have to the
best of my knowledge not been investigated in the literature. An understanding
of these differences is important because agents that anticipate systematic differ-
ences in economic outcomes across the business cycle will adapt their economic
decisions to these differences. The standard international real business cycle model
(IRBC), i.e. the workhorse model with which economist model economic decisions
in international macroeconomics, cannot generate asymmetries between countries
by construction. It is typically solved using linear perturbations around its deter-
ministic steady state. Policy recommendations drawn by economists who base their
conclusions on linear models when in fact important non-linearities are present in
the data might be misled. In this theoretical section, I am building a framework in
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Table 1.4 – Correlations of country pairs
NBER TP
1961-2011
Country Exp Contr Diff Exp Contr Diff
Avg. Correlation 0.1910 0.3973 0.2270*** 0.1994 0.3389 0.1535***
P-Value 0.0000 0.0000
Obs. 210*169 210*35 210*114 210*89
1961-2006
Avg. Correlation 0.1862 0.2479 0.0679*** 0.1901 0.2395 0.0544***
P-Value 0.0000 0.0000
Obs. 210*155 210*28 210*99 210*83
∗ ∗ ∗,∗∗ and ∗, indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, p < 0.1, respectively. The table shows cross-country
correlations of GDP growth rates between all 20 countries during US expansions (Exp) and US
contractions (Contr). Expansions and contractions are found using the NBER recession dates in
the NBER columns and the Harding and Pagan (2002) turning point algorithm in the TP
columns. The columns titled ’Diff’ give the difference in correlation coefficient calculated for
expansions and contractions. The results are calculated for the full sample of Q1:1961 to Q4:2011,
as well as for a subsample from Q1:1961 to Q4:2006 which excludes the recent financial crisis.
which country-specific shocks and their spill-overs to other countries endogenously
lead to higher cross-country co-movements in recessions compared to expansions.
For this purpose, I am introducing a friction in the form of an occasionally binding
capacity utilization constraint in an otherwise standard 2-country, 2-goods large-
open economy model (e.g. Heathcote and Perri, 2002). To solve the model, I use
the solution algorithm for models with occasionally binding constraints developed
by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015), which is able to capture non-linearities arising
from the occasionally binding constraints. For the model to match the observed
asymmetries well, I choose to target the most conservative measure obtained by the
empirical analysis. Therefore, the targeted difference in line with the data is the
increase of 5.44 percentage points between expansions and recessions obtained by
applying the TP algorithm on data excluding the global financial crisis. This num-
ber is also broadly in line with the findings of Antonakakis and Scharler (2012). I
will show that the model produces systematically higher cross-country correlations
in contractions compared to expansions. In order to match the targeted magnitude,
tradable intermediate goods have to be complements to a certain degree.
1.4 International Model with Occasionally Bind-
ing Capacity Constraints
The model economy consists of Home country (1) and Foreign country (2). Despite
the occasionally binding capacity constraint it follows the exposition of Heathcote
and Perri (2002). Within these countries there is an identical measure of infinitely
lived households. Moreover, in each country, there exists a representative producer of
a final consumption good and a representative producer of intermediate goods. The
intermediate goods can be traded internationally, Foreign and Home intermediate
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goods are imperfect substitutes in the production process of the final good. Final
goods can only be invested or consumed in the country they are produced in. The
model economy experiences a random event st ∈ S every period t. S is a possibly
infinite set of states of the world. The history of events up to and including date t
is given by st. At date 0 Π(st) denotes he probability that any particular history st
has realized up to t. Households choose to supply capital and labor to intermediate-
good-producing firms (i-firms). These firms are perfectly competitive. It is assumed
that households’ labor as well as their capital cannot be exchanged internationally,
i.e. it is internationally immobile. The capital stock ki(s
t) of each country i is
owned by that country’s households at any point in time t. Moreover, they choose
the intensity with which firms can operate the households’ machines. Households
can only save in an international uncontingent bond and therefore financial markets
are incomplete. Households in each country obtain their utility from consumption,
ci(s
t), and leisure 1−ni(st). In the definition of leisure, ni(st) is the amount of labor
supplied and total period time endowment is fixed at 1.
1.4.1 The maximization problems of the agents
In each country i = 1, 2 there is a representative final good producer, an intermediate
good producer and a representative household.
Intermediate good firms
The intermediate good firms produce country i’s intermediate good. They are
termed a for country 1 and b for country 2. For the production process they hire
labor and rent capital from the households, which own all the resources of the econ-
omy. Intermediate good firms operate a Cobb-Douglas production technology
F (zi(s
t), ki(s
t), ni(s
t), ui(s
t)) = ezi(s
t)
(
ui(s
t)ki(s
t)
)θ
ni(s
t)1−θ (1.3)
where zi(s
t) is an exogenous technology shock. The rental on capital and the wage
rate in country i are given by wi(s
t) and ri(s
t). They are denoted in terms of
country i’s intermediate good. after history st, the static maximization problem an
intermediate firm in country i is
maxki(st),ni(st){F (zi(st), ki(st), ni(st), ui(st))− wi(st)ni(st)− ri(st)ui(st)ki(st)}
subject to ki(s
t), ni(s
t) ≥ 0. (1.4)
Final good firms
Investment adds to country i’s capital stock as follows:
ki(s
t+1) =
[
1− δ(ui(st))
]
ki(s
t) + xi(s
t). (1.5)
Here, δ(ui(s
t)) is the depreciation rate, which depends on the degree of capital
utilization in this model, and xi(s
t) is country i’s investment in terms of final goods.
16 Moritz A. Roth Chapter 1
Three Essays in International Macroeconomics
Final goods are produced using intermediate goods a and b as inputs. They operate
a constant returns to scale technology and are perfectly competitive:
Gi(ai(s
t), bi(s
t)) =
{
[ω1ai(s
t)
σ−1
σ + (1− ω1)bi(st)σ−1σ ] σσ−1 if i = 1,
[(1− ω1)ai(st)σ−1σ + ω1bi(st)σ−1σ ] σσ−1 if i = 2.
(1.6)
The elasticity of substitution between goods a and b is σ and ω1 > 0.5 denotes the
home bias in the production of domestic final goods. The maximation problem of
country i final good firm’s after history st is
maxai(st),bi(st){G(ai(st), bi(st))− qai (st)ai(st)− qbi (st)bi(st)}
subject to ai(s
t), bi(s
t) ≥ 0 (1.7)
for i = 1, 2. qai (s
t) and qbi (s
t) denote the country i prices of intermediary goods a
and b in units of country i’s final good.
Households
The per-period utility for the country i household after history st is given by the
standard Cobb-Douglas utility function introduced by Heathcote and Perri (2002):
U
[
ci(s
t), 1− ni(st)
]
=
1
γ
[
ci(s
t)µ(1− ni(st))1−µ
]γ
. (1.8)
The budget constraints of households in country i is denoted in terms of the final
good produced in country i, where i = 1, 2. For the representative Home household
this budget constraint is given by
c1(s
t) + x1(s
t) + qa1(s
t)Q(st)B1(s
t) +
φ
2
k1(s
t)
[
x1(s
t)
k1(st)
− δ(u1(st))
]2
= qa1(s
t)
(
w1(s
t)n1(s
t) + u1(s
t)r1(s
t)k1(s
t
)
+ qa1(s
t)
(
B1(s
t−1)− Φ(B1(st))
)
. (1.9)
For the representative Foreign household it is
c2(s
t) + x2(s
t) + qa2(s
t)Q(st)B2(s
t) +
φ
2
k2(s
t)
[
x2(s
t)
k2(st)
− δ(u2(st))
]2
= qb2(s
t)
(
w2(s
t)n2(s
t) + u2(s
t)r2(s
t)k2(s
t
)
+ qa2(s
t)
(
B2(s
t−1)− Φ(B2(st))
)
. (1.10)
Here, ci(s
t) denotes consumption and xi(s
t) is investment in country i. Both are
denominated in i’s final good. The holdings of the international bond Bi(s
t) are
denoted in terms of the Home intermediate good a. The wage rate wi(s
t) and the
rental rate ri(s
t) are denoted in country i’s final good. ni(s
t) is the amount of labor
supplied by the household to intermediate firms and ki(s
t) is the amount of capital
rent out to intermediate firms. ui(s
t) is the rate of capital utilization. Intermediate
firms pay the rental rate for each unit of effective capital ui(s
t)ki(s
t) in their use.
Φ() is a small adjustment cost on bond holdings that ensures the determinancy of
the international bond positions as for instance in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003).
The functional form of the depreciation function is assumed to be
δ(ui(s
t)) = δui(s
t)η. (1.11)
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I assume that there is an upper bound on capital utilization. The upper bound
is motivated by fact that machines cannot be used over their capacity of 100%.
Therefore it holds that
ui(s
t) ≤ 1. (1.12)
The maximization problem of the representative country i household is
maxci(st),ni(st),xi(st),ki(st+1),Bi(st),ui(st)
∞∑
t=0
βt
∑
st
U
[
ci(s
t), 1− ni(st)
]
(1.13)
subject to the budget constraint (1.9) or (1.10) for country 1 or 2, the respective law
of motion for capital (1.5) as well as the occasionally binding capacity utilization
constraint (1.12).
1.4.2 Equilibrium Conditions
The first-order optimality conditions for the households and firms are obtained from
the agents’ maximization problems outlined above. They are given in the Techni-
cal Appendix. Next, I define the stochastic disturbances and the market clearing
conditions.
1.4.3 Market Clearing Conditions
The bond market clearing condition states that the international bond is in zero net
supply:
B1(s
t) +B2(s
t) = 0. (1.14)
For the intermediate good market the supply has to be equal to demand from Home
and Foreign:
a1(s
t) + a2(s
t) = ez1(s
t)
(
u1(s
t)k1(s
t)
)θ
n1(s
t)1−θ = y1(st) (1.15)
b1(s
t) + b2(s
t) = ez2(s
t)
(
u2(s
t)k2(s
t)
)θ
n2(s
t)1−θ = y2(st). (1.16)
For the final good market consumption and investment demand from households
has to be equal to the supply of the final good within a given country (as final goods
are not internationally traded):
ci(s
t) + xi(s
t) = Gi(ai(s
t), bi(s
t)) (1.17)
for i = 1, 2.
1.4.4 Exogenous process
The vector of shocks z(st) = [z1(s
t), z2(s
t)] follows the law of motion
z(st) = Az(at−1) + (st) (1.18)
with A being a 2×2-matrix and (st) being a 2×1-vector of independently distributed
random variables with variance-covariance matrix Σ.
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1.4.5 Equilibrium
The equilibrium of the model is given by a set of policy functions for the Home
household c1(s
t), n1(s
t), x1(s
t), k1(s
t+1), u1(s
t), B1(s
t), and the same policy functions
for the Foreign household c2(s
t), n2(s
t), x2(s
t), k2(s
t+1), u2(s
t), B2(s
t), obtained from
the households’ first-order conditions, a set of choice functions of the Home and
Foreign intermediary and final good firms a1(s
t), a2(s
t), b1(s
t), b2(s
t), G1(s
t), G2(s
t),
y1(s
t), y2(s
t), and pricesQ(st), r1(s
t), r2(s
t), w1(s
t), w2(s
t), qa1(s
t), qa2(s
t), qb1(s
t), qb2(s
t),
such that, given the realizations of the random disturbances z1(s
t), z2(s
t) and the
Lagrange multipliers on the occasionally binding constraints λ1(s
t), λ2(s
t),
1. goods markets for intermediary and final goods clear,
2. factor markets for labor and capital clear,
3. the international bond market clears.
1.5 Solution Method
I am using the algorithm developed by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) (the ’OccBin’
toolkit) to solve the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with
occasionally binding constraints. In essence the solution algorithm relies on the
fact that a model including an occasionally binding constraint can be represented
by a model with different regimes. The model under investigation is log-linearized
around the same point of approximation under each of these regimes. The algorithm
combines the information about which regime prevails for the model economy in a
given state and the dynamics within as well as across these regimes. In this way
a model with occasionally binding constraints can be solved and simulated. As
Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) point out it is important that the algorithm does
not only result in the model switching from one linear regime to another. Rather,
the anticipation effects of when a certain regime prevails and for how long it is
expected to prevail can create high degrees of non-linearity. In the following I briefly
describe how the algorithm works. In principle it implements a piecewise-linear
approximation to the agents’ policy rules. Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) describe
the algorithm mostly for an example with one occasionally binding constraint. Since
in an international model there are two identical countries, the model investigated
here has two occasionally binding constraints. A model with two constraints has
four regimes, one in which both constraints are slack, two in which one constraint
binds and the other one is slack, and one in which both constraints bind. Under
each of these regimes the model is log-linearized around its non-stochastic steady
state. Following the notation of Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015), the regime that
prevails at the steady state is called ’reference regime’ or (M1), the other regimes
are called ’alternative regimes’ or (M2), (M3) and (M4). Which combination of
the constraints bind or are slack at the reference regime does not matter for the
algorithm. But two conditions have to be satisfied in order for the algorithm to be
applicable:
1. The Blanchard and Kahn (1980) conditions for the existence of a rational
expectation solution have to be fulfilled in the reference regime (not necessarily
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in the alternative regimes), and
2. the model has to return to the reference regime in a finite number of periods
in case a shock moves it to one of the alternative regimes and agents expect
no further shocks to occur.
Closely following Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015), but extending their description to
a model with two constraints, I will now define the piecewise-linear solution of such
a model. The occasionally binding constraints are denoted g1(EtXt+1, Xt, Xt−1) ≤ 0
and g2(EtXt+1, Xt, Xt−1) ≤ 0. Assuming that under the reference regime neither of
them binds (M1) can be written
A11EtXt+1 +B11Xt + C11Xt−1 + E11t = 0, (1.19)
where X is n × 1 vector of all the endogenous variables in the model; Et is the
conditional expectations operator; A11, B11, C11 are n × n matrices of structural
parameters for the linearized model equations;  is a size m× 1 vector of zero mean
i.i.d. shocks and E11 is a m × n matrix of structural parameters. When g1 binds
and g2 is slack, we can write (M2) as
A21EtXt+1 +B21Xt + C21Xt−1 +D21 + E21t = 0, (1.20)
where the notation is analogous to the one in (M1), with the addition that the n×1
column vector D21 of structural parameters enters the system of equations because
the linearization is taken around an approximation point in which (M1) applies.
Similarly, regimes (M3) and (M4) are defined as
A12EtXt+1 +B12Xt + C12Xt−1 +D12 + E12t = 0 (1.21)
and
A22EtXt+1 +B22Xt + C22Xt−1 +D22 + E22t = 0, (1.22)
where the notation is again analogous to the regimes above. Definition 1 (Guer-
rieri and Iacoviello (2015)). A solution of a model with two occasionally binding
constraints is a function f : Xt−1 × t → Xt such that the conditions under system
(M1),(M2),(M3) or (M4) apply, depending on whether the occasionally binding
constraints g1(EtXt+1, Xt, Xt−1) ≤ 0 and/or g2(EtXt+1, Xt, Xt−1) ≤ 0 bind or are
slack. I refer to the paper by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) for a detailed descrip-
tion of the algorithm and to the OccBin toolkit for the codes to implement the
solution procedure.
1.6 Results
1.6.1 Calibration
I am calibrating the model to produce quarterly simulated data. Therefore, I choose
a discount factor of β = 0.99. Relative risk aversion is set to the standard value
1− γ = 2. The capital share in intermediate good production is set to θ = 0.36 and
the consumption share in utility is µ = 0.34, which are also standard values in the
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Table 1.5 – Calibration
Parameter Description Value
β discount rate 0.99
Φ maximum utilization rate 1
θ capital share 0.36
ω home bias in production of final goods 0.7
σ substitution elasticity in final good production 0.5
1− γ relative risk aversion 2
µ consumption share in utility 0.34
δ depreciation parameter 0.025
η depreciation parameter 1.42
φ bond adjustment costs 0.0005
φk investment adjustment costs 0.5
literature. The depreciation rate is governed by two parameter, a standard linear
component which I set to δ = 0.025, as well as the component varying with capacity
utilization which I set to η = 1.42. The maximum capacity utilization is given by
100% which is indicated by Φ = 1. The parameter for the small bond adjustment
costs and capital adjustment costs are set to standard values. This calibration
largely follows Heathcote and Perri (2002). Other than Heathcote and Perri (2002),
I choose shock processes that are not correlated in order to clearly see the spillover
effects of uncorrelated shocks in the model. Furthermore, I choose a home bias in
consumption parameter of ω = 0.7 in order to show the functioning of the model
more clearly, as this is an important channel of international correlations in the
model. For, the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign intermediate
goods in the production of final good, I choose a value of σ = 0.5 which I take from
Corsetti et al. (2005, 2008). I also perform a robustness check with the value chosen
by Heathcote and Perri (2002) of σ = 0.9. Estimated values for σ vary quite a bit
in the literature. While Taylor (1993) estimates a value of σ = 0.39 for the US,
Whalley (1984) estimates a value of σ = 1.5. Thus, the chosen value are well in
range with the data. The benchmark parameter values are summarized in Table 1.5.
With these parameters, the steady state utilization of capital is 97.3%. Therefore,
I assume that producers in the absence of shocks, use their machines to less than
their maximum capacity of 100%. The occasionally binding constraint on capital
utilization invokes that there is a physical limit such that machines cannot be utilized
more than their full capacity. In my model, as a result of shocks the economy can be
driven into situations in which the constraint binds and producers cannot increase
utilization to a level that would be optimal in the absence of the constraint. In the
next sections, I investigate the consequences of this physical bound on the symmetry
of business cycles and the cross-correlations of international business cycles created
by the model.
1.6.2 Disentangling expansions and recessions
Since I am foremost interested in whether my model can replicate the asymmetry
of business cycle correlations between expansions and recessions, I need to find a
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Figure 1.2 – Simulations
reasonable way of disentangling business cycle phases from the simulated model
data. For comparability I use the exact same approach on the simulated data as I
applied to the empirical data in section 1.2.
1.6.3 Simulations
To investigate the cross-country correlations of GDP and other macroeconomic vari-
ables I run 1000 simulations of 1400 periods each. I am dropping the first 1000
periods of each simulation, such that the simulation results are not influenced by
the initial conditions. Therefore, in essence the simulation simulates 1000 world
economies consisting of two countries for 100 years. Both countries’ random dis-
turbances are assumed to have a persistence parameter of ρ = 0.95 and a standard
deviation of σe = 0.02 For illustration purposes I plot series of the 400 valid periods
out of the last simulation for the calibration using σ = 0.5.
Figure 1.2 shows the simulations of GDP, capital utilization and the Lagrange pa-
rameter on the occasionally binding constraint for Home on the left-hand and Foreign
on the right-hand side. The dashed line gives the simulations of the unconstrained
model and the solid line shows the simulations with the constraint imposed. Notice
that GDP in booms is decreased in comparison to the unrestricted model due to the
binding capacity constraints. This creates a negative skewness of GDP of the two
individual countries. Another important point is that the constraints on capacity
utilization do not bind necessarily at the same time. For this example simulation
the constraint for both countries bind most of the time for the first 50 periods, but
after that it is only Foreign for which the constraint binds a substantial amount of
time between periods 200 and 300. Moreover, one can see that the correlation of
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GDP is high for both countries, but the effect of the constraint on cross-country
correlations is hard to interpret in this figure.
1.6.4 International Correlations
Now, I first turn to the simulation moments in recessions and expansions overall
in the unconstrained model, as well as in a model in which the constraint is oc-
casionally binding. In table 1.6 I summarize the correlations calculated from the
simulated data using the benchmark calibration in recessions and expansions. Re-
cession and expansion episodes are determined using the turning point algorithm by
Harding and Pagan (2002) and the cyclical component of the HP filter GDP data
being positive or negative. The first two rows show the correlations between the
economies in the unconstrained symmetric model. The first row shows the results
using the turning point (TP) algorithm. The difference if Home is in recession is
positive and significant at the 5% level, but very small. If Foreign is in a recession
the correlation is small and not significantly different from zero. The second row
shows the same numbers obtained by applying the HP filter. The correlations if
Home or Foreign are in recession are small and not significantly different from zero
at the 10% level. The third and fourth rows show the results in the constrained
model. The third row shows the correlations obtained using the TP algorithm. The
difference between correlations in Home contractions (0.7780) and Home expansions
(0.7400) amounts to 3.8 percentage points and is statistically significantly different
from zero at the 1% confidence level. A similar difference holds for Foreign expan-
sions and recessions. In the fourth columns, the same numbers are calculated for
the HP cyclical component. Here the difference between correlations during Home
contractions (0.8333) and Home expansions (0.7419) amounts to 9.14 percentage
points and is significant at the 1% confidence level. Again a similar difference holds
for Foreign contractions and Foreign expansions. Now, I turn to the correlation re-
sults for calibrations with an elasticity of substitution bewteen intermediary goods
of σ = 0.9. They are given in table 1.7. The differences decrease when the elastic-
ity of substitution is increased. The numbers for the unconstrained model are not
significantly different from zero. The difference between correlations in Home con-
tractions (0.6346) and Home expansions (0.6267) calculated with the TP algorithm
amounts to 0.8 percentage points and is statistically significantly different from zero
at the 1% confidence level. A similar difference holds for Foreign expansions and
recessions. Also the difference calculated with the HP filter gives a similar difference
and levels of correlations. With in-between values of σ the obtained differences are
between the two calibrations above. The model is able to replicate a difference in
cross-country correlations of around 4 percentage points for the benchmark calibra-
tion of σ = 0.5. This is at the lower end of the calibration range and means that
international intermediary goods have to have a certain degree of complementarity
in order to make international correlations higher in recessions than in expansions.
For a higher degree of substitutability producers are more flexible in their choice of
inputs, output is not depressed as much and spillovers are more symmetric.
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Table 1.6 – Conditional Correlations from the Model - GDP
Home Foreign
Contr Exp Contr Exp
Unconstrained TP 0.8784 0.8743 0.8779 0.8757
Difference 0.0040** 0.0022
P-Value 0.0138 0.1884
Unconstrained HP 0.8988 0.8984 0.8984 0.8981
Difference 0.0005 0.0004
P-Value 0.7193 0.7971
Constrained TP 0.7780 0.7400 0.7758 0.7414
Difference 0.0380*** 0.0344***
P-Value 0.0000 0.0000
Constrained HP 0.8333 0.7419 0.8338 0.7410
Difference 0.0914*** 0.0928***
P-Value 0.0000 0.0000
∗ ∗ ∗,∗∗ and ∗, indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, p < 0.1, respectively. The table shows cross-country
correlations of GDP growth rates between Home and Foreign produced by simulations of the
model. The ’Home’ column shows the results for contractions (Contr) and expansions (Exp)
determined using the Home GDP series. The ’Foreign’ column shows the same results using the
Foreign GDP series. Expansions and contractions are found using the Harding and Pagan (2002)
turning point algorithm in the rows indicating ’TP’ and using the HP-filtered GDP data being
below or above trend in the rows indicating ’HP’. The first two rows give the results for the
unconstrained symmetric model, while the last two rows show the results for the model in which
the constraint is invoked.
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Table 1.7 – Conditional Correlations from the Model - GDP
Home Foreign
Contr Exp Contr Exp
Unconstrained TP 0.6413 0.6391 0.6407 0.6394
Difference 0.0023 0.0014
P-Value 0.2932 0.5253
Unconstrained HP 0.6857 0.6847 0.6853 0.6849
Difference 0.0010 0.0004
P-Value 0.6054 0.8279
Constrained TP 0.6346 0.6267 0.6349 0.6266
Difference 0.0079*** 0.0083***
P-Value 0.0003 0.0001
Constrained HP 0.6801 0.6689 0.6795 0.6695
Difference 0.0112*** 0.0100***
P-Value 0.0000 0.0000
∗ ∗ ∗,∗∗ and ∗, indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, p < 0.1, respectively. The table shows cross-country
correlations of GDP growth rates between Home and Foreign produced by simulations of the
model. The ’Home’ column shows the results for contractions (Contr) and expansions (Exp)
determined using the Home GDP series. The ’Foreign’ column shows the same results using the
Foreign GDP series. Expansions and contractions are found using the Harding and Pagan (2002)
turning point algorithm in the rows indicating ’TP’ and using the HP-filtered GDP data being
below or above trend in the rows indicating ’HP’. The first two rows give the results for the
unconstrained symmetric model, while the last two rows show the results for the model in which
the constraint is invoked.
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Figure 1.3 – Impulse responses - 1 std benchmark
1.6.5 Impulse responses
To understand how the investigated mechanism works to create asymmetry, I com-
pare the impulse response functions to shocks of different magnitudes. The shocks
are chosen to have a standard deviation of σe = 0.02. In this section, I compare im-
pulse response functions to positive and negative shocks to Home TFP, while holding
Foreign TFP constant. Figure 1.3 shows the responses of GDP, capital utilization
and the Lagrange multiplier on the occasionally binding constraint for a 1 standard
deviation shock to Home TFP for Home variables on the left-hand side, as well as
Foreign variables on the right-hand side. This is for the benchmark calibration.
For a one standard deviation shock, the occasionally binding constraints are not
violated, thus the IRFs for positive and negative shocks are perfectly symmetric
and the Lagrange multipliers remain at zero. Furthermore, note that there are
spillover effects of a shock to the Home country to the Foreign country due to
trade linkages. The assumed value for the substitution elasticity imply that the one
standard deviation shock to Home leads to an increase in Home GDP by nearly 1.5%,
while Foreign GDP increases by 2%. Therefore, the low elasticity of substitution
implies that the Home shock has a larger effect on the Foreign country’s GDP than
on Home GDP. For the robustness check of σ = 0.9 this result is reversed. As can be
seen in figure 1.4, the Home TFP shock has a larger effect in Home than in Foreign.
Still, as the constraints are not violated, the responses are completely symmetric for
a positive and a negative shock to Home TFP.
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Figure 1.4 – Impulse responses - 1 std σ = 0.9
Next, I want to show a case that illustrates the workings of the model when the
constraint is violated. Therefore, in figure 1.5 I show the same response picture for
a five standard deviations shock to Home GDP. This is a very large shock that in
practice will happen very rarely. Keep in mind that during the model simulations
both countries are hit by a variety of shocks and that the constraint might become
binding after several small shocks hit the economy. From the simulations we saw
that the constraint binds a considerable number of periods for Home as well as
Foreign. To concentrate on the effects of a single shock to the Home economy, I
assume a large shock to make the workings of the constraint obvious. Technically
the constraint starts to bind for the Foreign economy for a two standard deviation
shock, but the effects only become visible for a larger shock as the one shown.
In figure 1.5, as the Lagrange multipliers are different from zero, the constraints
bind for both countries when the shock hits, but only for the Foreign country the
constraint binds longer than one period. The most important point of having this
large shock is that the asymmetry in spillovers between positive and negative shocks
becomes visible. In the response plots for GDP in Home and Foreign one can see that
the drop in GDP is larger for a negative shock than the increase in GDP for a positive
shock of the same size. This is true for the response of Home GDP to the Home
TFP shock, as well as for the spillover of this shock to Foreign GDP. Therefore, the
model can indeed create asymmetric international spillovers, i.e. Home recessions
have larger effects on Foreign GDP than Home expansions. Note that the response
of Foreign GDP to a Home TFP shock is larger than on Home GDP. As I will show
with empirical impulse responses from the VAR evidence in the next section, for a
US TFP shock, it is not uncommon that the responses of smaller other countries to a
US TFP shock are relatively larger than on US variables themselves. For robustness,
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Figure 1.5 – Impulse responses - 5 std benchmark
in figure 1.6 I show the same plot for the σ = 0.9 calibration.
Here we can see that the shocks to Home TFP spills over less than in the σ = 0.5
benchmark case. Furthermore, the difference in the responses of GDP to a posi-
tive and a negative shock are not as high as in the benchmark calibration, which
contributes to the finding that the differences in correlations are not as high as in
the benchmark calibration. Overall, the impulse response analysis shows that the
model can create asymmetric spillovers and as I showed with the simulations, these
asymmetric spillovers result in state-dependent cross-country correlations that can
match the observed differences in the data if I assume a sufficient amount of com-
plementarity between internationally tradable intermediary goods. Therefore, my
empirical as well as theoretical findings show that we might miss a lot of interesting
features of the world, if we do not take into account asymmetries in international
RBC models.
1.7 VAR Evidence
After having shown that occasionally binding capacity constraints are capable of
producing business cycle asymmetry and asymmetric international spillovers for suf-
ficient complementarity between intermediary goods, in this section I motivate this
channel empirically. The empirical equivalent of a regime switch due to occasionally
binding constraints are threshold effects in a given time series. Therefore, the as-
sumption of occasionally binding constraints on capacity utilization at the aggregate
production level to explain state-dependent cross country GDP correlations can be
justified by the existence of threshold effects in capacity utilization giving rise to
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Figure 1.6 – Impulse responses - 5 std σ = 0.9
business cycle asymmetries. In this section, I investigate the empirical evidence on
the presence of threshold effects in the capacity utilization rate of the US economy.
Moreover, the consequences threshold effects within the US economy have on each
of the remaining six G7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and UK)
are explored. A complication is that the utilization series for Japan is indexed and
set to 100 in Q1:2010, therefore it is not directly comparable with the other series
which are given as percentage of total production capacity. The analysis proceeds
as follows. In a first step, I test for threshold effects in US capacity utilization using
Hansen (2000)’s threshold test. In a second step, I use the threshold estimates from
Hansen’s test as informative priors for the estimation of a reduced-form threshold
vector autoregressive (TVAR) model. Finally, using short-run zero restrictions, I
identify a US TFP shock and track the impact it has on US capacity utilization, US
GDP, as well as Foreign9 capacity utilization and Foreign GDP.
1.7.1 Data
The GDP series and capacity utilization series are gathered using Thomson Reuters
Datastream from various national and international organizations (see table A.2
in appendix). All series are transformed to be seasonally adjusted using the X13
Census filter in EVIEWS and the GDP series are at constant 2010 prices and per
capita, if not provided in this way. The US TFP series is from of Fernald (2012). The
capacity utilization series for all investigated countries despite Japan represents the
percentage utilization of all available production capacities across all industries. The
data availability for each country is limited by the introduction data of a capacity
utilization variable in both the respective country and the US. For the US a quarterly
9Foreign refers to each of the remaining G7 countries on a rotating basis.
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capacity utilization measure is available from Q1:1967, so this is the earliest possible
data point for the international VAR estimation.10 For the UK a capacity utilization
measure is only available from Q1:1985 onward and thus US-UK country pair has
the least observations available for the estimation and testing procedures. The latest
data point available for France, Germany and Italy is Q4:2015, while for Canada
it is Q3:2015 and for the UK it is Q2:2015. For the VAR estimation I work with
mean adjusted utilization levels to make the series fluctuate around zero. Moreover,
I work with year-over-year GDP growth rates and also the TFP data of Fernald
(2012) is provided in year-over-year growth rates. The hypothesis of stationarity in
a standard VAR the same specifications as used in the threshold VAR later cannot
be rejected for any country pair.11 Therefore, no further adjustments to transform
the variables to stationarity are necessary.
1.7.2 Hansen Threshold test
The threshold test is based on a regression of lagged dependent variables Xt−d on
the independent variable Yt. The independent variable in the regressions considered
here is the US GDP growth rate, while the X’s include 6 lags of first differences in US
GDP and Foreign GDP, as well as the level of US capacity utilization and Foreign
capacity utilization. The test allows for heteroscedastic residuals and is based on
1000 draws with a trimming value of 0.2 for all countries. I test for threshold effects
in each of the included lags of US capacity utilization. The results are shown in
table 1.8.
A first observation from the table is that with the varying availability of the capacity
utilization series, even for the US the mean utilization rate varies for each country
pair, though without large deviations from 80%. Moreover, the mean utilization
rates vary across countries in a range of 75% to 84%. The results of the Hansen
threshold test show that there are significant threshold effects in US capacity uti-
lization that determine the behavior of the US GDP series in all specifications. For
Canada there are significant differences in the effects of US capacity utilization on
US GDP depending on whether US capacity utilization was more than 1.449 per-
centage points above its mean four quarters ago or 2.386 percentage points above
its mean 6 quarters earlier. The specifications for France, Germany and Italy all
show significant threshold effects in US capacity utilization with shorter delays. Ger-
many and Italy have significant effects at delays of one, two and three quarters. For
Germany they occur if the US utilization rate was 0.092 percentage points below
its mean one quarter earlier, 1.308 percentage points above its mean two quarters
ago or 0.808 percentage points above mean three quarters before. For the specifi-
cation using Italian time series the US utilization rate had to be 0.886 percentage
points above its mean one quarter earlier, 2.394 percentage points above its mean
two quarters before or 0.290 percentage points below its mean three quarters ago
for significant threshold effects to show. For Japan and the UK, significantly dif-
ferent effects occur at shorter lags (1 or 2), as well as longer lags (5 or 6). For
10Although for instance for Germany a measure is available from Q1:1960 onward.
11These test have been conducted using the standard unit root tests in EVIEWS.
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Table 1.8 – Hansen (2000)’s threshold test - US utilization, mean adjusted - 6 Lags,
1000 draws
Dep.Var: US GDP
Threshold US-CAN US-FRA US-GER US-ITA US-JPY US-UK
Variable (adj.lvl) (adj.lvl) (adj.lvl) (adj.lvl) (adj.index) (adj.lvl)
uUSt−1 0.886 -2.484** -0.092** 0.886** 0.074 1.683***
p-Value (0.327) (0.028) (0.023) (0.028) (0.223) (0.008)
uUSt−2 2.067 -1.555** 1.308* 2.394* 0.235* 1.746***
p-Value (0.237) (0.046) (0.096) (0.085) (0.059) (0.005)
uUSt−3 1.648 -0.326** 0.808** -0.290** 0.137 -1.180
p-Value (0.287) (0.043) (0.027) (0.020) (0.105) (0.298)
uUSt−4 1.449** -0.222* 1.308 2.422 2.640* -1.028
p-Value (0.029) (0.052) (0.221) (0.136) (0.078) (0.170)
uUSt−5 1.058 -2.636 0.808 2.649 -0.617 0.840*
p-Value (0.417) (0.397) (0.149) (0.211) (0.224) (0.081)
uUSt−6 2.386* -3.363 1.208 -1.025 0.513*** 1.748**
p-Value (0.080) (0.448) (0.447) (0.282) (0.011) (0.025)
Avg u US 80.34 79.65 80.46 80.21 80.24 79.51
Avg u FOR 81.17 84.33 83.64 75.05 112.08 80.80
Observations 189 156 190 184 187 122
∗ ∗ ∗,∗∗ and ∗, indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, p < 0.1, respectively. The specification always include
six lags of US TFP, US GDP, US utilization, Foreign utilization and Foreign GDP.
the specification using UK data, the US capacity utilization rate needed to be at
least 1.683 percentage points above its mean one quarter earlier, 1.746 percentage
points above its mean two quarters earlier, 0.84 percentage points above its mean
5 quarters ago or 1.748 percentage points above its mean 6 quarters ago in order
to reveal significantly different effects in the explanation of US GDP across the two
identified regimes. For the specification including Japanese data the interpretation
of Japanese variables is different as the utilization series for Japan is given as an
index set to 100 in Q1:2010. Because in this section, I estimate threshold effects in
US capacity utilization, the interpretation of the above results is the same as for the
other country pairs. For the US-Japan country pair there are significant threshold
effects if US capacity utilization was at least 0.235 percentage points above its mean
two quarters before, 2.64 percentage points above its mean 4 quarters ago or 0.513
percentage points above its mean 6 quarters earlier. While for Canada, Germany,
Italy, Japan and the UK most threshold effects occur if the US utilization rate was
above mean in the past, for France all significant threshold effects occur if the US
utilization rate was below mean. There are significant threshold effects for the spec-
ification using French time series data, when US capacity utilization was between
2.484 percentage points below its mean one quarter earlier and 0.222 percentage
points below its mean 4 quarters before. This indicates that for France threshold
effects rather show when US utilization was low in the past, compared to the other
countries examined for which they show when US capacity utilization was high in
the recent past. If I find that in the high utilization regime GDP responses of the
US and the rest of the G7 countries to a positive US TFP shock are dampened in
comparison to US and Foreign GDP responses to a negative US TFP shock in the
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low utilization regime, I find that for five out of six country pairs there is statistical
evidence of capacity utilization constraints being present when production capacities
are already used to a high degree.12 This is exactly what I investigate in the next
section using the estimated thresholds from Hansen’s test as informative priors in
the estimation of a Bayesian T-VAR.
1.7.3 Bayesian Threshold VAR
In this section, I investigate the effects of the presence of the above threshold effect
on the transmission of a US TFP shock through the US economy and to the other
four countries investigated here, with a special interest in the asymmetries that
can arise within the US economy and how they spill over internationally. For this
purpose, I estimate a Bayesian vector autoregression (VAR) that can account for
the presence of different regime depending on if a certain threshold variable is below
or above an estimated threshold value. Therefore, this type of model is called a
(Bayesian) threshold vector autoregression model (T-VAR model).
Theory
With at least 2 regimes and at least 2 lags the threshold VAR models estimated in
this paper are highly parameterized. To improve inference using these models com-
bined with the limited data availability of macroeconomic time series, it is common
in the literature to estimate unrestricted VAR models by Bayesian methods. To
obtain impulse response functions, short run zero-restrictions are imposed on the
responses of the variables included in the VAR. The usage of Bayesian techniques
in a setting like this allows the inclusion of prior information on the parameters to
be estimated in a natural way and therefore improves the inference in these mod-
els. For estimation of this type of model prior distributions for all parts of the
econometric model that are treated as exogenous have to be assumed. A systematic
way to do this for an underlying structural VAR model is to use natural conjugate
priors for which the prior, the likelihood and the posterior have the same distri-
butional form. This assumption allows the implementation of the dummy variable
approach to elicit priors for structural VARs following Sims and Zha (1998) and
Banbura et al. (2010). The posterior distributions of these exogenous model param-
eters are derived from the prior distributions and the model’s Bayes factor. To be
able to obtain the posterior distributions and do inference on the model’s parame-
ters some prior specifications require the use of simulation based techniques, such as
Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) procedures. These MCMC procedures create
a Markov chain converging to a chain of drawings from the posterior distribution
and thus allow the researcher to draw inference from posteriors that are analytically
intractable. Frequently used procedures to create such converging Markov chains
are the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm or the Gibbs sampler. The procedures I use
to estimate the threshold VAR follow the algorithm of Chen and Lee (1995), as
used by Alessandri and Mumtaz (2013).13 This procedure uses the Gibbs sampler
12As the analysis uses aggregate data, the economies operate well below full utilization even in
the strongest boom periods they barely exceed 90%.
13Their codes are available under https://sites.google.com/site/hmumtaz77/code
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to create the Markov chain from which drawings from the approximate posterior
distributions are obtained. The threshold VAR is given by:
Yt =
[
c1 +
p∑
j=1
A1,jYt−j + 1,t
]
St +
[
c2 +
p∑
j=1
A2,jYt−j + 2,t
]
(1− St) , (1.23)
with i,t N(0,Ωi) and St = 1 ⇐⇒ Y1,t−d ≥ Z for t = 1, ..., T . Yt is the N × 1
vector of endogenous variables, which includes the first differences of US total factor
productivity (TFP), the level of US capacity utilization and US GDP growth rates
for all presented specifications and on a rotating basis the level of Foreign capacity
utilization and the first difference of Foreign GDP. Here, Foreign represents each of
the G7 countries excluding the US in turn. ci, Ai and Ωi are a constant term, the
VAR-coefficient matrix and the variance-covariance matrix of the iid disturbance
term t for the two regimes i = 1, 2, respectively. These three matrices for the
two VAR regimes contain all but two of the parameters of the TVAR. The other
two are the threshold Z and the threshold delay d. The two latter parameters are
unobserved and thus have to be estimated. For each period, the threshold variable
Z determines the prevalent regime. Because I obtained estimates of the threshold
value of US capacity utilization for each country pair, I use this estimated value as
initial value as priors for Z.
Parameters of Bayesian Estimation
To implement the Bayesian Threshold VAR estimation parameters regarding the
prior distributions on the model parameters and the number of draws, as well as
the simulation horizon for the impulse response functions have to be set. I am using
the mean of the significant threshold estimates of Hansen (2000)’s test for threshold
effects as mean of the conjugate prior distribution on the threshold in US capacity
utilization Z for each country pair. The variance of the prior distribution of the
threshold parameter is set at σ2 = 0.5 for all country pairs. This assumption and
the assumptions on other estimation parameters are summarized in table 1.9. This
parameterization is in line with standard values chosen in the literature. In this
calibration I set the prior tightness parameter λP = 0.5, which is slightly looser
than for instance the parameterization of Alessandri and Mumtaz (2013), while the
values of the prior tightness on the sum of coefficients and the constant term are set
according to those in Alessandri and Mumtaz (2013). As the threshold estimates
from the Hansen test conducted above give a statistical indication of the threshold
value in the data, I choose the variance on the threshold value to be 0.5.
1.7.4 Impulse Responses
I am now using the threshold estimates of Hansen (2000)’s test for threshold effects
as priors and a Bayesian vector autoregression allowing for threshold effect (TVAR)
for the US and the rest of the G7 country pairs. The following figures show the
impulse responses for a positive standardized US total factor productivity shock
initialized at the mean levels of each variable. The standard deviation of the shock
is set to 0.1 and the investigated shock are a positive two standard deviation shock
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Table 1.9 – Bayesian TVAR - Parameters
Parameter Description Value Posterior Value
Prior Threshold Z Canada 1.9174 3.5772
France −1.1467 −2.3768
Germany 0.6747 3.9950
Italy 0.9967 4.3436
Japan 1.1293 −0.4056
UK 1.2552 3.9329
σ2 Variance on threshold 0.5
Reps Simulation replications 20500
Drop Disregarded initial draws 20000
λP Prior tightness 0.5
τP Prior tightness on sum of coefficients 10 ∗ λP
P prior tightness on constant 1/10000
d Maximum lag in threshold 2
scalein Prior random walk variance 0.01
scaleex Standard deviation of simulated shock [−0.1; 0.1]
horzir Horizon IRF 40
The utilization series for Japan is indexed and set to 100 in Q1:2010, therefore it is not directly
comparable with the other series given in percentage of total capacity.
triggering the high utilization regime and a negative 2 standard deviation shock
triggering the low utilization regime. The identification procedure is a standard
Cholesky zero restriction identification scheme building on the assumption that a
TFP shock contemporaneously affects all other variables in the VAR (they are first
in the variable ordering), while shocks to the other variables in the VAR are not
affecting US TFP contemporaneously.
US responses to a US TFP shock
The US variables are included in the specification for each country pair. For brevity,
I concentrate on the responses of these variables obtained from the US-Canada
specification which are shown in figure 1.7.14 Despite for the case of France, the
responses are similar and the following interpretation is valid. 15
The figure shows that in responses to a positive US TFP shock (dotted lines with
lighter confidence bands), US capacity utilization and US GDP growth increase,
while they decrease in response to a negative TFP shock (dashed lines with darker
confidence bands). Furthermore, in comparison with a negative TFP shock hitting
the economy at the mean of all the specified variables, i.e. a shock that does not
trigger a regime switch, the responses for the positive shock are lower. Thus, I find
evidence that positive TFP shocks have lower effects on US capacity utilization and
14The responses obtained from the other country pair specifications can be found in the appendix.
15For France the results indicate that a regime switch is triggered when a negative shock hits
the economy, as the impulse responses are initialized at the mean levels of each variable and the
threshold estimate is lower than the mean for France.
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Figure 1.7 – US - Canada impulse response functions - US variables
US GDP growth than negative TFP shocks of the same magnitude, if one accounts
for the estimated threshold effects in US capacity utilization. I interpret this as an
occasional inability to adjust capacity utilization beyond a certain degree within a
given period. This is the motivation to investigate the international transmission of
TFP shocks in a model with occasionally binding constraints on capacity utilization
in the theoretical section of this paper.
International responses to a US TFP shock
US - Canada
For the case of the US-Canada example the threshold estimation within the Bayesian
VAR procedure suggests a mean threshold on US capacity utilization of 83.92 percent
instead of 82.26 percent, as estimated by the threshold test above. Figure 1.8 shows
the responses of Canadian capacity utilization and Canadian GDP growth to a US
TFP shock.
Similarly to the domestic US responses, the Canadian responses show that there
are positive international spillover effects to a positive US TFP shock on Canadian
capacity utilization and Canadian GDP growth (dotted lines), while there are neg-
ative international spillover effects on the same variables in response to a negative
TFP shock (dashed lines). The comparison between the responses to positive and
negative US TFP shocks provide evidence that negative US TFP shocks have higher
international spillover effects to the Canadian economy compared to a positive US
TFP shock. Therefore, spillovers show the same asymmetry that is present in the
responses to US TFP shock in the US economy. Moreover, the responses to Cana-
dian GDP and capacity utilization are only slightly smaller in magnitude than the
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Figure 1.8 – US - Canada impulse response functions - Canada variables
responses to the US variables themselves, indicating that spillovers of a US TFP
shock are almost as high as the domestic effects on the US themselves. This, fact
was also present in the theoretical model responses for the benchmark calibration
and supports the model assumption of a intertemporal elasticity of substitution be-
tween intermediary goods of σ = 0.5, which was a crucial assumption for creating
asymmetric business cycle correlations in the theoretical model. I also find this fact
confirmed for the US-Germany specification below.
US - Germany
For Germany the prior threshold estimate is at 81.13 percent, while the Posterior
threshold estimate has a mean of 84.45.
Similarly to the international spillovers of a US TFP shock to Canada, the German
responses show that there are positive international spillover effects to a positive
US TFP shock on German capacity utilization and German GDP growth (dotted
lines), while there negative international spillover effects on the same variables in
response to a negative TFP shock (dashed lines). The comparison between the
responses to positive and negative US TFP shocks provide evidence that negative
US TFP shocks have higher international spillover effects to the German economy
compared to a positive US TFP shock. Therefore, also for Germany spillovers show
the same asymmetry that is present in the responses to US TFP shock in the US
economy. In this specification, astonishingly, the responses to German GDP and
capacity utilization are larger in magnitude than the responses to the US variables
themselves (compare to figure in the Appendix), indicating that spillovers of a US
TFP shock are relatively higher as the domestic effects on the US themselves. Again,
this supports the benchmark calibration of the theoretical model.
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Figure 1.9 – US - Germany impulse response functions - German variables
US - Italy
For Italy the prior threshold estimate is at 81.13 percent, while the Posterior thresh-
old estimate has a mean of 84.45.
Figure 1.10 – US - Italy impulse response functions - Italian variables
As expected, the differences in the response of the utilization rate and GDP go
in the same direction as for Canada or Germany. The utilization rate changes
less after a positive TFP shock in the US in the high utilization regime, than in
the low utilization regime. At the same time, GDP growth increases by more.
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Responses for Italy are slightly smaller in magnitude than for the US variables
themselves, not directly supporting the theoretical benchmark calibration but still
showing substantial asymmetry.
US - UK
Hansen’s threshold estimate for the UK is 82.05 percent and the posterior mean is
84.73 percent.
Figure 1.11 – US - UK impulse response functions - UK variables
The overall pattern of the US-UK responses is similar to the ones investigated above.
Similar to Italian responses, the responses for the UK are slightly smaller in mag-
nitude compared to the US responses to a US TFP shock. I omit the responses of
France and Japan here, they can be found in the appendix. For France, this is the
case because the threshold estimates indicate a regime switch below average values
of US capacity utilization. For Japan, the responses are not directly comparable to
those of the other countries as utilization is given as an index instead of being given
as percentage of total production capacity.
1.7.5 Summary of VAR evidence
The above analysis provides evidence that for five out of six country pairs, threshold
effects in the US capacity utilization rate cause asymmetric responses to a US GDP
shock both within the US economy and internationally. For these country pairs
the data supports a positive threshold in the utilization rate, i.e. in booms when
utilization is high the response to a US TFP shocks is dampened. The explanation of
this phenomenon that I highlight in this paper is that in US booms, more and more
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individual producers hit a capacity utilization constrained where their machines
work at their maximum production capacity and producers take time to expand their
capacities. In this way the full potential of a positive TFP shock cannot transmit into
production and thus dampens both the national and international shock responses,
while a negative shock is fully transmitted into the production process, decreasing
the utilization of existing machines. For France there is evidence that the threshold
effect is below mean utilization. Note that the asymmetry in responses still goes in
the same direction, i.e. the response to a positive shock is dampened in comparison
to a negative shock. Therefore, the asymmetry in cross-country GDP correlations
between France and the US in recessions and expansions can be explained using
capacity constraints, but the fact that these capacity constraints are identified below
mean utilization may be explained by additional channels being at work dominating
the utilization channel. I leave this to further research.
1.8 Conclusion
In this paper I show that cross country correlations of GDP increase during recessions
compared to expansions and that this phenomenon can in part be explained in a real
business cycle model with occasionally binding capacity constraints. Intuitively, the
constraints cause asymmetries in the business cycles of individual countries, which
spill over to other countries. Thus, spill-overs of negative shocks are higher than
spill-overs of positive shocks, thereby causing the same correlation pattern as in the
data. To match the magnitude of the correlation differences in the observed data
I assume a value for the elasticity of substitution between tradable intermediate
goods suggesting that they are to a certain degree complementary. I successfully
test the presence of capacity constraints as a mechanism which leads to business cycle
asymmetries empirically using data from the G7 advanced economies in a Bayesian
threshold autoregressive model. This finding does not only support capacity con-
straints as a prominent transmission channel of cross-country GDP asymmetries in
recession compared to expansions, it also supports the benchmark calibration of
the theoretical model with intermediary goods being complementary to a certain
degree. So far the exact consequences of asymmetric cross-country correlations for
the international economy and policy choices remain largely unexplored. Exploring
the consequences on agents’ choices and policy recommendations is an interesting
avenue for future research.
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Chapter 2
Foreign Direct Investment and the
Equity Home Bias Puzzle
joint with Sven Blank1 and Mathias Hoffmann23
2.1 Introduction
How does the degree of internationalization of a country’s firms influence the equity
investment choices of its households, and how does it affect the widely observed
equity home bias? Focusing on an individual household, investing in an internation-
ally active domestic firm is more attractive than investing in a firm that is solely
domestically active. The reason is that the revenue stream of internationally active
firms is less prone to country-specific economic conditions and thus provides a higher
diversification benefit. Note that this argument only involves portfolio diversifica-
tion through holding equities of different types of domestic firms, neglecting the
possibility of obtaining portfolio diversification by holding equity of foreign firms.
Most economic work on international portfolio choice and its empirical patterns ex-
clusively focuses on the latter portfolio diversification motive and disregards indirect
diversification through internationally active domestic firms. In this paper, we give
a more diverse picture of different internationalization strategies for firms and their
implications for the optimal portfolio choice of households. The internationaliza-
tion strategies we model are exporting an foreign direct investment (FDI). They
are fundamentally different in the sense that a firm serving foreign markets through
exporting only sustains all of its production facilities in its country of residence,
while a firm serving the foreign market through FDI sets up production plants in
the foreign countries it serves. An FDI firm thus becomes directly prone to the eco-
nomic conditions in the countries it serves, while an export firm is only indirectly
prone to these conditions through the foreign countries’ demand for its domestically
produced products. In modelling different internationalization strategies we are es-
1Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre, Frankfurt am Main, Germany
2Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre, Frankfurt am Main, Germany
3The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those
of the Deutsche Bundesbank or its staff.
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pecially interested in the consequences these different strategies have for the equity
home bias. It is a well established empirical fact that individuals all over the world
hold large fractions of their wealth in assets of their own country (see table 2.1 for
evidence on selected countries). Parts of the literature on the home equity bias re-
gard this observation as an indication that households might not diversify optimally
(e.g. Baxter and Jermann (1997)), others try to rationalize the observation through
specific economic channels (e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001), Heathcote and Perri
(2013)).
Table 2.1 – Equity Home Bias in 2008
Country Domestic market in % Share of portfolio in Degree of Equity
of world market capitalization domestic equity in % Home Bias (EHBi)
Australia 1.8 76.1 0.76
Brazil 1.6 98.6 0.99
China 7.8 99.2 0.99
Canada 2.7 80.2 0.80
Euro Area 13.5 56.7 0.50
Japan 8.9 73.5 0.71
South Africa 1.4 87.8 0.88
South Korea 1.4 88.5 0.88
Sweden 0.7 43.6 0.43
Switzerland 2.3 50.9 0.50
United Kingdom 5.1 54.5 0.52
United States 32.6 77.2 0.66
EHBi = 1− Share of Foreign Equities in Country i Equity Holdings
Share of Foreign Equities in the World Market Portfolio
(2.1)
Source: Coeurdacier and Rey (2013)
In this paper, the possibility to obtain international diversification indirectly by in-
vesting in domestic multinational firms allows us to take an in-between position. On
the one hand, we provide an explanation for why it might be optimal for agents to
bias their equity holdings towards domestic firms, instead of diversifying their equity
holding internationally. On the other hand, we argue that the empirical measure of
home bias is underestimating the true international diversification of households as
it does not take into account indirect diversification through internationally active
firms. Empirically, Cai and Warnock (2012) show the relevance of this channel for
the US. They find that indirect diversification accounts for approximately 25% of
the US equity home bias. Our contribution is that we investigate the effects of inter-
nationalization strategies on optimal portfolio choice of households in a theoretical
framework which enables us to shed light on the mechanisms at work for different
internationalization strategies. Namely, we investigate the effects of introducing the
possibility for firms to either tap foreign markets by exporting their products or by
setting up foreign affiliates through foreign direct investment (FDI). We find that,
due to the higher production diversification possibilities in the model with FDI, the
average domestic firm is indeed less prone to country-specific shocks, giving a better
hedge against these shocks than in a model with international trade only. Thus,
given a standard calibration the home bias in optimal portfolio positions is higher
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if we allow for FDI. Our work builds upon two strands of the literature. First, the
literature on the home equity bias puzzle that started with Lucas (1982). Second,
the literature on international trade with heterogeneous firms building on Melitz
(2003). Lucas (1982) investigates a two-country endowment economy with a single
consumption good in which both countries are hit by independently and identical
distributed dividend shocks. Perfect risk-sharing in this economy is achieved if all
agents hold a percentage of their wealth in the stock of a given country which is equal
to the relative size of its market capitalization.4 The fact that empirical evidence
suggests that agents hold a substantially higher share in domestic equity constitutes
the original equity home bias puzzle and can be interpreted as evidence for a lack
of international diversification. Since then, numerous attempts have been made to
explain or rationalize this empirical finding. The second substantial contribution to
the literature has been made by Baxter and Jermann (1997). Essentially, they add
labor income to Lucas’ one-good model and find that in order to hedge against labor
income risk it is optimal for agents to short home equity and to take up large long po-
sitions in foreign equity. Thus in their model the discrepancy between theoretically
optimal and observed diversification is even higher than in Lucas (1982), indicating
that the international diversification puzzle is even worse than previously thought. A
third fundamental contribution is Heathcote and Perri (2013) who investigate a two
good production economy with labor and capital income and find that a standard
international macroeconomic model building on Backus et al. (1992) can rationalize
the equity home bias to a large extent. This is because in their framework domestic
equity is a good hedge against labor income risk. An extensive review of the home
bias literature is given in Coeurdacier and Rey (2013). The second relevant strand
of literature on which this paper builds on is the workhorse model of international
trade with heterogeneous firms by Melitz (2003), and its extension by Ghironi and
Melitz (2005) who investigate macroeconomic fluctuations with heterogeneous firms.
The main feature of these models is that they include endogenous selection into in-
ternational trade and can therefore replicate the observed differences in firm-specific
productivity between exporters and non-exporters. In these papers, firms have an
individual and heterogeneous productivity which they draw from an exogenously
given Pareto-distribution. If firms are productive enough they are able to afford
the fixed costs to enter foreign markets as well as the shipping costs to export their
product to these markets. Helpman et al. (2004) extend the Melitz (2003) model
by the possibility for firms to serve the foreign market by horizontal FDI. Foreign
affiliates are costly to set up, operate with the firm-specific productivity of their
parent firm, but hire local production factors in the host economy. In line with the
empirical evidence only the most productive firms engage in FDI. Contessi (2010)
incorporates horizontal FDI in the model of Ghironi and Melitz (2005) to investigate
its implications for macroeconomic fluctuations. To investigate the impact of FDI
activity on international asset positions, we extend the Ghironi and Melitz (2005)
model by FDI, international bonds, as well as international equity holdings. The in-
troduction of horizontal foreign direct investment follows the style of Helpman et al.
(2004) and Contessi (2010). Hamano (2015) investigates the hedging of variety risk
in a Ghironi and Melitz (2005) type economy with international bond and equity
markets. His paper is our orientation point for the asset structure in our model.
We contribute to both strands of the literature. By introducing horizontal FDI in
4In Lucas (1982) there are two symmetric countries, thus 50-50 portfolios are optimal.
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a model of heterogeneous firms and international portfolio choice we are able to
thoroughly investigate the real link between different internationalization strategies
of firms and the portfolio decisions of households. This theoretical foundation al-
lows us to evaluate how the measure of the home equity bias should be adjusted to
account for non-diversified vs. diversified investments.
2.2 The model
The model consists of two countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F). If not stated other-
wise, foreign variables are indicated by an asterisk. First, we turn to the households’
optimization problems in section 2.2.1, before we have a detailed look at the struc-
ture of the firms’ sector in section 2.2.2.
2.2.1 Households
The representative households in Home maximizes its expected stream of utility
from consumption Ct and labor Lt,
Et
∞∑
s=t
βs−tUt(Ct, Lt), (2.2)
where the utility function takes the CRRA form
Ut(Ct, Lt) =
C1−γt
1− γ − χ
L
1+ 1
ϕ
t
1 + 1
ϕ
(2.3)
with the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ(≤ 1). χ(> 0) represents the dis-utility
of supplying labor Lt(∈ [0, 1]) and ϕ(≥ 0) is the Frisch elasticity of supplying labor.5
βt is the endogenous discount factor and evolves as follows
βt+1 = βtΥ(Ct) , with β0 = 1. (2.4)
The functional form of Υ(Ct) is
Υ(Ct) = β¯C
−ν
t (2.5)
where 0 ≤ ν < γ and 0 < β¯C−ν < 1. Including an endogenous discount factor
with Υ′(Ct) < 0 guarantees the stationarity of the model including net foreign asset
dynamics as pointed out by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003). Ct is assumed to be a
nested CES aggregator of goods that are produced domestically by home firms CH,t,
imported goods that are produced abroad by Foreign firms CX,t and goods that are
domestically produced by affiliates of Foreign firms CI,t:
Ct = [α
1
ω
1 C
1− 1
ω
H,t + α
1
ω
2 C
1− 1
ω
X,t + (1− α1 − α2)
1
ωC
1− 1
ω
I,t ]
1
1− 1ω . (2.6)
5With ϕ = ∞ marginal disutility of labor is constant at χ. With ϕ = 0 it becomes infinite
and labor supply becomes inelastic. Following Hamano (2015) in the calibration disutility will be
increasing in the labor supplied.
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In this definition, the α’s give different weights to the three distinct good categories,
i.e. home produced goods, imported goods and goods produced in the domestic
economy by affiliates of foreign firms. The nested CES structure is commonly used
in international macroeconomic models with portfolio choice, since it gives a natural
notion of home bias in consumption (see for instance Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001)
and van Wincoop and Warnock (2010)). Because in these models there are only
domestically produced and imported goods the weights represent the home bias in
consumption directly. In the case of FDI, there are three types of goods entering
the aggregator. To be able to interpret the weights in a similar way as in a two good
model, one has to assume that FDI goods are interpreted by agents either as domes-
tic or foreign goods. In the calibration later on, we will assume that FDI goods are
treated as domestic goods by the households. The implicit assumption that house-
holds care more about where a good is produced than about the origin of the firm
producing the good seems the more realistic one to us. Thus, in our model (1−α2)
is a measure of the home bias in consumption. To complete the nested preference
structure over the consumption goods, CH,t, CX,t and CI,t are themselves consump-
tion baskets of varieties within the classified categories of domestic, imported and
FDI goods. They are defined as
CH,t = VH,t
(∫
ζ∈Ω
cD,t(ζ)
1− 1
σ dζ
) 1
1− 1σ
,
CX,t = V
∗
X,t
(∫
ϑ∈Ω
cX,t(ϑ)
1− 1
σ dϑ
) 1
1− 1σ
,
CI,t = V
∗
I,t
(∫
ϕ∈Ω
cI,t(ϕ)
1− 1
σ dϕ
) 1
1− 1σ
,
where VH,t ≡ Nψ−
1
σ−1
D,t , V
∗
X,t ≡ N
∗ψ− 1
σ−1
X,t and V
∗
I,t ≡ N
∗ψ− 1
σ−1
I,t introduce a love of
variety following Benassy (1996). ND,t, N
∗
X,t andN
∗
I,t denote the number of domestic,
imported and FDI goods that are available in the Home economy.
Optimal consumption and price indices
From the nested CES demand structure, the optimal consumption of domestic,
imported and FDI baskets, as well as individual varieties, that are produced domes-
tically by domestic firms, imported from foreign firms and produced domestically
by affiliates of foreign firms can be derived as
CH,t =
(
PH,t
Pt
)−ω
α1Ct,
CX,t =
(
PX,t
Pt
)−ω
α2Ct,
CI,t =
(
PI,t
Pt
)−ω
(1− α1 − α2)Ct
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cD,t(ζ) = V
σ−1
H,t
(
pD,t(ζ)
PH,t
)−σ
CH,t,
cX,t(ϑ) = V
∗σ−1
X,t
(
p∗X,t(ϑ)
PX,t
)−σ
CX,t,
cI,t(ϕ) = V
∗σ−1
I,t
(
p∗I,t(ϕ)
PI,t
)−σ
CI,t.
p∗X,t(ϑ) denotes the price of exported goods from foreign and p
∗
I,t is the price domestic
affiliates of foreign firms charge in the domestic market, both are denominated in
Home currency. Price indices are given by
Pt =
[
α1P
1−ω
H,t + α2P
1−ω
X,t + (1− α1 − α2)P 1−ωI,t
] 1
1−ω ,
PH,t =
1
VH,t
(∫
ζ∈Ωt
pD,t(ζ)
1−σdζ
) 1
1−σ
,
PX,t =
1
V ∗X,t
(∫
ϑ∈Ωt
p∗X,t(ϑ)
1−σdϑ
) 1
1−σ
,
PI,t =
1
V ∗I,t
(∫
ϕ∈Ωt
p∗I,t(ϕ)
1−σdϕ
) 1
1−σ
.
Because the price indices are defined on a welfare basis, they fluctuate with changes
in the extensive margin. The impact of extensive margins in price indices is greater,
the higher the love for variety, ψ. Following Hamano (2015) we define the welfare-
based consumer price index, Pt, as numeraire for the Home economy. Therefore,
real prices are defined as
%H,t ≡ PH,t
Pt
,
%X,t ≡ PX,t
Pt
,
%I,t ≡ PI,t
Pt
,
ρD,t(ζ) ≡ pD,t(ζ)
Pt
,
ρ∗X,t(ϑ) ≡
p∗X,t(ϑ)
Pt
, and
ρ∗I,t(ϕ) ≡
p∗I,t(ϕ)
Pt
.
Similar expressions hold for foreign.
2.2.2 Firms
In the Home country, as well as in the Foreign country there is a continuum of firms.
Each firm produces a unique variety of the consumption good with labor being the
only production input. Firms are heterogeneous with respect to their individual
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idiosyncratic labor productivity level z. Furthermore, firms’ labor productivity is
dependent on an aggregate country-specific component Zt.
6
Entry into and exit from production
Every period there is a mass of new entrants NE,t. New entrants are ex-ante identical
and face an entry cost fE,t in terms of effective labor. In terms of domestic consump-
tion these costs are
wtfE,t
ZE,t
, where ZE,t denotes the aggregate labor productivity level
in the entry sector. Firms finance these entry costs by issuing equity on the interna-
tional financial markets. Upon entering, firms draw their idiosyncratic productivity
z from a distribution G(z) with support [zmin,∞). Once drawn, this idiosyncratic
productivity remains constant over the firm’s lifetime. There is a time-to-build lag,
as firms only start producing one period after their entry decision. As there are no
fixed costs of production, all firms that enter produce in any subsequent period until
they are hit by an exit shock. This exit shock can occur every period with a fixed
probability of δ and is independent of the idiosyncratic productivity parameter. The
timing is such that the exit shock only hits at the very end of a given period, i.e.
after the new entrants have decided to enter. This has two implications. First, a
fraction δ of the new entrants will be forced to exit before they can actually start
producing. The Home economy’s law of motion for the number of producing firms
in the current period is thus given by
ND,t = (1− δ)(ND,t−1 +NE,t−1). (2.7)
Second, households that invested in these entrants will immediately lose the value
of their investment. Because households cannot foresee which individual firms are
hit by the exogenous exit shock, it is optimal for them to hold the same amount
of shares in every potentially producing firm of a given country. Therefore, it is
without loss of generality to assume that all firms of a given country are owned by a
mutual fund in which the individual households can invest. On aggregate firms will
enter production as long as their expected profits from entering are at least zero.
Because the average expected profit of the ex-ante identical firms is equal to their
average share price v˜s, firms will enter until
v˜s =
wtfE,t
ZE,t
. (2.8)
For Foreign firms similar conditions hold.
Internationalization strategies
Firms can produce for the home market and engage in international activity, either
through exports or foreign direct investment (FDI). The two internationalization
strategies differ in their cost structures. Exporters produce their goods in their
domestic plants, using domestic resources. They face a fixed period-by-period entry
6For an individual firm, z and Zt affect its productivity independently of each other. Thus, for
instance the production of a domestic firm with individual productivity z for the domestic market
is yt = Ztzlt, where lt is the labor of this firm.
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cost to the foreign market fX,t, generally interpreted as a cost to set up and maintain
a distribution network for their products. Furthermore, export firms face an iceberg
type shipping cost τt ≥ 1. In contrast, FDI firms set up production plants or
affiliates in the foreign country and produce using foreign labor input. Setting up
and maintaining the foreign plant involves a period-by-period fixed cost fI,t which
is assumed to be higher than the exporting fixed cost fX,t. The reason is that these
firms incur the same costs of maintaining a distribution network in addition to the
costs of setting up their own plant. Therefore, on the one hand the fixed costs of
FDI are higher than those of exporting, but on the other hand producing abroad
saves FDI firms the variable shipping costs.
Production, pricing and profits
In order to evaluate whether or not it is useful for a firm with individual productivity
z to engage in exporting or FDI, the firm weighs the different types of costs against
the potential revenues these activities generate. To investigate the cost side it is
useful not to look only at the production functions of the different plants7, but also
at the number of goods the firm is able to supply to the consumers at Home and
Foreign for a given amount of hired labor. The latter differs from the former because
of potential shipping costs. For each unit of domestic labor input, a Home firm can
supply Ztz units of its unique variety to the domestic agents and
Ztz
τt
units to the
foreign agent. Furthermore, a foreign affiliate of a domestic firm can supply Z∗t z
units of the Home firm’s variety to the foreign agents for each unit of foreign labor
input. The total supply functions of a Home firm for each production type are given
by
yD,t(z) = ZtzlD,t(z) (2.9)
yX,t(z) =
Ztz
τt
lX,t(z) if firm z exports (2.10)
yI,t(z) = Z
∗
t zl
∗
I,t(z) if firm z has an affiliate in the foreign country. (2.11)
On the revenue side, firms are monopolistically competitive and face an individual
downward sloping demand function with constant elasticity σ in every market they
serve. This induces the following profit maximizing real prices, where prices are
denoted in terms of the destination country’s consumption good:
ρD,t(z) =
σ
σ − 1
wt
Ztz
(2.12)
ρX,t(z) =
τt
Qt
σ
σ − 1
wt
Ztz
if firm z exports (2.13)
ρI,t(z) =
σ
σ − 1
w∗t
Z∗t z
if firm z has an affiliate in the foreign country. (2.14)
Putting the revenue and cost sides together, we obtain the profits an individual
firm with productivity z can generate from producing for the domestic market, from
7Generally a Home firm’s production is Ztzlt for a good produced at Home and Z
∗
t zl
∗
t for goods
produced by a potential affiliate.
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producing for exporting and through its foreign affiliates, respectively. They are:
dD,t =
1
σ
N
ψ(ω−1)−1
D,t ρD,t(z)
1−ωα1Ct (2.15)
dX,t =
1
σ
QtN
ψ(ω−1)−1
X,t ρX,t(z)
1−ωα∗2C
∗
t −
wtfX,t
Zt
if firm z exports (2.16)
dI,t = Qt
[
1
σ
N
ψ(ω−1)−1
I,t ρI,t(z)
1−ω(1− α1 − α2)C∗t −
w∗t f
∗
I,t
Z∗t
]
if firm z engages in FDI.
(2.17)
In the profit equation for FDI firms f ∗I,t is the FDI entry cost to the foreign market
that the domestic firm has to pay. Total profits of a firm can be decomposed
into profits generated by domestic sales, exports and FDI activities. Thus dt(z) =
dD,t(z)+dX,t(z)+dI,t(z). All profits are denominated in terms of Home consumption
good. Similar equations apply to the foreign producers.
Firm averages
The heterogeneous firms and the variety they produce are completely characterized
by the firm specific average productivity levels. Defining a specific distribution from
which firms draw their individual labor productivity, we can define three distinct
average productivity levels: The average productivity of all firms that produce in
the Home economy z˜D, the average productivity of Home exporters z˜X,t and the
average productivity of Home FDI firms z˜I,t. Generally, they are given by
z˜D,t ≡
[∫ ∞
zmin
zσ−1dG(z)
] 1
σ−1
, z˜X,t ≡
[
1
G(zI,t)−G(zX,t)
∫ zI,t
zX,t
zσ−1dG(z)
] 1
σ−1
,
z˜I,t ≡
[
1
1−G(zI,t)
∫ ∞
zI,t
zσ−1dG(z)
] 1
σ−1
.
The variables zX,t and zI,t denote the productivity cutoff levels such that a given firm
with productivity z ≥ zX,t finds it profitable to export and a given firm with z ≥ zI,t
finds it profitable to engage in FDI. Due to the assumed cost structure it holds
that zI,t > zX,t, such that there is a direct mapping from the drawn productivity
to the production modes a firm engages in. The least productive firms only find
production for the domestic market profitable, firms with intermediate productivity
optimally serve the foreign market through exports and the firms with the highest
firm-specific productivity engage in FDI. The cutoff levels vary depending on the
economic situation in a given country and play a crucial role in the dynamics of
the model economy. These levels are derived below using an assumption on the
distribution of firm specific productivities. Following Melitz (2003) and Ghironi
and Melitz (2005), we assume the firm specific productivity to be drawn from a
Pareto distribution, which they show matches the actual distribution of firm-specific
productivity well. The cumulative distribution function is given by
G(z) = 1− (zmin
z
)k, (2.18)
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where z denotes a specific cutoff productivity level and k(> σ − 1) is a shaping
parameter. From the distributional assumption, the geometric productivity averages
in terms of the productivity cutoff levels can be derived as
z˜D,t = O
1
σ−1 zmin, z˜X,t = O
1
σ−1 [
zσ−1X,t z
k
I,t − zkX,tzσ−1I,t
zkI,t − zkX,t
]
1
σ−1
z˜I,t = O
1
σ−1 zI,t, with O =
k
k − (σ − 1) .
Furthermore, the shares of exporters and FDI firms in the total number of domestic
firms can be expressed as:
NX,t
ND,t
=
z˜−kX,t − z˜−kI,t
(zmin)−k
(2.19)
NI,t
ND,t
=
(z˜I,t)
−kO kθ−1
(zmin)−k
. (2.20)
Importantly, the distributional assumption allows us to calculate the cutoff levels
of the individual productivities, for which firms break even when they consider to
export or produce for the domestic economy only or when they consider to engage in
FDI or to serve foreign markets only through exporting. Thus, firms with individual
productivity equal to one of the cutoff levels are indifferent between exporting or
not, or between setting up an affiliate or exporting, respectively. The productivity
level of the marginal FDI firm is implicitly defined such that
zI,t : dI,t = 0⇔ Qt
[
1
σ
N
ψ(ω−1)−1
I,t ρI,t(z)
1−ω(1− α1 − α2)C∗t
]
= Qt
w∗t f
∗
I,t
Z∗t
(2.21)
This leads to a cutoff productivity of
zI,t =
1
σ − 1N
1−ψ(ω−1)
ω−1
I,t
(
w∗tσ
Z∗t
) ω
ω−1
(
f ∗I,t
(1− α1 − α2)C∗t
) 1
ω−1
.
Using this productivity cutoff level for FDI firms and keeping in mind that the
definition of the average productivity level of all FDI firms is z˜I,t = O
1
σ−1 zI,t we can
determine the average profits of all domestic FDI firms from their FDI activity
d˜I,t = Qt
(
O 1−ω1−σ − 1
) w∗t
Z∗t
f ∗I,t.
The productivity level of the marginal export firm is such that
zX,t : dX,t = 0⇔ 1
σ
QtN
ψ(ω−1)−1
X,t ρX,t(zX,t)
1−ωα∗2C
∗
t =
wtfX,t
Zt
(2.22)
zX,t =
(
σfX,t
α∗2C
∗
t
) 1
ω−1
(
wt
QtZt
) ω
ω−1
τt
σ
σ − 1N
1−ψ(ω−1)
ω−1
X,t .
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Substituting in both the cutoff level of exporters zX,t and the cutoff level for FDI
firms zI,t into the definition of the average productivity level of exporters yields
z˜X,t = O
1
σ−1
σ
ω
ω−1
(σ − 1)
(
1
C∗t
) 1
ω−1
N
(1−ψ(ω−1))
ω−1
X,t
(
wt
QtZt
) ω
ω−1
τt [KKt]
1
σ−1
where
KKt =
(
fX,t
α∗2
) k−σ+1
1−ω −
[
(TOLt)
ω τ 1−ωt
(
f∗I,t
(1−α1−α2)
)(
NX,t
NI,t
)(ψ(ω−1)−1)] k−σ+11−ω
(
fX,t
α∗2
) k
1−ω −
[
(TOLt)
ω
(
f∗I,t
1−α∗1−α∗2
)
τ 1−ωt
(
NX,t
NI,t
)(ψ(ω−1)−1)] k1−ω .
with TOLt =
(
wt
ZtQt
)−1 (
w∗t
Z∗t
)
being the terms of labor. This implies average profits
of exporting firms of
d˜X,t =

O

(
fX,t
α∗2
) k−σ+1
1−ω −
[
(TOLt)
ω
τ1−ωt
(
f∗I,t
1−α∗1−α∗2
)(
NX,t
NI,t
)(ψ(ω−1)−1)] k−σ+11−ω
(
fX,t
α∗2
) k
1−ω −
[
(TOLt)
ω
(
f∗I,t
1−α∗1−α∗2
)
τ1−ωt
(
NX,t
NI,t
)(ψ(ω−1)−1)] k1−ω


ω−1
σ−1
α∗2 − fX,t

wt
Zt
.
(2.23)
For Foreign an analogous expression holds. This completes the description of the
firms.
2.2.3 The asset market structure and the household’s bud-
get constraints
The key to understanding the households’ investment decisions in our model econ-
omy is the budget constraint of the Home and Foreign household. Its description
gives us the opportunity to explain the asset market structure as well. The budget
constraint of the Home representative household in terms of the Home consumption
basket is given by
Ct + sh,t+1v˜
s
t (ND,t +NE,t) + sf,t+1Qtv˜
s∗
t (N
∗
D,t +N
∗
E,t) + bh,t+1v
b
t + bf,t+1Qtv
b∗
t
= wtLt + sh,tND,t(v˜
s
t + d˜t) + sf,tN
∗
D,tQt(v˜
s∗
t + d˜
∗
t ) + bh,t(v
b
t + d
b
t) + bf,tQt(v
b∗
t + d
b∗
t ).
(2.24)
In essence, it has the usual interpretation that the Home household’s consumption
smoothing is restricted by its decision to split its income of the current period
between consumption Ct and different means of savings to carry over consumption
to future periods. wt are real wages and Lt is the labor supply of the household.
Thus, wtLt gives the income from supplying labor. Qt is the welfare based real
exchange rate. It is defined as the welfare-based Foreign price index P ∗t converted
to Home currency by the nominal exchange rate t and divided the welfare-based
Home price index Pt: Qt ≡ (tP ∗t )/Pt. Therefore, Qt is defined in terms of the Home
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consumption good. The Home household can invest in shares of the Home or the
Foreign mutual fund. The Home mutual fund owns all the shares of the domestic
new entrants NE,t, as well as all the Home firms that produce in the current period
ND,t. The Foreign mutual fund owns all the shares of the foreign new entrants N
∗
E,t
as well as all currently producing Foreign firms N∗D,t. sh,t+1(sf,t+1) denote the shares
in the mutual fund of Home (Foreign) firms the Home household buys in the current
period. v˜st (v˜
s∗
t ) is the real price of a Home (Foreign) mutual fund share denominated
in Home (Foreign) consumption goods. Furthermore, the Home household can invest
in bonds issued by Home and Foreign. bh,t+1 and bf,t+1 denote the amount of Home
and Foreign bond bought by the Home household, respectively. vbt and v
b∗
t are the
real prices of bonds issued in Home and Foreign. d˜t and d˜
∗
t are the average real
dividends of Home (Foreign) firms and dbt and d
b∗
t are the real dividends of bonds
issued in Home and Foreign. For a bond indexed by the welfare-based price index
we have dbt = d
b∗
t = 1. For a bond indexed by the empirical CPI real dividends
are given by dbt =
Pˆt+1
Pt+1
and db∗t =
Pˆ ∗t+1
P ∗t+1
, where the empirical measure of CPI is
denoted by Pˆ (Pˆ ∗). The interpretation of the pricing is that Home (Foreign) CPI
indexed bonds give a nominal payoff of Pˆ (Pˆ ∗) units of Home (Foreign) currency next
period. Since the rest of the variables in the budget constraint are deflated using the
welfare-based price levels Pt(P
∗
t ), the nominal payoff of Pˆ (Pˆ
∗) has to be divided by
Pt(P
∗
t ) to denote it in real terms. In Ghironi and Melitz (2005) the relation between
the welfare-based and the empirical CPI measures is given by Pt = N
1
1−σ
t Pˆt, with
Nt = ND,t+N
∗
X,t, as the empirical measure usually does not account for the changes
in the extensive margin, which influence the welfare-based CPI. The representative
Foreign household maximizes its utility with respect to a symmetric real budget
constraint denominated in Foreign consumption goods:
C∗t + s
∗
f,t+1v˜
s∗
t (N
∗
D,t +N
∗
E,t) + s
∗
h,t+1Q
−1
t v˜
s
t (ND,t +NE,t) + b
∗
h,t+1Q
−1
t v
b
t + b
∗
f,t+1v
b∗
t
= w∗tL
∗
t + s
∗
f,tN
∗
D,t(v˜
s∗
t + d˜
∗
t ) + s
∗
h,tND,tQ
−1
t (v˜
s
t + d˜t) + b
∗
h,tQ
−1
t (v
b
t + d
b
t) + b
∗
f,t(v
b∗
t + d
b∗
t ).
Households’ optimality conditions
Defining the returns on Home and Foreign equities as
rsh,t ≡ (1− δ)
v˜st + d˜t
v˜st−1
, rsf,t ≡ (1− δ)
v˜s∗t + d˜
∗
t
v˜s∗t−1
Qt
Qt−1
, (2.25)
respectively, and the return on the domestic bond as
rbh,t ≡
vbt + d
b
t
vbt−1
, rbf,t ≡
vb∗t + d
b∗
t
vb∗t−1
Qt
Qt−1
, (2.26)
where the dividends paid by a regular bond are
dbt = 1, d
b∗
t = 1, for welfare-based bonds (2.27)
dbt =
Pˆt+1
Pt+1
, db∗t =
Pˆ ∗t+1
P ∗t+1
, for CPI indexed bonds (2.28)
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the first-order conditions of the household become
χL
1
ϕ
t = C
−γ
t wt (2.29a)
1 = Υ(Ct)Et{(Ct+1
Ct
)−γrsh,t+1} (2.29b)
1 = Υ(Ct)Et{(Ct+1
Ct
)−γrsf,t+1} (2.29c)
1 = Υ(Ct)Et{(Ct+1
Ct
)−γrbh,t+1} (2.29d)
1 = Υ(Ct)Et{(Ct+1
Ct
)−γrbf,t+1} (2.29e)
Ct + sh,t+1v˜
s
t (ND,t +NE,t) + sf,t+1Qtv˜
s∗
t (N
∗
D,t +N
∗
E,t) + bh,t+1v
b
t + bf,t+1v
b∗
t
= wtLt + sh,tND,t(v˜
s
t + d˜t) + sf,tN
∗
D,tQt(v˜
s∗
t + d˜
∗
t ) + bh,t(v
b
t + d
b
t) + bf,t(v
b∗
t + d
b∗
t ).
(2.29f)
Using the same definitions of returns on home and foreign equities as above the
first-order conditions of the Foreign household are
χL
∗ 1
ϕ
t = C
∗−γ
t w
∗
t (2.30a)
1 = Υ(C∗t )Et
[(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−γ
rsh,t+1
Qt
Qt+1
]
(2.30b)
1 = Υ(C∗t )Et
[(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−γ
rsf,t+1
Qt
Qt+1
]
(2.30c)
1 = Υ(C∗t )Et
[(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−γ
rbh,t+1
Qt
Qt+1
]
(2.30d)
1 = Υ(C∗t )Et
[(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−γ
rbf,t+1
Qt
Qt+1
]
(2.30e)
C∗t + s
∗
f,t+1v˜
s∗
t (N
∗
D,t +N
∗
E,t) + s
∗
h,t+1Q
−1
t v˜
s
t (ND,t +NE,t) + b
∗
h,t+1Q
−1
t v
b
t + b
∗
f,t+1v
b∗
t
= w∗tL
∗
t +s
∗
f,tN
∗
D,t(v˜
s∗
t + d˜
∗
t )+s
∗
h,tND,tQ
−1
t (v˜
s
t + d˜t)+b
∗
h,tQ
−1
t (v
b
t +d
b
t)+b
∗
f,t(v
b∗
t +d
b∗
t ).
(2.30f)
A detailed derivation of these conditions is given in the technical appendix ??.
2.2.4 Market Clearing
In the model there are seven markets: Four asset markets, two labor markets and
a good market. By Walras’ law one of these market clearing conditions is implied
by the other six and thus can be disregarded in the final system of equilibrium
conditions.
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Asset Markets
Following Hamano (2015) we assume that the equity supply of each individual firm is
normalized to 1. Because households cannot foresee which individual firms are hit by
the exogenous exit shock, they hold the same amount of shares in every potentially
producing firm of a given country. Therefore, the home household’s holdings in each
home firm sh,t+1 and the foreign household’s holdings in each home firm s
∗
h,t+1 have
to sum to unity:
sh,t+1 + s
∗
h,t+1 = 1. (2.31)
Analogously, the home household’s holdings in each foreign firm sf,t+1 and the for-
eign household’s holdings in each foreign firm s∗f,t+1 have to sum to unity:
sf,t+1 + s
∗
f,t+1 = 1. (2.32)
Additionally, there are two international bond markets:
bh,t+1 + b
∗
h,t+1 = 0 (2.33)
and
bf,t+1 + b
∗
f,t+1 = 0. (2.34)
Labor market
There are three separate sources of labor demand for production in each country.
Home firms demand domestic labor lD,t for production to serve the domestic market
and lX,t to serve the foreign market through exports. Furthermore, foreign firms
serving the Home market through their affiliates demand lI,t units of domestic labor.
In addition to the use in production, firms hire labor in order to pay entry, export
and FDI costs. Entering firms hire
NE,tfE,t
ZE,t
units of effective labor in total, domestic
export firms
NX,tfX,t
Zt
and affiliates of foreign firms
N∗I,tfI,t
Zt
.
Adding up all of these demand sources of the average firms and equating it to the
labor supply of the representative household, the overall Home labor market clearing
condition is
Lt =
(σ − 1)
wt
[
ND,td˜D,t +NX,td˜X,t +N
∗
I,tQtd˜
∗
I,t
]
+
NE,tfE,t
ZE,t
+
σ
Zt
[
NX,tfX,t +N
∗
I,tfI,t
]
.
(2.35)
For Foreign the condition is
L∗t =
(σ − 1)
w∗t
[
N∗D,td˜
∗
D,t +N
∗
X,td˜
∗
X,t +NI,tQ
−1
t d˜I,t
]
+
N∗E,tf
∗
E,t
Z∗E,t
+
σ
Z∗t
[
N∗X,tf
∗
X,t +NI,tf
∗
I,t
]
.
(2.36)
Good Market
International good market clearing states that international consumption has to be
equal to international labor and capital income, denoted in the Home consumption
basket.
Ct +QtC
∗
t = Yt +QtY
∗
t (2.37a)
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where
Yt = wtLt +ND,td˜t −NE,tv˜st (2.37b)
Y ∗t = w
∗
tL
∗
t +N
∗
D,td˜
∗
t −N∗E,tv˜s∗t . (2.37c)
2.2.5 The stochastic processes of production
The stochastic aggregate productivities and the productivities specific to the entry
sector are assumed to be given by the following AR(1) processes:
log(Zt+1) = ρlog(Zt) + t+1 (2.38a)
log(Z∗t+1) = ρlog(Z
∗
t ) + 
∗
t+1 (2.38b)
log(ZE,t+1) = ρElog(ZE,t) + E,t+1 (2.38c)
log(Z∗E,t+1) = ρElog(Z
∗
E,t) + 
∗
E,t+1. (2.38d)
With 4 shocks and 4 assets that Home and Foreign households can invest in, we
have complete markets in our model economy.
2.2.6 Net foreign asset dynamics
We can combine the two budget constraints of the households to obtain an expression
for the net foreign asset dynamics of the Home economy:
sh,t+1v˜
s
t (ND,t +NE,t) + sf,t+1Qtv˜
s∗
t (N
∗
D,t +N
∗
E,t) + bh,t+1v
b
t + bf,t+1Qtv
b∗
t
= sh,tND,t(v˜
s
t + d˜t) + sf,tN
∗
D,tQt(v˜
s∗
t + d˜
∗
t ) + bh,t(v
b
t + d
b
t) + bf,tQt(v
b∗
t + d
b∗
t )
+
1
2
(
NE,tv˜
s
t +QtN
∗
E,tv˜
s∗
t
)−1
2
(
ND,td˜t −QtN∗D,td˜∗t
)
+
1
2
(wtLt −Qtw∗tL∗t )−
1
2
(Ct −QtC∗t ) .
(2.39)
This condition can be interpreted as an equation for the dynamics of the Home
country’s financial wealth.
2.2.7 Equilibrium
The equilibrium conditions are given by four of the first-order conditions for the
Home household (2.29a - 2.29e), the equivalent equations for the Foreign house-
hold (2.30a - 2.30e), the aggregate accounting constraint (2.39), the 16 optimality
conditions of the firm and the 12 optimal pricing and dividend conditions, the 6
clearing conditions for the Home and Foreign labor and asset markets in (2.2.4)
and the definitions of equity returns (2.25), bond returns (2.26), the two defini-
tions of the dividends of bonds (2.27), the definition of the terms of labor, the
income (2.37b), as well as the stochastic processes (2.38). As mentioned above,
the goods market clearing condition (2.37) is left out due to Walras’ law. All
these conditions are summarized in section B.1. Theses are 58 equations, in 58 un-
knowns. The unknowns are Ct, C
∗
t ,Lt, L
∗
t sh,t, s
∗
h,t, sf,t, s
∗
f,t, bh,t, bf,t, b
∗
h,t, b
∗
f,t r
s
h,t, r
s
f,t,
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rbh,t, r
b
f,t v˜
s
t , v˜
s∗
t , v
b
t , v
b∗
t , d
b
t , d
b∗
t Yt, Y
∗
t , wt, w
∗
t , dt, d
∗
t , NE,t, N
∗
E,t, z˜X,t, z˜
∗
X,t, z˜I,t, z˜
∗
I,t,
ND,t, N
∗
D,t, NX,t, N
∗
X,t, NI,t, N
∗
I,t, Qt, TOLt ρ˜D,t, ρ˜
∗
D,t, ρ˜X,t, ρ˜
∗
X,t, ρ˜I,t, ρ˜
∗
I,t, d˜D,t, d˜
∗
D,t,
d˜X,t, d˜
∗
X,t d˜I,t, d˜
∗
I,t, and Zt, Z
∗
t , ZE,t, Z
∗
E,t.
2.3 Portfolio intuition
Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2011) derive general results for portfolio solutions in
a complete markets economy like ours. We can use a linearized version of the real
exchange rate and a static version of the household’s budget constraint to obtain
an intuition on how the household uses bonds and equity to hedge against exchange
rate fluctuations and labor income risk.
2.3.1 Welfare-based and CPI-indexed real exchange rate
In general, the risk components in the welfare based real exchange rate in a model
with a preference for variety of the Benassy (1996) type can be decomposed as
Qˆt = qˆt + ψRv,t (2.40)
where ψ is the ’love of variety’ parameter, qˆt is the linearized CPI based real exchange
rate and Rv,t is the risk component associated with the varieties. The welfare-based
real exchange rate in our model is
Qt =
tP
∗
t
Pt
=
t
[
α1N
∗−ψ(1−ω)
D,t p˜
∗(1−ω)
D,t + α2N
−ψ(1−ω)
X,t p˜
(1−ω)
X,t + (1− α1 − α2)N−ψ(1−ω)I,t p˜(1−ω)I,t
] 1
1−ω
[
α1N
−ψ(1−ω)
D,t p˜
(1−ω)
D,t + α2N
∗−ψ(1−ω)
X,t p˜
∗(1−ω)
X,t + (1− α1 − α2)N∗−ψ(1−ω)I,t p˜∗(1−ω)I,t
] 1
1−ω
Log-linearizing around the steady-state yields
Qˆt = (1− 2SXD) ˆTOLt − SXDzˆRX − (1− SDD − SXD)zˆRI + ψ(SDD − SXD)NˆRD
− ψ(1− SDD − SXD)NˆRX + ψSXD
[
NˆRD,t − NˆRX,t
]
+ ψ (1− SDD − SXD)
[
NˆRX,t − NˆRI,t
]
, (2.41)
where SDD = α1ρ¯
1−ω
H,t , SNX = α2ρ¯
1−ω
X,t , SNI = (1−α1−α2)ρ¯1−ωI,t = (1− SDD − SXD).
The first three terms denote the effects of changes in the terms of labor, relative FDI
cutoffs and relative export cutoffs on Qˆt, respectively. The last four terms represent
the effect of changes in the relative numbers of domestic, export and FDI varieties
on the welfare-based real exchange rate. The average terms of trade are related with
the terms of labor as follows
TOTt =
tp˜X,t
p˜∗X,t
=
z˜∗X,t
z˜X,t
TOL−1t .
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Linearized this gives
ˆTOT t = − ˆTOLt − zˆRX,t. (2.42)
Therefore, the linearized real exchange rate can be rewritten as
Qˆt = (2SXD− 1) ˆTOT t− (1−SXD)zˆRX,t− (1−SDD−SXD)zˆRI +ψ(SDD−SXD)NˆRD
− ψ(1− SDD − SXD)NˆRX + ψSXD
[
NˆRD,t − NˆRX,t
]
− ψ (1− SDD − SXD)
[
NˆRI,t − NˆRX,t
]
, (2.43)
As for instance in Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Hamano (2015), the welfare-based
price indices in our model fully reflect changes in varieties and this affects optimal
portfolios if bonds are indexed by the welfare-based price indices. As Broda and
Weinstein (2004) point out, in reality the CPI’s do not adjust for changes in varieties.
Therefore a more realistic assumption is that agents base their decisions on empirical
versions of CPI indices and the real exchange rate. To extract the effect of changes
in the number of varieties from bonds and the real exchange rate, Hamano (2015)
defines the price indices in a way such that the empirical real exchange rate does
not reflect these changes any more. For our model it becomes
qˆt = (2SXD − 1) ˆTOT t − (1− SXD)zˆRX,t − (1− SDD − SXD)zˆRI . (2.44)
2.3.2 Portfolios from static budget constraint and complete
asset markets
We derive the intuition behind the optimal portfolios we get from a static version of
the household’s budget constraint. Expressing both the Home and Foreign budget
constraints in terms of the Home consumption good, subtracting the Home from the
Foreign constraint and log linearizing this equation yields
Pˆt+Cˆt−
(
Pˆ ∗t + Cˆ
∗
t
)
= SW
(
wˆRt + lˆ
R
t
)
+(2s−1)
[
SD
(
NˆRD,t +
ˆ˜dRt
)
− SI
(
NˆRE,t + ˆ˜v
sR
t
)]
+2b′dˆbRt ,
(2.45)
with SW ≡ wC , SD ≡ ND d˜C and SI ≡ NE v˜
s
C
being the labor income, dividends and
investments relative to consumption in the symmetric steady state, respectively.
Bond holdings are multiplied by their dividend db and normalized by steady state
consumption b′ = bdb/C. We use the following definitions wˆRt + lˆ
R
t ≡ wˆt + lˆt− (Qˆt +
wˆ∗t + lˆ
∗
t ), Nˆ
R
D,t +
ˆ˜dRt ≡ NˆD,t + ˆ˜dt− (Nˆ∗D,t + Qˆt + ˆ˜d∗t ), NˆE,t + ˆ˜vsRt ≡ NˆE,t + ˆ˜vst − (Nˆ∗E,t +
Qˆt+ ˆ˜v
s∗
t ) and dˆ
bR
t ≡ dˆbt−(Qˆt+ dˆb∗t ). The terms denote relative nominal labor income,
relative average equity dividends, relative investment and relative bond dividends
between Home and Foreign, respectively. Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2011) find
that for economies with complete asset markets, the portfolio solution of Devereux
and Sutherland (2010) coincides with finding portfolios that replicate the complete
market allocation, i.e. portfolios ensuring that the perfect risk-sharing condition
Pˆt + Cˆt −
(
Pˆ ∗t + Cˆ
∗
t
)
= −
(
1− 1
γ
)
Qˆt (2.46)
is satisfied for arbitrary realizations of the stochastic shocks driving the economy.
It is important to stress that in this setup the static budget constraint (2.45) is
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not equivalent to the period-by-period budget constraint (2.24). The static budget
constraint does not capture the period-by-period dynamics and thus we cannot
deduce that if (2.45) holds, (2.24) holds as well. Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2011)
derive their results for a case where they are both equivalent. Although this is not
the case here, we still rely on the static budget constraint as we find it useful to
derive households’ hedging motives from it, keeping in mind that there might be
other factors influencing the solution to the dynamic model which we obtain by
numerical procedures. Since our model is relatively complex, obtaining the portfolio
intuition from the static budget constraint instead of deriving closed-form solutions
of the portfolios simplifies our solution procedure. We proceed by substituting in
the perfect risk-sharing condition under complete asset markets in the linearized
budget constraint above. This yields
−
(
1− 1
γ
)
Qˆt = SWRw,t + (2s− 1)Re,t + 2b′Rb,t, (2.47)
withRw,t ≡
(
wˆRt + lˆ
R
t
)
, Re,t ≡
[
SD
(
NˆRD,t +
ˆ˜dRt
)
− SI
(
NˆRE,t + ˆ˜v
sR
t
)]
andRb,t ≡ dˆbRt .
Portfolios
We postulate the following loadings of equities and bonds on the risk components
in Qˆt:
ˆTOT t = φTOT,bRb,t + φTOT,eRe,t
zˆRX,t = φZX,bRb,t + φZX,eRe,t
zˆRI,t = φZI,bRb,t + φZI,eRe,t
NˆRD,t = φND,bRb,t + φND,eRe,t
NˆRX,t = φNX,bRb,t + φNX,eRe,t
NˆRD,t − NˆRX,t = φNDNX,bRb,t + φNDNX,eRe,t
NˆRI,t − NˆRX,t = φNXNI,bRb,t + φNXNI,eRe,t.
Similarly, the loadings of the assets on labor income risk are
Rw,t = φw,bRb,t + φw,eRe,t.
Substituting in this set of relations into (2.47), we can solve for the optimal port-
folio positions that replicate the complete market allocation. Thus, the portfolio
allocations we find imply that (2.47) holds for all possible realizations of the relative
shocks
(
Zˆt, ZˆE,t
)
. As in Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2011) agents use bonds to
hedge all risks deriving from the real exchange rate, while they use equity to hedge
those risks orthogonal to the real exchange rate. Next we have to make some dis-
tinctions depending on the type of bonds that are traded in the model economy.
If bonds perfectly load on the welfare-based real exchange rate and have returns
Rb,t = −Qˆt with dividends dbt = d∗t = 1, from above we have
Qˆt = (2SDI−1)φTOT,e+SNIφNDI,e+(1−SDI)φNEX,e+ψ(SD−1)φIV,e+ψ(SI−1)φID,e.
(2.48)
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Therefore, if bonds perfectly hedge all variations in the number of firms and their
offered varieties, the optimal portfolios become those given in Coeurdacier and Gour-
inchas (2011)
s =
1
2
[1− Swφw,e] , (2.49)
b′ =
1
2
[(
1− 1
γ
)
− Swφw,b
]
. (2.50)
Home bias in equities arises only because the real exchange rate does not fully hedge
against labor income risk. If the partial correlation between relative labor income
and relative equity returns φw,e is negative it is optimal for home agents to hold a
home biased share portfolio. This is a standard result in the literature (e.g.Heathcote
and Perri (2013)). Note, that the structure of the model can influence the partial
correlation φw,e, as well as the steady state ratio SW = w/c and therefore, the home
bias in a model with FDI can differ from that in a model without FDI if there is a
systematic way in which FDI activity influences these two numbers. If bonds only
hedge the CPI-based real exchange rate risk, i.e. Rb,t = −qˆt, the optimal portfolios
become
s =
1
2
[1− Swφw,e − ψ
(
1− 1
γ
)
((SDD − SXD)φND,e (2.51)
− (1− SDD − SXD)φNX,e + SXDφNDNX,e − (1− SDD − SXD)φNINX,e)], (2.52)
b′ =
1
2
[
(
1− 1
γ
)
− Swφw,b − ψ
(
1− 1
γ
)
((SDD − SXD)φND,b (2.53)
− (1− SDD − SXD)φNX,b + SXDφNDNX,b − (1− SDD − SXD)φNINX,b)]. (2.54)
Portfolios without FDI from Hamano (2015) are given by
s =
1
2
[
1− Swφw,e − ψ
(
1− 1
γ
)
((2SED − 1)φND,e + (1− SED)φNDNX,e)
]
, (2.55)
b′ =
1
2
[(
1− 1
γ
)
− Swφw,b − ψ
(
1− 1
γ
)
((2SED − 1)φND,b + (1− SED)φNDNX,b)
]
(2.56)
where SED = αρ
1−ω
H and α is the home bias in production in Hamano’s model, which
is 1−α2 in our model. An intuition is that the firms on average become less prone to
the country specific shock if some of them engage in FDI. Therefore, the correlation
could decrease contributing to a larger home bias in equity holdings.
2.4 Solution procedure and parametrization
Ghironi and Melitz (2005) show that in models in which heterogeneous firms are
characterized in the way we do it here, despite the very rich heterogeneity, macroe-
conomic fluctuations only depend on the average characteristics of the average do-
mestic producer, the average exporter and the average FDI firm and the fluctuations
in the cutoff levels. Therefore the model with heterogeneous firms is observationally
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equivalent to an economy with a representative firm that has a domestic branch,
an export branch and an FDI branch and is adjusting the relative sizes of these
branches depending on the shocks to the economy. This feature is very convenient
since aggregation becomes easy and we are able to solve this heterogeneous agent
model by perturbation methods. Regular DSGE models are usually log-linearized
around their non-stochastic steady-state and solved using an appropriate solution
method (e.g. the method of undetermined coefficients, etc.). In models that include
a country portfolio choice involving the possibility for the agents to invest in multi-
ple assets, as in the model presented here, this approach becomes unfeasible. This
is the case because up to a first-order approximation, the portfolio is indeterminate.
In the non-stochastic steady-state, there is no uncertainty and portfolios with the
same return do not pin down a unique portfolio choice. The same is true for a
first-order approximation in which certainty equivalence holds and assets have to
have the same expected payoff. The method developed by Devereux and Suther-
land (2010, 2011) allows pinning down the steady-state portfolio choice uniquely by
approximating the portfolio part of the model to the second order, while the rest of
the model is approximated to the first order. Furthermore, the first-order dynam-
ics of the portfolio choice can be pinned down using a third-order approximation
of the portfolio part and a second-order approximation of the rest of the model.
The parametrization of the model follows largely from Hamano (2015) and Contessi
(2010) for the parts regarding foreign direct investment. The parameter governing
relative risk aversion γ is set to 2. We interpret a period as a year and therefore set
the discount factor β equal to 0.96. As is standard in this literature, the lower bound
of the Pareto distribution determining the individual firm productivities is set to 1
and the time endowment of workers is also set to 1. The Frisch elasticity of labor
supply is ϕ = 2 and χ is calibrated such that in steady state the households’ labor
supplies are equal to 1. Furthermore, we assume k+1 > σ to ensure that the scaling
factor O = k/[k − (σ − 1)] is positive. The shape parameter of the Pareto distribu-
tion k determines the dispersion of individual firm productivities. The elasticity of
substitution among varieties σ is set to 3.8 and the elasticity of substitution between
Home and Foreign goods ω is set to 2. This induces firms to charge an average price
mark-up of 35.7 percent above the average marginal costs. In the presence of fixed
entry costs to production this is not as high as it might seem. Ghironi and Melitz
(2005) calibrate the exit shock δ to match the ratio of job destruction in the US,
which is 10 percent. This gives them a value of δ = 0.025. This parameter governs
the ratio of entering to existing varieties NE,t/ND,t in our model. The fixed entry
cost to production is normalized to be fE,t = 1. The fixed costs of international
activity fX,t and fI,t are set relative to fE,t. Following Contessi (2010) the share of
FDI firms in the total number of firms is calibrated using the fixed entry cost to FDI
activity fI,t. Like him, we set fI, to 28 percent of ΘfE,t = 0.0036, which is the fixed
cost of entering production of a new variety annualized. The fixed cost of exporting
is set to about 10 percent of this annualized entry cost. Following Hamano (2015)
we choose a preerence for variety parameter ψ = 0.18. Like Hamano (2015) we take
the shock processes from Coeurdacier et al. (2010). For annual data from 1984 to
2004, they estimate productivity processes for the G7 countries. The AR(1) process
for our 4 shocks in matrix notation is
Zt+1 = ΓZt + t+1 (2.57)
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where Zt = [log(Zt) log(Z
∗
t ) log(ZE,t) log(Z
∗
E,t)] and t = [t 
∗
t E,t 
∗
E,t]. The
matrix Γ and the variance-covariance matrix Σ of the innovations t are assumed to
be
Γ =

0.75 0 0 0
0 0.75 0 0
0 0 0.79 0
0 0 0 0.79

and
Σ =

0.0096 0.0043 0 0
0.0043 0.0096 0 0
0 0 0.0199 0.0038
0 0 0.0038 0.0199
 .8
2.5 Optimal portfolios with different internation-
alization strategies
The results we obtain by applying the Devereux and Sutherland solution algorithm
for our baseline calibration are given in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2 – Optimal Portfolios
Welfare RER Empirical RER
Without FDI With FDI Without FDI With FDI
Equity 1.18 1.69 1.34 2.79
Bonds 0.74 0.15 0.45 0.05
The first two columns show the optimal equity and bond portfolios for our baseline
model with bonds indexed by the welfare-based CPI, while the third and fourth col-
umn show the optimal portfolios in an economy with bonds indexed by the empirical
CPI. The very first column shows the optimal bond and equity portfolio holdings of
the Home household in a model in which firms can only tap international markets by
exporting. The model produces a significant home bias in domestic equity holdings
for all specifications. In fact, home households short foreign equity to take exces-
sive long positions in domestic equity. With welfare-based bonds available, Home
households optimally hold 118 percent of the shares of Home firms, while at the
same time, they hold −18 percent of the shares of foreign firms, i.e. they increase
their exposure to domestic equity by short-selling foreign equity. At the same time
the Foreign household does the opposite trade and shorts home equity. Thus, this
is a sustainable equilibrium outcome. The bond position is positive such that in
order to hedge the real exchange rate risk, Home households save in domestic bonds
and borrow abroad. Qualitatively, the same is the case with bonds based on the
empirical CPI in column 3 which shows that the optimal equity bias increases to
8These variances and covariances are the same in relative magnitude as in Hamano (2015),
but smaller in absolute magnitude to ensure sensible simulation results, i.e. that for instance
consumption is not negative after shocks. Since asset markets are complete, this does not affect
the portfolio solutions.
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134 percent and bond positions decrease as the variety risk component drops out of
the empirical real exchange rate and households have to hedge additional risk.9 In
our model with FDI, the optimal share Home households hold in the equity issued
by domestic firms amounts to 169 percent and is thus higher than in the comparable
benchmark model without FDI. Equity positions again increase with CPI-indexed
bonds compared to welfare-indexed bonds and bond positions. Moreover, as before
the Home household is more exposed to foreign bonds when these are CPI-based
bonds. To explore possible sources of the high home bias we obtain, we take a closer
look at the conditional correlations that enter the optimal portfolio choices that we
derived from the static budget constraint. We calculate the conditional correlations
using simulated data from our model. For this purpose, we simulate the model 10000
times for 500 periods, dropping the first 100 observations to ensure that the results
are not sensible to the used initial conditions. The results are presented in Table
2.3.
Table 2.3 – Conditional correlations - Baseline Model
φw,. φND,. φNX,. φNDNX,. φNINX,.
FDI
Equity -0.5201 -0.0997 -0.0403 -0.0546 0.0667
Bonds -0.5142 0.0405 -0.4251 0.3056 0.5042
No FDI
Equity -0.4822 -0.1445 - -0.2463 -
Bonds -0.5925 0.0068 - 0.0897 -
The entries in the above table give correlations of the relative wages, as well as the
variety effects given in the portfolio solutions (2.51) with the relative return of one
asset, conditional on the relative return of the other asset. The definition of the
conditional returns is given by
φx,y = ρxy|z =
ρxy − ρxzρzy√
1− ρ2xz
√
1− ρ2zy
. (2.58)
For our baseline model with FDI x represents one of the relative differences Rw,t,
NˆRD,t, Nˆ
R
X,t, Nˆ
R
D,t− NˆRX,t and NˆRI,t− NˆRX,t. y represents Re,t or Rb,t, while z represents
the other asset return, respectively. So for instance, φw,e represents the correlation
between relative labor income and relative equity returns, conditional on relative
bond returns. For the model without FDI, which is analogous to the model of
Hamano (2015), x represents one of the relative differences Rw,t, Nˆ
R
D,t, and Nˆ
R
D,t −
NˆRX,t. Our portfolio equations in a model with FDI differ from the ones obtained
by Hamano (2015) in a model without FDI in that they load on additional risk
components and furthermore the weights given to these components. Therefore,
they are only comparable to a limited degree. In the case where welfare-based bonds
can be traded, the equity portfolios in both models only depend on the conditional
9Intuitively, there is risk related with the number of foreign varieties that are available in future
periods, more varieties for instance imply higher consumption spending on these varieties in future
periods. Since foreign goods are denominated in foreign currency exposure to foreign bonds reduces
consumption spending risk in foreign currency and therefore hedges against fluctuations in the real
exchange rate.
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correlation between wages and equity returns, given the returns on bonds, φw,e. As
in Hamano (2015), the negative value of −0.48 is the main source of the high equity
home bias in the model without FDI. The first column of table2.3 shows that the
presence of FDI further lowers this correlation contributing to higher optimal equity
holdings. For the case of CPI-based bonds, two sources of risk that equity positions
aim to hedge against are qualitatively the same in both models, the number of
domestic firms and the relative number of domestic firms and exporters. In both
models the conditional correlations on these components are negative, contributing
to home biased portfolios.10 In addition, the optimal equity positions with FDI load
on two additional terms, the number of exporters and the relative difference in the
number of FDI firms and exporters. Since all the coefficients on the correlations are
positive, a negative conditional correlation on these terms would suggest less home
biased portfolios. The table shows that the conditional correlation on the number of
exporters is negative, decreasing the optimal equity position, while the conditional
correlation on the relative number of FDI firms and exporters is positive contributing
to higher home equity position of the Home household. As both of these terms enter
our portfolio solution with identical coefficients and the second correlation is higher
than the first one, overall the presence of these additional risk channels contributes
to higher home equity positions compared to the absence of these channels. From the
above portfolio intuition we thus expect that the the home equity positions in our
dynamic model are higher in a model of FDI compared to a model where FDI is not
present and also higher in a model where CPI-based bonds are traded compared to
one in which bonds are welfare based. This is consistent with the portfolio solution
we obtain with our solution algorithm. Looking at the differences in bond portfolios,
we see that the conditional correlation φIV,b and φIV,b are positive. This is likely to
be the reason why agents hold less bonds in the economy with CPI based bonds.
A shortfall of the model is the absolute magnitude of the portfolios we find and
the fact that in our model the Home household wants to short foreign equity to
gain additional exposure to domestic equity. Given that Hamano (2015) in a model
without FDI also finds optimal Home equity shares above one and our findings for
the baseline case without FDI are very similar to those in Hamano (2015), this does
not come as a surprise. Our aim in this paper is to show that the presence of FDI
raises the optimal equity home bias in a DSGE model with endogenous selection into
internationalization modes of production, as is suggested in the empirical work by
(Cai and Warnock, 2012). To make the theoretical model match the empirical data
to a realistic extend the modeling framework has to be refined. Nonetheless, the
direction in which portfolios move in our model in the presence of FDI is a valuable
first step in this direction.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate two questions: How does the degree of international-
ization of a country’s firms influence the equity investment choices of its households,
and how does it affect the widely observed equity home bias? Our rational is that in
10Since the coefficients on these terms are not directly comparable across models, we only com-
pare them qualitatively not in terms of their magnitude.
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addition to being prone to the economic conditions of their home country, interna-
tionally active firms also depend on the economic conditions of other countries they
operate in. Thus, the shares of multinational firms provide a higher diversification
benefit to investors than investing in a firm that is operating solely nationally. In
a DSGE model that includes the endogenous choice of firms to become interna-
tionally active through either exports or foreign direct investment (FDI), we find
that indeed the optimal equity holdings of agents are more strongly biased towards
domestic firms than in a model with trade only. Our finding indicates that inter-
national diversification is not as bad as empirical measures of the equity home bias
suggest and that the international activity of firms should be taken into account
when calculating empirical measures of the equity home bias.
Chapter 2 Moritz A. Roth 63
Chapter 3
Sovereign Bailouts: Why defaults
are possible in a union after all
3.1 Introduction
Recently, the debate about the ongoing financial assistance measures for the Euro-
pean Monetary Union (EMU) countries which are experiencing troubles with their
public finances in the European debt crisis has gained a new aspect. A report of the
European Central Bank (HFCN (2013)) on household finances in the Eurosystem
revealed that households in Germany have the lowest median wealth in the EMU,
while at the same time households in Greece, Spain and Cyprus, have a median
wealth that is well above the one in Germany. Therefore, the median household in
the EMU member country carrying the largest burden from the financial assistance
programmes provided by the EU and the ECB, has significantly less wealth than
the median households in those countries that are receiving financial assistance or
bailouts from the rest of the union (see Table C.1 in the appendix of this chapter).
Although, the median alone is only a very restrictive measure of the households’
wealth distribution in the EMU and it has been criticized that the survey only ac-
counts for disposable wealth, some observers showed concerns about the effect that
wealth inequality within and across EMU member countries might have on future fi-
nancial assistance and the EU crisis policy. For example, the Financial Times wrote
’Poor Germans tire of bailing out eurozone’. 1 Thus, a concern is the effect of wealth
inequality within Germany on its will to provide further financial assistance to trou-
bled EMU member states. In this paper I show that wealth inequality in the bailout
providing nation can indeed have a significant influence on the outcome of a bailout
negotiation with a defaulting member state. In a multi-country model of sovereign
default with bailout negotiations, the introduction of dispersely distributed wealth
and the consequent dispersed holdings of government debt in the country providing
a bailout induce the possibility that this nation refuses a bailout and the struggling
member nation is forced to declare an outright default. An outcome that is not
possible if one investigates a representative agent model.
1http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2f89e5ee-930a-11e2-9593-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2U6ktrTCj
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3.2 Literature Review
Structural empirical research on sovereign default started with Arellano (2008), who
investigates endogenous external default in an incomplete market setting. She mod-
els a small open economy (given by a representative benevolent government) that
trades obligations with risk-neutral international investors. In equilibrium, the bond
price reflects the default probability of the country. Given the representative agent
framework, distributional issues within the country or outside do not play any role.
Countries that default are excluded from financial markets for a random number
of periods and suffer a direct output cost. Default is only triggered by low real-
izations of the stochastic income of the economy. The distributional incentives of
sovereign default within one country have been investigated by D’Erasmo and Men-
doza (2016). They look at a single economy and argue that disperse holdings of
the government’s debt within the economy can trigger optimal default. Given an
utilitarian social welfare function, the government optimally defaults if the repay-
ment costs through lump-sum taxation on low income households that do not hold
a large amount of government debt, is higher than the default costs encountered
by high wealth households that hold a lot of obligations. Thus, the government
optimally defaults if the debt holdings are very concentrated at high wealth house-
holds. Guembel and Sussman (2009) show that default can also be optimal when
there are no default costs. They set up a two-period model with heterogeneous
domestic households (three types), where debt can also be held by foreign agents.
They model the default decision explicitly as a political process in which there is an
election that decides whether the country defaults in the second period or not. The
household taking this decision is the median voter. They find that if the debt is
held by domestic and foreign agents, instead of exclusive foreign holdings, the me-
dian voter has incentives to repay even if there is no cost of default. Cooper (2012)
builds a simple model of a monetary union in which a given member region can issue
debt obligations that can be held by the representative agents in all the regions of
the union. In the repayment period a stochastic income shock realizes for the debt
issuing country. Given this realization and the fraction of debt held by domestic
agents (distribution of debt across countries) the government decides whether to tax
the domestic agents and to repay its debt or to default and to pay the default cost.
Investigating the second period default decision the paper analyzes the role of fun-
damental as well as strategic uncertainty. Because the default threshold depends on
the interest rate the country has to pay on bonds, the higher the probability agents
attach to a default and the higher interest they demand, the more likely a default
becomes. Moreover, Cooper (2012) uses his model to investigate debt guarantee and
bailout policies in the monetary union. Because in his model the two regions are
populated by representative agents, Cooper (2012) has to assume that there exists
a planner who seeks to maximize the overall union welfare, in order to create an
incentive for bailouts and incentives to hold regional debt for all agents in the union.
If in his model the governments only cared about the welfare of their own citizens,
the debt issuing region could default in all states of its economy and the Foreign
government would always be willing to provide a bailout up to the fraction of debt
that is held by the citizens of the other regions. If agents in the region providing a
bailout anticipate that in the worst case their bond holdings will be taken of them
by the government to finance a bailout for the debt issuing region, they will not hold
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debt of that region in equilibrium. In this paper, I combine some of the features of
the above models. The basic two-period model structure is similar to the one used
in Cooper (2012), but I investigate how his results change if the bailout providing
nation is populated by heterogeneous household investors, similar to D’Erasmo and
Mendoza (2016). Moreover, the countries in my model have a fundamental default
incentive as in Arellano (2008) and government debt can be held in both countries
such as in Guembel and Sussman (2009). This is the first paper which emphasizes
that bailout incentives can depend on the distribution of bond holdings across het-
erogeneous household investors in the bailout providing nation and that household
heterogeneity induces the possibility that a sovereign bailout to a struggling member
country might be refused by other member countries.
3.3 The model
The model consists of two countries, Home and Foreign. Both countries are popu-
lated by a continuum of households. Each country has a government with a utili-
tarian social welfare function that only takes into account the welfare of households
in their own country. The economy lasts for two periods t = 0, 1. The focus of
this study is the effect of income inequality among households on bailout incentives
between the two economies. I assume that the Home country can issue government
debt to smooth a stochastic government spending shock, while the Foreign country’s
income stream is exogenously given. The crucial assumption is that households in
Foreign are distinct in high initial income households and low initial income house-
holds and both can hold Home government debt to smooth their consumption. At
the same time, households in Home are of one type only.
3.3.1 Households
There is a continuum of infinitesimally small households in Home and Foreign. Their
mass is fixed to 1 in each country. Households obtain utility from consumption.
Their discounted stream of utility from consumption in this two period model is
u(c0) + βE0 [u(c1)] (3.1)
where β is the discount factor and the utility function is of the standard CRRA
type, given by
u(c) =
c1−σ
1− σ . (3.2)
All households are endowed with an initial stock of income, which is the same
for all Home households and differs between the two types of Foreign households.
Furthermore, in both periods households in Home and Foreign receive an exogenous
income (y0, y1) and (y
∗
0, y
∗
1), respectively.
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Home households
Home households are identical. They are endowed with an initial income stream
of y0 in period t = 0
2 and y1 in period t = 1. In addition, the Home household
is assumed to have some initial bond holdings b0. They have to pay a per capita
lump-sum tax T0 depending on how the Home government decides to finance first
period government spending g0 and how it chooses to smooth taxation over time.
Note that for T0 < 0 the Home household receives a transfer. Thus, the Home
household’s first period income is y0 +b0−T0, which it can spend on consumption c0
or on newly issued government bonds b1 at price q0. This information is summarized
in the Home household’s budget constraint for the first period as follows
c0 + q0b1 ≤ y0 + b0 − T0. (3.3)
The second period budget constraint is similar. Once the stochastic second period
government spending shock g1 has realized, the Home household takes the resulting
taxation and repayment decision of the Home government as given and consumes
what is left of the bond proceeds b1 and its t = 1 period income y1 after taxation
T1. A general form of the t = 1 budget constraint is
c1 ≤ y1 + b1 − T1, (3.4)
where the actual amounts of b1 and T1 depend on the government’s decision to service
its government debt, default or accept a bailout from Foreign. This is described in
detail in the next section 3.3.2.
Foreign households
I assume that Foreign households do not face any uncertainty with respect to their
own economy. To smooth their consumption stream they can invest in Home gov-
ernment bonds and are therefore prone to Home risk. The Foreign government is
assumed to issue no government debt, it is only involved in bailout negotiations.
An important assumption is that there are two types of Foreign households. The
low income type starts period t = 0 with initial income yL∗0 , while the high income
type starts with yH∗0 , where I assume that y
L∗
0 < y
H∗
0 . The fraction of low income
households in Foreign is γ and the fraction of high income households in Foreign is
1− γ. The Foreign households’ t = 0 budget constraints are
c∗0,i + q0b
∗
1,i ≤ yi∗0 + b∗0,i − T ∗0 (3.5)
for i = L,H. The Foreign government also finances government spending by levy-
ing lump-sum taxes on Foreign households and in this respect it cannot discriminate
between high and low wealth households. Given the realization of the Home govern-
ment spending shock and the resulting taxation decisions of the Foreign government,
the t = 1 budget constraint of both Foreign household types is
c∗1,i ≤ y∗1 + bi∗1 − T ∗1 (3.6)
2In this two period model the initial income y0 can also be seen as initial wealth. That is why
I sometimes use the terms wealth and income, as well as wealth inequality and income inequality
interchangeably in the model description. In general, wealth is a stock accumulated over time and
income is the corresponding flow at a given point in time. Thus, in general these concepts cannot
be used interchangeably.
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for i = L,H, where again the actual amounts of bi∗1 and T
∗
1 depend on the gov-
ernment’s decision to service its government debt, default or accept a bailout from
Foreign. The next section will describe this in detail.
3.3.2 Government
The governments in both countries seek to maximize the welfare of the households
within their own country. They do not take into account the welfare of households
in the other country. I assume that governments maximize the welfare of all the
types of households in their country in a utilitarian fashion, i.e. the utility that each
individual household obtains from consumption is taken into consideration with
equal weights. Thus, the objective of the Home government for each period is given
by
u(c0) + βu(c1) (3.7)
where c0 and c1 are the period t = 0 and t = 1 consumption levels of the Home rep-
resentative household and u(·) is the instantaneous utility function which is assumed
to be strictly increasing u′(·) > 0 and strictly concave u′′(·) < 0. The objective of
the Foreign government takes into account the utility of both low and high income
households and is thus given by
γu(cL∗0 + βu(c
L∗
1 )) + (1− γ)u(cH∗0 + βu(cH∗1 )) (3.8)
with foreign consumption levels for the low income household cL∗0 , c
L∗
1 and the high
income household cH∗0 , c
H∗
1 , respectively. The fraction of low wealth agents in Foreign
is γ and the instantaneous utility function u(·) is of the same form as the one for
the Home household. For reasons of tractability, I assume that only the government
of the Home country can issue a total amount of debt B1 in the first period. This
assumption makes us focus on the decision process concerning one country. The
model can be extended to multiple debt issuing countries. Furthermore, the Home
government is subject to government spending shocks in the second period and can
impose a lump-sum tax on the Home household. In period t = 0 the government
can finance the difference between tax income and government spending by issuing
debt. In period t = 1 it has to run a balanced budget, thus it finances the spending
shock by taxation and can decide to repay its debt or default upon the debt. Since, I
assume a two period model, there is a fixed cost of defaulting to ensure some incentive
to repay. The Home debt obligations can be bought and held by households in both
countries. The revenues from issuing bonds are distributed lump-sum to the Home
households in the first period. The motive for the government to issue debt is to
smooth the consumption of the Home household. Therefore, Home’s government
bonds are the only means of savings that households in both countries have. The
purpose of this paper is to show that international bond holdings create default
incentives for the Home government and also incentives for the Foreign government
to provide a bailout to Home. The second incentive is however limited by the
dispersion of bond holdings within Foreign: If bond holdings are very concentrated
at a small number of high income households, a default of the Home government
leads to a more favorable consumption redistribution within Foreign than bailing
out the Home government. The Foreign government will thus neglect a bailout to
the Home government if income and bond holdings are very unequally distributed
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in Foreign. A crucial assumption for this results to hold is that the government
can neither discriminate domestic and foreign households when it issues bonds nor
when it repays. The repayment of the government bonds in the second period of
the economy is not enforceable. Hence, the government chooses whether to repay its
obligations or to default on them. If the state of the economy in the second period
is such that it is welfare maximizing for the government to honor its obligations, it
repays its creditors by taxing the second period income of the Home agents with a
proportional tax. Otherwise, the Home government can default on its obligations.
The assumption that the government cannot discriminate lenders rules out selective
default. In the case that the Home government finds default optimal, the Foreign
government can intervene and offer a bailout to the Home government, i.e. to pay
a fraction of its outstanding debt in order to make them honor their remaining
obligations. The Home government can accept this offer or decline it. If it declines,
Home defaults and all domestic agents incur a default cost cdef proportional to their
second period income. The Home and Foreign government budget constraints in
period t = 0 are
T0 = g0 − qB1 (3.9)
and
T ∗0 = g
∗
0, (3.10)
respectively. The Home government budget constraint in period t = 1 in case of
repayment is
T1 = g1 +B1. (3.11)
In case of default it is
T1 = λy1 (3.12)
where it is assumed that the government defaults on the stock of debt B1 the govern-
ment spending shock g1 and λy1 is the output cost of default, which is proportional
to the Home household’s t = 1 income. If Home announces a default, but Foreign
is willing to provide an acceptable bailout for Home, Home’s government budget
constraint is
T1 = g1 + (1− a)B (3.13)
where a is the fraction of Home’s debt the Foreign government is willing to provide
as a bailout.
Bailout negotiations
The timing of the second period is described above. What is left to be specified is
the exact negotiation between the two countries given a bailout decision. Figure 3.1
shows the assumed timing of the bailout negotiation. First, the Home government
has to decide whether to repay or to default. Thereafter, the Foreign government
decides whether to provide a bailout or not. The bailout offer made has to be
accepted by the Home government, i.e. the Home government has to be at least as
well off as under default.
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Figure 3.1 – Timing of the bailout negotiation
3.3.3 Timing
The state of the economy in the second period is determined by the savings deci-
sions the agents take in the first period and by the realizations of the second period
government spending shock. In the first period agents make their savings decisions
building expectations on the state of the economy in the second period and antici-
pating the outcome of the repayment and bailout decisions. The timing with which
decisions are taken in the model is given by:
• Period 0:
– Agents get to know the size of the exogenous government spending in
Home (t = 0) and Foreign (t = 0 and t = 1)
– Home government issues bonds and finances the remainder of the govern-
ment spending shock by taxing households in a lump-sum fashion, while
Foreign government finances g∗0 fully through taxation
– Households decide on how much they want to save in government bonds,
taking the prices and transfers as given
– In equilibrium prices adjust such that the bond market is cleared
– Agents consume
• Period 1:
– The stochastic period t = 1 government spending shock realizes for Home
– Given the distribution of bond holdings in the economy, the government
decides to tax the agents with a proportional income tax and repay its
debt or to default in the second period, taking into account that a fraction
of aggregate income is lost
– The Foreign government finances g∗1 through taxation
– Given these decisions, the other member country can start a bailout ne-
gotiation
• Bailout negotiations
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– In the subgame of bailout negotiations the Foreign country decides to
intervene if the Home country prefers default to repayment. In this case
both governments bargain over a fraction a of the home debt stock that
the Foreign government is willing to pay in order to make the Home
country pay its obligations. The bailout is financed by proportionally
taxing the Foreign households’ second period income.
3.4 Equilibrium
3.4.1 Households’ saving problem
In the first period the different household types in Home and Foreign decide on their
savings in Home government bonds. Because there is a continuum of households in
both countries, the individual household is infinitesimally small and does not take
into account its own influence on equilibrium market prices. Nonetheless, households
form expectations about the state of the economy in the second period and the
resulting default and bailout decisions the governments take. In equilibrium the
expectations of all household types have to correspond to the actual state in the
second period. The objective of all the household types in Home and Foreign is to
smooth their consumption over the two periods of the economy, taking into account
their income and wealth endowments in the first and second period, as well as the
Home government’s bond issuance decision and the consequences of its incentive to
default. Thus, households decide on how much of their first period endowments to
save in government bonds given their expectations about the state of the economy
in the second period and the resulting repayment, bailout or default decision.
Home household
In period t = 0 the Home household chooses how much to save in Home government
bonds, taking as given the total debt the Home government issues, B1, the price
of the debt q0, its first period endowments and initial debt holding y0 and b0. It
chooses its bond holdings into period t = 1, b1
v(B1, g1, γ) = maxb1{u(y0 + b0 − q0b− T0) + βEg1 [R(B1, g1, γ)u(y1 + b− TR1 (g1))
+B(B1, g1, γ)u(y1 − TB1 (g1)) +D(B1, g1, γ)u((1− λ)y1 − TD1 (g1))]}
subject to the constraint that b1 ≥ 0. Here, R,B and D are indicator variables that
take on the value 1 if the outcome of the bailout negotiation subgame is repayment,
bailout or default, respectively, given the realized state of the economy in the second
period (B1, g1, γ).
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Foreign household
Foreign households have a similar optimization problem given by
v∗(B1, g1, γ) = maxbi∗1 {u(y∗0 + bi∗0 − q0bi∗1 − T ∗0 ) + βEg1 [R(B1, g1, γ)u(y∗1 + bi∗1 − T ∗R1 (g1))
+B(B1, g1, γ)u(y
∗
1 − T ∗B1 (g1)) +D(B1, g1, γ)u(y∗1 − T ∗D1 (g1))]}.
Market Clearing
Bond market clearing in each period is ensured if
Bt = bt + γb
L∗
t + (1− γ)bH∗t (3.14)
for t = 0, 1 holds.
3.4.2 Government
Home government’s default decision
In t = 1 the Home government chooses to default if it maximizes its social welfare
function
maxd∈(0,1)
[
W d=01 (B1),W
d=1
1
]
. (3.15)
Substituting the government budget constraints, the welfare levels under repayment
and default are
W d=01 (B1, g1) = u(y1 − g1 + b1 −B1) (3.16)
and
W d=11 (g1) = u((1− λ)y1), (3.17)
respectively. A difference of my model to the one of D’Erasmo and Mendoza (2016)
is that I assume the consumption level in default not to depend on the second
period government shock. Thus, if Home defaults it defaults on the debt stock and
expenditure cost. At the same time I assume that the proportion of output lost
in default is as high as 70 percent. The reason to make the welfare under default
independent of the government spending shock is to ensure that there is only default
at significantly high levels of government debt instead of defaults being optimal for
large spending shocks, even with low levels of government debt stock.
Foreign government’s bailout decision
If Home government chooses to default, the Foreign government will choose to make
a given bailout offer a according to
maxB∈(0,1)
[
W ∗,B=01 (g1),W
∗,B=1
1 (a,B1, g1)
]
(3.18)
where the welfare values under bailout and non-bailout for the Foreign government
are given by
W ∗,B=01 (g1) = γ
(
u(yL∗1 − g∗1)
)
+ (1− γ) (u(yH∗1 − g∗1)) (3.19)
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and
W ∗,B=11 (g1) = γ
(
u(yL∗1 − g∗1 + bL∗1 − aB1)
)
+ (1− γ) (u(yH∗1 − g∗1 + bH∗1 − aB1)) .
(3.20)
Home’s acceptance decision
Home’s government will accept the Foreign government’s bailout offer if
WB=11 (B1, a) ≥ W d=11 (g1). (3.21)
The welfare values of accepting and not accepting are given by
WB=11 (B1, a) = u(y1 − g1 + b1 − (1− a)B1) (3.22)
and
W d=11 (g1) = u((1− λ)y1). (3.23)
As this is the last stage, the Foreign government will anticipate the Home govern-
ment’s acceptance decision and optimally provide the bailout such that the Home
government is indifferent between accepting and not accepting. Thus, the optimal
bailout size a¯ will be such that
WB=11 (B1, a¯) = W
d=1
1 (g1). (3.24)
3.4.3 Home government’s debt issuance decision
In period t = 0, the Home government decides how much debt to issue taking into
account the discounted welfare of the Home household only
maxB1Eg1 [v(B1, g1, γ)] . (3.25)
3.4.4 Equilibrium Definition
Definition: An equilibrium in the two period economy is given by bond demands of
all the household types, bond prices and the second period decisions such that, given
the total amount of debt issued B1, and given the fractions of low wealth households
in Foreign γ,
1. All household types choose their optimal bond holdings according to their
maximization problems given their expectations about the bond holdings of
the other household types, the bond price and the governments’ second period
decisions given their expectations,
2. the equilibrium price function clears the bond market in the first period, such
that bL1 + b
H
1 + b
L∗
1 + b
H∗
1 = B1,
3. the agents’ expectations are consistent with the bond holdings of the other
types of households and thus agents correctly anticipate the optimal repay-
ment, bailout and default decisions of the two governments in the second
period.
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Following D’Erasmo and Mendoza (2016) I explicitly concentrate on equilibria in
which the low wealth foreign household does not save in Home government bonds.
This condition is checked for all equilibria solved for numerically. The bond market
of the initial period is assumed to be cleared by definition of the initial bond holdings.
3.5 Intuition: A Bailout Model without hetero-
geneity
After having introduced the general model setup, I proceed by showing that het-
erogeneity within the bailout providing country is the crucial ingredient to arrive
at the conclusions highlighted in this work. Therefore, I solve the second period
bailout negotiation subgame in a world where Foreign households, as well as Home
households are homogeneous. In this world economy I show that the Foreign gov-
ernment will always prefer to provide a bailout to an outright default of the Home
government. This setup can be regarded as the special case of the general setup in
which γ = 1. I will solve for the equilibrium of the economy by backward induction,
starting with the bailout negotiations.
3.5.1 Backward induction: Home’s acceptance decision
Taking as given that Home has announced to default in the second period given the
state of the economy that has materialized (g1, B1) and Foreign has made a bailout
offer a ∈ [0, 1], it is Home’s choice to accept this offer. Its value from accepting the
offer is
V accH = u(y1 − g1 + b1 − (1− a)B1) (3.26)
where y1 is the Home agents period t = 1 income, b1 is its bond holdings carried
over from the first period and (1− a)B1 are the taxes the government levies on the
Home household in order to repay the outstanding debt obligations after a bailout
of size aB. The Home government’s value of declining the offer is
V decH = u((1− λ)y1). (3.27)
where λ is the fraction of second period output that is lost in default. The Home
government would only accept a bailout offer for which
V accH ≥ V decH . (3.28)
Therefore,
y1 − g1 + b1 − (1− a)B1 ≥ (1− λ)y1 (3.29)
and
a ≥ 1 + g1 − b1 − λy1
B1
. (3.30)
This threshold decreases in the default costs, the Home bond holdings and also in
the total debt stock B1. It increases in the t = 1 government spending shock g1. If
the Home agent does not hold any of its own government’s debt obligations and the
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default costs are zero, the Home government is not willing to pay a positive fraction
of its debt and a ≥ 1 + g1
B1
> 1. On the other hand, if the Home agent holds all of
the Home debt obligations, the threshold is a ≥ g1−λy1
B1
and can become negative if
g1 > λy1. In this case the government would repay in the first place. The level at
which the Home government is indifferent between being bailed out by the Foreign
government and defaulting is defined as
a¯ = 1 +
g1 − b1 − λy1
B1
. (3.31)
3.5.2 Backward induction: Foreign’s bailout decision
The Foreign government is willing to provide a bailout to the Home government if
its value from providing the bailout is higher than its value from not providing the
bailout, i.e. if
V bailoutF ≥ V defaultF (3.32)
u(y∗1 − g∗1 + b∗1 − aB1) ≥ u(y∗1 − g∗1) (3.33)
b∗1 ≥ aB1. (3.34)
Therefore, the maximum bailout amax Foreign is willing to provide is
amax =
b∗1
B1
(3.35)
which is the fraction of total debt held by agents in the Foreign country. This is
already a key finding in this simplified version of the model: Without heterogeneity
in Foreign, the Foreign government will always be willing to provide a bailout up to
the fraction of total Home debt that is held by the Foreign representative household.
It is not always the optimal amount for Foreign to offer to the Home government.
As the Foreign government anticipates the optimal reaction function of the Home
government in the subgame of Home’s acceptance decision, the Foreign government’s
optimal strategy is to offer a bailout of size a¯ to the Home government, i.e. the
amount at which the Home government is indifferent between accepting the bailout
and defaulting. The Foreign government will make this offer if
a¯ ≤ amax. (3.36)
3.5.3 Backward induction: Home’s default decision
In turn, Home anticipates Foreign’s optimal behavior and its own optimal behavior
from the point of its default decision onward. The Home government’s value of
repaying, bailout and default are given by
V repayH = u(y1 − g1 + b1 −B1), (3.37)
V bailoutH = u(y1 − g1 + b1 − (1− a¯)B1), (3.38)
and
V defaultH = u((1− λ)y2), (3.39)
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respectively. Because the optimal bailout offer of Foreign in the case that Home
defaults will always set the Home government indifferent between being bailed out
and defaulting, it holds that
V bailoutH = V
default
H . (3.40)
Thus, the Home government’s decision to default or not reduces to a decision be-
tween two values. The Home country will prefer repayment to default (or being
bailed out) if
V repayH ≥ V defaultH (3.41)
u(y1 − g1 + b1 −B1) ≥ u((1− λ)y1). (3.42)
Thus, the Home government will repay if the Home household’s holdings of govern-
ment bonds are
b1 ≥ B1 + g1 − λy1. (3.43)
The Home country would only default if it would also find it optimal to default in
a world without bailouts.
3.6 Intuition: A Bailout Model with Heterogene-
ity
In this section, the bailout negotiation subgame is investigated for a world where
there is household heterogeneity in the Foreign bailout providing country. In Home,
for simplicity, there exists a representative household.
3.6.1 Backward induction: Home’s acceptance decision
Again, taking as given that Home has announced to default in the second period
given the state of the economy that has materialized (g1, B1, γ) and Foreign has
made a bailout offer a ∈ [0, 1], Home takes the decision to accept or reject this offer
according to
V accH ≥ V decH . (3.44)
Because there exists a representative Home household, the functional forms of V accH
and V decH remain the same as in the previous section. Thus, the level at which the
Home government is indifferent between being bailed out by the Foreign government
and defaulting also remains
a¯ = 1 +
g1 − b1 − λy1
B1
. (3.45)
3.6.2 Backward induction: Foreign’s bailout decision
Households in Foreign are now assumed to be heterogeneous in the way specified
in the general model setup. Therefore, the Foreign government’s bailout decision
changes because the Foreign utilitarian government weighs the utility levels of low
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and high income households to take its bailout decision. The Foreign government is
willing to provide a bailout to the Home government if its value from providing the
bailout is higher than its value from not providing the bailout, i.e. if
V bailoutF ≥ V defaultF (3.46)
γu(yL∗1 − g∗1 + bL∗1 − aB1) + (1− γ)u(yH∗1 − g∗1 + bH∗1 − aB1) ≥ u(y∗1 − g∗1). (3.47)
As I focus on equilibria in which bL∗1 = 0 and all household bond holdings cannot
be negative, the respective market clearing conditions imply that bH∗1 > b1∗ ≥ bL∗1 .
Here b1∗ is the optimal level of bond holdings in a model without heterogeneity.
Since the utility function is assumed to be strictly increasing and concave γu(yL∗1 −
g∗1 + b
L∗
1 −aB1) + (1−γ)u(yH∗1 − g∗1 + bH∗1 −aB1) ≤ u(y∗1− g∗1 + b∗1−aB1). Therefore,
the maximum bailout amax Foreign is willing to provide is
amax ≤ b
∗
1
B1
. (3.48)
This result states that in an economy with wealth heterogeneity in the bailout
providing country, this country is only willing to provide a bailout which is less or
equal to the fraction of total debt held by its agents. This is the key finding in the
model with heterogeneity: With heterogeneity in Foreign, the Foreign government
will not be willing to provide a bailout up to the fraction of total Home debt that
is held in total by the Foreign households. Again the share amax is the maximum
bailout level the Foreign government is willing to provide. It is not always the
optimal amount for Foreign to offer amax to the Home government. Anticipating
the optimal reaction function of the Home government, the Foreign government’s
optimal strategy is to offer a bailout of size a¯ to the Home government. The Foreign
government will make this offer if
a¯ ≤ ahetmax ≤ ahommax. (3.49)
This provides the main intuition of the paper. In the following, I investigate the
optimal first period choices of the different agents and find a parameterization that
illustrates under which circumstances bailouts and defaults are equilibrium outcomes
of the model economy.
3.7 First period in a Bailout Model with Hetero-
geneity
Now, I turn to the optimal first period decisions of the households and the Home
government in a model with household heterogeneity in the Foreign country. As
outlined in the general model setup, only the Home government is assumed to be
able to issue debt, while households in both countries can save using government
bonds. Moreover, I assume log-utility and there are stochastic government expendi-
ture shocks in the debt issuing Home country. For the Foreign country government
expenditure is deterministic. The Home government spending shock in period t = 1
is drawn from known a set of realizations[
g11 < g
2
1 < ... < g
M
1
]
(3.50)
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with transition probabilities
Π(gj1|g0) (3.51)
for j = 1, ...,M with
M∑
j=1
Π(gj1|g0) = 1. (3.52)
Furthermore, as D’Erasmo and Mendoza (2016) I concentrate on equilibria in which
the low-type foreign household does not save in government bonds, i.e. bL∗1 = 0.
This depends on the parameterization of the model and has to be checked in the
theoretical and numerical exercises. In this model version all the possible t = 1
default and bailout scenarios are possible, so consumption levels will depend on the
default and bailout negotiations.
Households
The preferences of the Home representative household are
ln(c0)+β
 M∑
j:R(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)ln(cR1 ) +
M∑
j:B(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)ln(cB1 ) +
M∑
j:D(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)ln(cD1 )

(3.53)
where the sums are taken over the second period states in which the anticipated
outcome of the bailout negotiations result in repayment (R(B1, g
j
1, γ) = 1), bailout
(B(B1, g
j
1, γ) = 1) and default (D(B1, g
j
1, γ) = 1), respectively. To form expecta-
tions over the possible second period outcomes, the Home household weighs the
consumption levels in each possible contingency by the probability of this contin-
gency materializing. The period t = 0 and the t = 1 consumption levels under
repayment, bailout and default are
c0 = y0 − τ0 + b0 − qb1 (3.54)
cR1 = y1 − τR1 + b1 (3.55)
cB1 = y1 − τB1 + b1 (3.56)
cD1 = (1− λ)y1. (3.57)
The preferences of the two types of Foreign households are
ln(ci∗0 )+β
 M∑
j:R(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)ln(ci∗,R1 ) +
M∑
j:B(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)ln(ci∗,B1 ) +
M∑
j:D(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)ln(ci∗,D1 )

(3.58)
for i = L,H. With bL∗1 = 0 the budget constraints of the L-type are
cL∗0 = y
∗
0 − τ ∗0
cL∗,R1 = y
∗
1 − τ ∗,R1
cL∗,B1 = y
∗
1 − τ ∗,B1
cL∗,D1 = y
∗
1 − τ ∗,D1
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and the ones for the H-type households are
cH∗0 = y
∗
0 − τ ∗0 + bH∗0 − qbH∗1
cH∗,R1 = y
∗
1 − τ ∗,R1 + bH∗1
cH∗,B1 = y
∗
1 − τ ∗,B1 + bH∗1
cH∗,D1 = y
∗
1 − τ ∗,D1 + bH∗1 .
All the three household types choose to save in the Home government bond by max-
imizing their expected utility over the two model periods. The resulting optimality
condition (Euler condition) for the Home household yields
q = β
 M∑
j:R(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)
c0
cR1
+
M∑
j:B(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)
c0
cB1
 . (3.59)
The Euler equation for the Foreign H-type household is
q = β
 M∑
j:R(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)
cH∗0
cH∗,R1
+
M∑
j:B(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)
cH∗0
cH∗,B1
 . (3.60)
Since I concentrate on equilibria in which the low-type foreign household does not
save in government bonds, the parameterization has to be chosen such that the
Foreign L-type household is ’credit constraint’, i.e. given its income stream it would
like to borrow, but bond holdings are restricted to bL∗1 ≥ 0. This is the case if for a
given equilibrium price
q > β
 M∑
j:R(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)
cH∗0
cL∗,R1
+
M∑
j:B(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)
cH∗0
cL∗,B1
 (3.61)
holds, stating that the marginal cost of buying a unit of government bonds is strictly
greater than the marginal benefit to shift consumption from t = 0 to t = 1.
Government
Home government’s budget constraints for period t = 0 and for t = 1 under repay-
ment and bailout are
τ0 = g0 +B0 − qB1
τR1 = g1 +B1,
τB1 = g1 + (1− a)B1,
respectively. The Foreign government cannot issue debt and therefore, its budget
constraints are:
τ ∗0 = g
∗
0
τ ∗,R1 = g
∗
1,
τ ∗,B1 = g
∗
1 + aB1,
τ ∗,D1 = g
∗
1.
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Furthermore, the Home government chooses the optimal amount of debt it issues to
maximize the Home household’s welfare. Its objective function is
maxB1 ln(c0) + β
 M∑
j:R(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)ln(cR1 ) +
M∑
j:B(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)ln(cB1 ) +
M∑
j:D(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)ln(cD1 )
 .
Bond market equilibrium
The bond market is in a competitive equilibrium if for a given amount of Home
government debt, the following market clearing condition is fulfilled. Given that the
Foreign L-type does not hold debt, this condition is
b1 + (1− γ)bH∗1 = B1. (3.62)
Using the Euler conditions of the Home household and the H-type Foreign household
together with the bond market equilibrium condition the market clearing bond price
q0 can be derived. Since the possibility exists that in equilibrium only one of the
two household types holds all the debt supplied by the Home government, different
cases arise for finding a solution: One in which only the Home household holds Home
government debt, another in which both the Home and the H-type Foreign household
hold Home government bonds and a third case in which only the H-type Foreign
household holds Home government debt. In the following subsections I work through
the implications of all three cases for the equilibrium bond price, optimal bond
holdings by the different household types and the optimal bond issuance decision
of the Home government. As the optimality conditions and optimal choices of the
full model with household heterogeneity and Home government spending shocks
is not always straightforward, I add some intuition of a simplified version of the
model without uncertainty and commitment to repay by the Home government.
The solution of this simplified model can be found in the appendix C.2.
Case 1: Only Home households holds bonds
If the equilibrium price is such that
q = β
 M∑
j:R(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)
c0
cR1
+
M∑
j:B(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)
c0
cB1

> β
 M∑
j:R(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)
cH∗0
cH∗,R1
+
M∑
j:B(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)
cH∗0
cH∗,B1
 ,
only the Home household will optimally hold bonds, and from market clearing the
demand of the Home household would be b1 = B1. Therefore, the planner’s problem
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is
L = maxB1ln(y0 − g0 − (1− η)B0) + β[
M∑
j:R(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)ln(y1 − g1)
+
M∑
j:B(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)ln(y1 − g1 + aB1) +
M∑
j:D(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)ln((1− λ)y1)].
In this model with heterogeneity among households in Foreign, I have shown that
the maximum bailout fraction Foreign is willing to provide is less than the fraction
of Home government bonds held in total by Foreign households. Therefore Foreign
is not willing to provide a positive bailout, if the Home household holds all the debt,
i.e. amax ≤ 0. Therefore, there are no bailout states and the planner’s problem
becomes
L = maxB1ln(y0 − g0 − (1− η)B0)
+ β
 M∑
j:R(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)ln(y1 − g1) +
M∑
j:D(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)ln((1− λ)y1)

This shows that the level of government debt only influences the Home agent’s
welfare through its influence on default and repayment probabilities, but that it does
not influence intertemporal consumption. Furthermore, the possibility of default will
make the equilibrium inconsistent. The Home household anticipates that it is taxed
fully in period t = 1 to repay any debt issued by the Home government in period
t = 0. Thus, it is only indifferent between holding the debt and not holding it, if there
is full commitment to repay. Said differently, any positive default probability renders
this case inconsistent. The Home government can only achieve this solution by not
issuing any debt, i.e. B1 = 0 is the optimal debt issuance decision in this case. In
the simple model without uncertainty, the planner’s problem becomes independent
of Home government debt altogether if only the Home household holds bonds. In
both cases, with and without uncertainty, the Home government cannot influence
welfare at all with its debt issuance decision. Adding uncertainty therefore does not
make a difference in case 1. This does not mean, however, that this case is generally
not of interest. If we would add heterogeneity between households in Home, this
case 1 would be similar to the one investigated by D’Erasmo and Mendoza (2016)
and default would become a mean of redistribution between Home households, even
if no Foreign agents hold debt.
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Case 2: Both the Home and the Foreign L-type households hold Home
government bonds
If the equilibrium price is such that
q = β
 M∑
j:R(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)
c0
cR1
+
M∑
j:B(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)
c0
cB1

= β
 M∑
j:R(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)
cH∗0
cH∗,R1
+
M∑
j:B(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)
cH∗0
cH∗,B1
 ,
both the Home household and the Foreign H-type household want to hold Home
government debt. The market clearing condition in the bond market for this case is
given by b1 + (1− γ)bH∗1 = B1. Furthermore, I assume that Home households hold
a fraction η of the initial debt stock B0 and the Foreign H-type household holds the
remainder, i.e. per capita it holds 1−η
1−γB0. Using this in the price expression for the
Home household, I obtain
q = β
∑M
j:R(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0) y0−g0−(1−η)B0y1−g1−(1−γ)bH∗1 +
∑M
j:B(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0) y0−g0−(1−η)B0y1−g1+aB1−(1−γ)bH∗1
1−∑Mj:R(B1,gj1,γ)=1 Π(gj1|g0) (1−γ)bH∗1y1−g1−(1−γ)bH∗1 −∑Mj:B(B1,gj1,γ)=1 Π(gj1|g0) (1−γ)bH∗1y1−g1+aB1−(1−γ)bH∗1 .
Note that the bond price depends on B1 through the size of the bailouts in bailout
states of the world, as well as through its influence on the second period bailout
negotiation outcomes. From the price expression for the Foreign H-type household
I obtain
q = β
∑M
j:R(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)
y∗0−g∗0+ 1−η1−γB0
y∗1−g∗1+bH∗1
+
∑M
j:B(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)
y∗0−g∗0+ 1−η1−γB0
y∗1−g∗1+aB1+bH∗1
1 +
∑M
j:R(B1,g
j
1,...)=1
Π(gj1|g0) b
H∗
1
y∗1−g∗1+bH∗1
+
∑M
j:B(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0) b
H∗
1
y∗1−g∗1+aB1+bH∗1
.
Again the bond price depends on B1 through the size of the bailouts in bailout
states of the world, as well as through its influence on the second period bailout
negotiation outcomes. In equilibrium,∑M
j:R(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0) y0−g0−(1−η)B0y1−g1−(1−γ)bH∗1 +
∑M
j:B(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0) y0−g0−(1−η)B0y1−g1+aB1−(1−γ)bH∗1
1−∑Mj:R(B1,gj1,γ)=1 Π(gj1|g0) (1−γ)bH∗1y1−g1−(1−γ)bH∗1 −∑Mj:B(B1,gj1,γ)=1 Π(gj1|g0) (1−γ)bH∗1y1−g1+aB1−(1−γ)bH∗1
=
∑M
j:R(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)
y∗0−g∗0+ 1−η1−γB0
y∗1−g∗1+bH∗1
+
∑M
j:B(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)
y∗0−g∗0+ 1−η1−γB0
y∗1−g∗1+aB1+bH∗1
1 +
∑M
j:R(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0) b
H∗
1
y∗1−g∗1+bH∗1
+
∑M
j:B(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0) b
H∗
1
y∗1−g∗1+aB1+bH∗1
This equation implicitly defines the optimal bond demand of Foreign H-type agents.
In the numerical section, I investigate how changes in B1 influence the equilibrium
bond price for a suitable parameterization example. If there would be no default
or bailout, the Foreign H-type’s bond demand bH∗1 would be independent of B1 and
there would be a unique optimal level of savings the Foreign H-type household would
like to hold in Home government bonds. With the possibility of default and bailout
this level varies with the likelihood of default and bailout states, as well as with the
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total amount of Home debt and the bailout size in each state. To get a clearer picture
of how the optimal bond demand and equilibrium pricing will look like, I present
these expressions for the simple model without heterogeneity and uncertainty. The
same steps for the simple model yield a closed form solution to optimal Foreign bond
holdings
b∗1 =
(y0 − g0 − (1− η)B0)(y∗1 − g∗1)− (y∗0 − g∗0 + 1−η1−γB0)(y1 − g1))
(y∗0 − g∗0 + 1−η1−γB0)(1 + β)(1− η)− (y0 − g0 − (1− η)B0)(1 + β)
. (3.63)
One can see that the demand for Home government debt by the Foreign H-type
household does not depend on the level of debt issued by the Home government B1.
It is solely determined by the parameters of the model. This demand pins down the
equilibrium price of debt to
q = β
y∗0 − g∗0 + 1−η1−γB0
y∗1 − g∗1 + (1 + β)bH∗1
(3.64)
which is then independent of B1 as well. The bond demand of the Home household
is derived from the market clearing condition as
b1 = B1 − (1− γ)bH∗1 . (3.65)
Since the demand of the Foreign H-type household is independent of B1, in the case
that Home households and Foreign H-type households hold debt and bond holdings
cannot be negative, the debt level issued by the government has to be at least
B1 > (1−γ)bH∗1 . Otherwise the Home household will not buy government bonds. For
the case that B1 > (1−γ)bH∗1 , the Home household will buy all residual government
debt above (1− γ)bH∗1 . Therefore, the Home government will be indifferent between
issuing B1 = (1− γ)bH∗1 and any other amount B1 > (1− γ)bH∗1 . The intertemporal
consumption levels of the Home household, and therefore its welfare, is not altered
by issuing any B1 > (1 − γ)bH∗1 . This case plays a role, if welfare is maximized
by an amount of debt larger or equal to the full demand for government bonds by
the Foreign household. Interestingly, the potential welfare gain from issuing debt
even under commitment in this model, is limited by the Foreign H-type household’s
demand for these bonds. In this case, the government can issue even more debt
without influencing the Home household’s welfare, as the Home household will just
hold the residual government debt, keeping its consumption levels the same. Turning
back to the full model, the presence of a government spending shock to the Home
economy as well as default and bailout possibilities will lead to dependence of the
Foreign bond demand on the Home government debt level. The higher the debt level
B1 and the higher therefore the possibility of default and bailout states, the lower
the Foreign household will value the expected value from saving in Home bonds
at a given price q0. The overall effect on prices and demand is not clear from the
analytical equation for the full model above and is investigated in more detail using
a numerical example in the next section of the paper.
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Case 3: Only Foreign H-type holds debt
The third case becomes relevant if the equilibrium price is such that
q = β
 M∑
j:R(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)
cH∗0
cH∗,R1
+
M∑
j:B(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)
cH∗0
cH∗,B1

> β
 M∑
j:R(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)
c0
cR1
+
M∑
j:B(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)
c0
cB1
 .
In this case, only the Foreign H-type household is saving in Home government bonds.
The market clearing condition in the bond market for this case is given by (1 −
γ)bH∗1 = B1, so the bond demand of the Foreign H-type household is b
H∗
1 =
B1
(1−γ) .
Using this in the price expression for the Foreign H-type household yields
q = β
∑M
j:R(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)
y∗0−g∗0+ 1−η1−γB0
y∗1−g∗1+ B1(1−γ)
+
∑M
j:B(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)
y∗0−g∗0+ 1−η1−γB0
y∗1−g∗1+aB1+ B1(1−γ)
1 +
∑M
j:R(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)
B1
(1−γ)
y∗1−g∗1+ B1(1−γ)
+
∑M
j:B(B1,g
j
1,γ)=1
Π(gj1|g0)
B1
(1−γ)
y∗1−g∗1+aB1+ B1(1−γ)
where the equilibrium bond price varies with the level of debt issued by the Home
government in repayment as well as in bailout states. Again the numerical section
provides an example of how the equilibrium price and optimal bond holdings react
to changes in the government debt issued by the Home government. Again, to
gain some baseline intuition in the simpler model using the price expression for the
Foreign H-type household yields
q(B1) = β
y∗0 − g∗0 + 1−η1−γB0
y∗1 − g∗1 + (1 + β) B1(1−γ)
where the equilibrium bond price varies with the level of debt issued by the Home
government. In particular the first order condition of the equilibrium price with
respect to B1 is
q′(B1) =
−q(B1)1+β1−γ
y∗1 − g∗1 + 1+β(1−γ)B1
. (3.66)
Given that the bond price in equilibrium is positive, it holds that
q′(B1) < 0. (3.67)
Therefore, in the simpler model the equilibrium price falls with the debt level B1
in the case that only the Foreign H-type household holds government debt. As the
presence of default and bailout states also depend on the government debt level B1,
it will add an additional layer of effects to the baseline effect in the simpler model.
The overall effect is not clear here, but with modest probabilities of default and
bailout states, the baseline effect will dominate the equilibrium price’s dependence
on the government debt stock B1. The numerical section will shed more light on
this for a specific example parameterization.
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Table 3.1 – Parameterization
Parameter Description Value
β discount rate 0.96
σ relative risk aversion 1
γ % of low wealth households in Foreign [0.4,0.6,0.8]
λ proportionate output loss in default 0.74
Exogenous income process
y0 t = 0 Home household income 0.94
y1 t = 1 Home household income 0.79
y∗0 t = 0 Foreign household income 0.225
y∗1 t = 1 Foreign household income 0.79
Government spending process
B0 Initial debt of Home government 0.3
η share of B0 held by Home household 0.5
g0 t = 0 Home government spending 0.5
g∗0 t = 0 Foreign government spending 0.2
g∗1 t = 1 Foreign government spending 0.3
g1 t = 1 Home government spending [0.1, 0.5, 0.55, 0.58, 0.6]
Π g1 probability distribution [0.9398, 0.02, 0.04, 0.0001, 0.0001]
3.8 Numerical results
As the interpretation of the analytical expressions of the equilibrium bond price
and the resulting equilibrium bond holdings for the different cases above is not
straightforward, this section provides a numerical example and shows numerical
comparative statics for the equilibrium outcomes of the model with heterogeneity
and bailouts.
3.9 Parmeterization
In this paper I choose a parametrization for which all possible outcomes of the
model happen in equilibrium to generate an example situation in which the Foreign
government refuses a bailout. This is a feature that only arises due to the wealth
heterogeneity in the Foreign bailout providing country. The chosen parametrization
is specified in table 3.1. I start with the optimal bond holding decisions, which
help to understand the optimal debt issuance decision of the Home government
and equilibrium prices. Thereafter, I present the equilibrium default and bailout
decisions of the second period.
3.9.1 Equilibrium Bond Holdings and Bond Price
For the parameterization chosen above, Figures 3.2 to 3.4 show the optimal equilib-
rium bond holdings of all three types of households and for three different values of
the dispersion of wealth in the Foreign country γ. For γ = 0.4 in figure 3.2 it can
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be observed that the Foreign H-type household demands all the government bonds
issued by the Home government for low values of government debt up to B1 = 0.02
(blue line). For B1 = 0.02 the H-type Foreign household is able to carry its optimal
savings over to the next period for the given equilibrium price. From this point
on all additional government debt issued by the Home government is bought by the
Home household and the equilibrium price stays constant at the level determined by
the Foreign H-type household’s demand (purple line in figure 3.5). As I concentrate
on equilibria in which the Foreign L-type household is credit constraint and does
not hold any debt, it’s optimal bond demand is zero for all debt levels (dots).
Figure 3.2 – Optimal bond holdings for γ = 0.4
For γ = 0.6 in figure 3.3 the debt level for which the Foreign H-type household can
satisfy its optimal savings demand and the Home household starts to demand the
residual is higher, at between approximately B1 = 0.06 and B1 = 0.07. From the
equilibrium price figure, one can observe that the equilibrium price for the segment
in which only the Foreign H-type demands bonds varies with the level of B1, while
as soon as the Home household starts demanding Home bonds as well, the demand
of the Foreign H-type household determines a constant equilibrium price of Home
bonds. This is in line with the findings in the theoretical section of this paper.
Note, that for higher γ, the equilibrium bond price increases. This is surprising
at first sight, as higher dispersion means that there are more states of bailout or
outright default. At the same time, tough, the first period debt stock held by foreign
households is constant while the share of high-types holding that debt is reduced.
Therefore, the per-capita wealth of H-type households is increased, making them
save more and thus they are willing to pay a higher price for a home bond. Due
to the low probability of default and bailout states this second effect outweighs the
first effect. From the theoretical section we could not anticipate the shape of how
the equilibrium price depend on the government debt level, as the price function in
the model with default and bailouts is not differentiable. Figure 3.5 shows that the
equilibrium price for a given γ is falling in the government debt level, which is also
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due to the fact that the Home government is more likely to default on high debt
levels, compared to low debt levels.
Figure 3.3 – Optimal bond holdings for γ = 0.6
Figure 3.4 – Optimal bond holdings for γ = 0.8
For γ = 0.8 in figure 3.4 the debt level for which the Foreign H-type household can
satisfy its optimal savings demand is higher than the specified range of government
debt values investigated. The point to take away from the comparison of the different
households’ government bond demands for different dispersion values of wealth in
the Foreign country is that the higher the dispersion, i.e. the lower the share of
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Foreign households rich enough to be able to save in Home government debt, the
higher the equilibrium bond holdings of the H-type Foreign households that satisfy
market clearing and the higher the equilibrium price.
Figure 3.5 – Bond price vs. debt level
3.9.2 Optimal debt issuance depending on γ
Figure ?? shows the welfare of the Home household according to the Home govern-
ment’s utilitarian welfare function. It shows that it is optimal for the Home house-
hold to issue a positive amount of debt. This amount is approximately B1 = 0.02 for
γ = 0.4, B1 = 0.025 for γ = 0.6 and B1 = 0.03 for γ = 0.8 as the welfare level peaks
in these points for different values of γ. Looking at the full range of values for B1
one can see that the welfare varies more for values of B1 such that B1 ≤ bH∗1,max, i.e.
the point where the optimal demand of the Foreign H-type household is completely
satisfied and the Home household starts buying its own debt. Since the probabilities
on default and bailout states in the model are set to be low to show and highlight
the possibility of a default outcome, the lines do not differ much from the deter-
ministic case for which I explained the intuition above, once the Home household
starts buying Home government bonds, the Home household’s welfare is unaffected
by the level of debt issued. While in the cases of default and bailouts, the welfare
still varies slightly with the debt level.
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Figure 3.6 – Home welfare
Foreign welfare does not vary significantly with the level of B1. For the case of
γ = 0.8 the welfare is improved with a higher level of B1, since the Foreign H-
type household is not able to satisfy its optimal demand. In equilibrium the Home
government will only issue B1 = 0.03 in this case. There are, however, significant
welfare differences between the difference levels of γ. There are two drivers for
this. First, with rising γ default and bailout states become more frequent, raising
the chances that the Home government will not service its debt and lowering the
Foreign H-type’s welfare. Second, and more prominent, the weight of the H-type
household in the Foreign government’s utilitarian welfare function is reduced for
higher γ contributing to lower levels of total welfare.
Figure 3.7 – Foreign welfare
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3.9.3 Second period decisions
For the given parameterization and the optimal levels of indebtedness found above,
the equilibrium repayment(light gray), bailout (gray) and default decisions (black),
for each realization of the second period Home government spending shock and for
the different levels of wealth dispersion in Foreign γ, are given in figures 3.8 to 3.10.
They show that with increasing dispersion, the Home government will repay for less
states of the world, while the number of bailout and default states increases. This
is because a constant bailout size that sets the Home household indifferent between
accepting the bailout and defaulting, has to be financed by a smaller portion of the
Foreign households and these H-type households become less willing to provide the
demanded bailout the fewer they are in numbers.
Figure 3.8 – Second period decisions in equilibrium, γ = 0.4
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Figure 3.9 – Second period decisions in equilibrium, γ = 0.6
Figure 3.10 – Second period decisions in equilibrium, γ = 0.8
3.10 Discussion of Social Welfare Function
As for D’Erasmo and Mendoza (2016), the main result of this paper, namely that
bailing out the Home country is not always optimal for Foreign even though house-
holds of the potentially helping Foreign country hold government bonds of the trou-
bling Home country, depends on the assumption of a utilitarian government. This
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utilitarian government weighs the consumption levels of both types of agents in the
Foreign country of this model equally. If one would instead assume a government
that puts more weight on H-type households than on L-type households, the states
of the world where outright default is optimal would decrease and in the extreme
case that the Foreign government only values H-types’ consumption, just as in a rep-
resentative agent model, it would always be optimal for Foreign to provide a bailout
to Home as soon as Foreign H-types hold a positive amount of Home government
bonds. But as long as the Foreign government places a positive weight on L-type
households and Home debt is held in Foreign, it can be optimal for Foreign to refuse
a bailout to Home at least in some state states of the world.
3.11 Conclusion
In this paper I show how the default and bailout decisions of two countries that
are interlinked through sovereign debt holdings of their households depend on the
wealth distribution within the bailout providing country and the resulting disper-
sion in bond holdings of a specific country. I find that the willingness to bailout
another country is shrinking in the dispersion of government bond holdings within
the country providing the bailout. Thus, there are situations in which it is optimal
for Foreign not to bail Home out although Foreign agents hold Home debt. The re-
sults of the paper have important policy implications for the current bailout policy
in the EU debt crisis. They imply that the dispersion of bond holdings within and
across EMU member countries play a significant role in determining the willingness
of a country to provide a bailout for another country. My results indicate that there
could arise situations in which a country might find it optimal not to provide a
bailout to another country although its agents hold bonds of the distressed country.
This finding is a major contribution to the literature on defaults and bailouts so far.
It arises because of the distributional bailout incentives introduced in this paper.
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A.1 Country Groups
Table A.1 – Country Groups
Group Included Countries
Full Sample Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
United Kingdom, United States
EU-13 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, United Kingdom
G7 Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
United Kingdom, United States
NAFTA Canada, Mexico, United States
Oceania Australia, New Zealand
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A.2 Equilibrium conditions
A.2.1 Households
First, I will derive the first-order conditions of the Home household. The Lagrangian
of the country 1 household’s problem is given by
L = maxc1(st),n1(st),x1(st),k1(st+1),B1(st),u1(st)
∞∑
t=0
βt
∑
st
pi(st){1
γ
[
c1(s
t)µ(1− n1(st))1−µ
]γ
+ λ1(s
t)[qa1(s
t)
(
w1(s
t)n1(s
t) + u1(s
t)r1(s
t)k1(s
t)
)
+ qa1(s
t)
(
B1(s
t−1)− Φ(B1(st))
)
− c1(st)− x1(st)− qa1(st)Q(st)B1(st)−
φ
2
k1(s
t)
[
x1(s
t)
k1(st)
− δu1(st)η
]2
]
+ ϑ1(s
t)[
(
1− δu1(st)η
)
k1(s
t) + x1(s
t)− k1(st+1)]
+ ψ1(s
t)
[
Ψ− u1(st)
]}.
The first-order conditions are:
∂L
∂c1(st)
: µ
[c1(s
t)µ(1− n1(st))1−µ]γ
c1(st)
= λ1(s
t)
∂L
∂n1(st)
: (1− µ) [c1(s
t)µ(1− n1(st))1−µ]γ
1− n1(st) = λ1(s
t)qa1(s
t)w1(s
t)
∂L
∂x1(st)
: λ1(s
t) = ϑ1(s
t)
[
1− φ
(
x1(s
t)
k1(st
− δu1(st)η)
)]
∂L
∂k1(st)
: ϑ1(s
t) = β
∑
st+1
Π(st+1|st){λ1(st+1)[qa1(st+1)r1(st+1)u1(st+1)
− φ
(
1
2
(
x1(s
t+1)
k1(st+1)
− δu1(st+1)η
)
− x1(s
t+1)
k1(st+1)
)(
x1(s
t+1)
k1(st+1)
− δu1(st+1)η
)
]
+ ϑ1(s
t+1)(1− δu1(st+1)η)}
∂L
∂B1(st)
: Q(st) = β
∑
st+1
Π(st+1|st)
[
λ1(s
t+1)
λ1(st)
qa1(s
t+1)
qa1(s
t)
]
− Φ′ (B1(st))
∂L
∂u1(st)
: Ψ1(s
t) = λ1(s
t)
[
qa1(s
t)r1(s
t)k1(s
t) + ηδu1(s
t)η−1k1(st)φ
(
x1(s
t+1)
k1(st+1)
− δu1(st+1)η
)]
− ϑ1(st)ηδu1(st)η−1k1(st).
For the Foreign household the Lagrangian is
L = maxc2(st),n2(st),x2(st),k2(st+1),B2(st),u2(st)
∞∑
t=0
βt
∑
st
pi(st){1
γ
[
c2(s
t)µ(1− n2(st))1−µ
]γ
+ λ2(s
t)[qb2(s
t)
(
w2(s
t)n2(s
t) + u2(s
t)r2(s
t)k2(s
t)
)
+ qa2(s
t)
(
B2(s
t−1)− Φ(B2(st))
)
− c2(st)− x2(st)− qa2(st)Q(st)B2(st)−
φ
2
k2(s
t)
[
x2(s
t)
k2(st)
− δu2(st)η
]2
]
+ ϑ2(s
t)[
(
1− δu2(st)η
)
k2(s
t) + x2(s
t)− k2(st+1)]
+ ψ2(s
t)
[
Ψ− u2(st)
]}.
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The first-order conditions are:
∂L
∂c2(st)
: µ
[c2(s
t)µ(1− n2(st))1−µ]γ
c2(st)
= λ2(s
t) (A.1)
∂L
∂n2(st)
: (1− µ) [c2(s
t)µ(1− n2(st))1−µ]γ
1− n2(st) = λ2(s
t)qb2(s
t)w2(s
t) (A.2)
∂L
∂x2(st)
: λ2(s
t) = ϑ2(s
t)
[
1− φ
(
x2(s
t)
k2(st
− δu2(st)η)
)]
(A.3)
∂L
∂k2(st)
: ϑ2(s
t) = β
∑
st+1
Π(st+1|st){λ2(st+1)[qb2(st+1)r2(st+1)u2(st+1) (A.4)
− φ
(
1
2
(
x2(s
t+1)
k2(st+1)
− δu2(st+1)η
)
− x2(s
t+1)
k2(st+1)
)(
x2(s
t+1)
k2(st+1)
− δu2(st+1)η
)
] (A.5)
+ ϑ2(s
t+1)(1− δu2(st+1)η)} (A.6)
∂L
∂B2(st)
: Q(st) = β
∑
st+1
Π(st+1|st)
[
λ2(s
t+1)
λ2(st)
qa2(s
t+1)
qa2(s
t)
]
− Φ′ (B2(st)) (A.7)
∂L
∂u2(st)
: Ψ2(s
t) = λ2(s
t)
[
qb2(s
t)r2(s
t)k2(s
t) + ηδu2(s
t)η−1k2(st)φ
(
x2(s
t+1)
k2(st+1)
− δu2(st+1)η
)]
(A.8)
− ϑ2(st)ηδu2(st)η−1k2(st). (A.9)
In addition, to the first order condition, also the budget constraints and the laws
of motion for capital are optimality conditions. Because of the occasionally binding
capacity utilization constraint, two complementary slackness conditions form part
of the optimality conditions as well. They are
ψi(s
t)
[
Ψ− ui(st)
]
= 0 (A.10)
for i = 1, 2.
Now, we turn to the optimality conditions of the firms.
A.2.2 Intermediate Firms
The intermediate firm’s static maximization problem in country i after history st is
given by
L = maxki(st),ni(st){ezi(s
t)
(
ui(s
t)ki(s
t)
)θ
ni(s
t)1−θ − wi(st)ni(st)− ri(st)ui(st)ki(st)}.
(A.11)
The first-order conditions are:
∂L
∂ki(st)
: ezi(s
t)θ
(
ui(s
t)ki(s
t)
)θ−1
ui(s
t)ni(s
t)1−θ = ri(st)ui(st) (A.12)
∂L
∂ni(st)
: ezi(s
t)(1− θ) (ui(st)ki(st))θ ni(st)−θ = wi(st). (A.13)
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This simplifies to:
∂L
∂ki(st)
: θ
yi(s
t)
ki(st)
= ri(s
t)ui(s
t) (A.14)
∂L
∂ni(st)
: (1− θ) yi(s
t)
ni(st)
= wi(s
t) (A.15)
for i = 1, 2, where yi(s
t) = F (zi(s
t), ki(s
t), ni(s
t), ui(s
t)) wi(s
t) and ri(s
t) are denoted
in local intermediary good.
A.2.3 Final good firms
The country 1’s final good firm’s maximization problem is
L = maxa1(st),b1(st){[ω1a1(st)
σ−1
σ + (1− ω1)b1(st)σ−1σ ] σσ−1 − qa1(st)a1(st)− qb1(st)b1(st)}.
(A.16)
The first-order conditions are:
∂L
∂a1(st)
: qa1(s
t) =
σ
σ − 1[ω1a1(s
t)
σ−1
σ + (1− ω1)b1(st)σ−1σ ] σσ−1−1σ − 1
σ
ω1a1(s
t)
σ−1
σ
−1
(A.17)
∂L
∂b1(st)
: qb1(s
t) =
σ
σ − 1[ω1a1(s
t)
σ−1
σ + (1− ω1)b1(st)σ−1σ ] σσ−1−1σ − 1
σ
(1− ω1)b1(st)σ−1σ −1.
(A.18)
They simplify to
qa1(s
t) = [ω1a1(s
t)
σ−1
σ + (1− ω1)b1(st)σ−1σ ] 1σ−1ω1a1(st)− 1σ (A.19)
qb1(s
t) = [ω1a1(s
t)
σ−1
σ + (1− ω1)b1(st)σ−1σ ] 1σ−1 (1− ω1)b1(st)− 1σ . (A.20)
(qa1(s
t))σ = [ω1a1(s
t)
σ−1
σ + (1− ω1)b1(st)σ−1σ ] σσ−1ωσ1a1(st)−
σ
σ (A.21)
(qb1(s
t))σ = [ω1a1(s
t)
σ−1
σ + (1− ω1)b1(st)σ−1σ ] σσ−1 (1− ω1)σb1(st)−σσ . (A.22)
a1(s
t) = G1ω
σ
1 (q
a
1(s
t))−σ (A.23)
b1(s
t) = G1(1− ω1)σ(qb1(st))−σ. (A.24)
For country 2’s final good firm’s maximization problem is
L = maxa2(st),b2(st){[(1− ω1)ai(st)
σ−1
σ + ω1bi(s
t)
σ−1
σ ]
σ
σ−1 − qa2(st)a2(st)− qb2(st)b2(st)}.
(A.25)
The first-order conditions are:
∂L
∂a2(st)
: qa2(s
t) =
σ
σ − 1[(1− ω1)ai(s
t)
σ−1
σ + ω1bi(s
t)
σ−1
σ ]
σ
σ−1−1(1− ω1)σ − 1
σ
ai(s
t)
σ−1
σ
−1
(A.26)
∂L
∂b2(st)
: qb2(s
t) =
σ
σ − 1[(1− ω1)ai(s
t)
σ−1
σ + ω1bi(s
t)
σ−1
σ ]
σ
σ−1ω1
σ − 1
σ
bi(s
t)
σ−1
σ
−1.
(A.27)
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And this simplifies to
a2(s
t) = G2ω
σ
1 (q
a
2(s
t))−σ (A.28)
b2(s
t) = G2(1− ω1)σ(qb2(st))−σ. (A.29)
A.3 Data Sources
Table A.2 – Data Sources
Country Variable Source Datastream ID (if available)
US TFP Fernald (2012) -
Capacity Utilization Federal Reserve USCAPUTLQ
GDP BEA USGDP...D
Canada Capacity Utilization CANSIM CNCAPUTLR
GDP OECD CNOEXO03D
France Capacity Utilization OECD FROBS076Q
GDP INSEE FRGDP...D
Germany Capacity Utilization OECD BDOBS076Q
GDP OECD BDOEXO03D
Italy Capacity Utilization OECD ITOBS076Q
GDP OECD ITOEXO03D
A.4 Domestic US responses in specifications with
Germany and Italy
Figure A.1 – US - Germany impulse response functions - US variables
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Figure A.2 – US - Italy impulse response functions - US variables
A.5 Results on omitted countries
US - France
For France the prior threshold estimate at 79.65− 1.15.
Figure A.3 – US - France impulse response functions - US variables
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Figure A.4 – US - France impulse response functions - Canada variables
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Appendix Chapter 2
B.1 The equation system
• Price indices: [
α1ρ
1−ω
H,t + α2ρ
1−ω
X,t + (1− α1 − α2)ρ1−ωFDI,t
]
= 1 (B.1)[
α1ρ
∗1−ω
H,t + α2ρ
∗1−ω
X,t + (1− α1 − α2)ρ∗1−ωFDI,t
]
= 1 (B.2)
• Price indices - Domestic Components:
ρH,t = N
−ψ
D,t ρ˜D,t (B.3)
ρ∗H,t = N
∗−ψ
D,t ρ˜
∗
D,t (B.4)
• Price indices - Imported Components:
ρX,t = N
∗−ψ
X,t ρ˜
∗
X,t (B.5)
ρ∗X,t = N
−ψ
D,t ρ˜X,t (B.6)
• Price indices - FDI Components:
ρFDI,t = N
∗−ψ
I,t ρ˜
∗
I,t (B.7)
ρ∗FDI,t = N
−ψ
I,t ρ˜I,t (B.8)
• Firm level pricing - Domestically sold goods:
ρ˜D,t =
σ
σ − 1
wt
Ztz˜D,t
(B.9)
ρ˜∗D,t =
σ
σ − 1
w∗t
Z∗t z˜∗D,t
(B.10)
• Firm level pricing - Exported goods:
ρ˜X,t =
τt
Qt
σ
σ − 1
wt
Ztz˜X,t
(B.11)
ρ˜∗X,t = τ
∗
t Qt
σ
σ − 1
w∗t
Z∗t z˜∗X,t
(B.12)
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• Firm level pricing - FDI goods sold by foreign affiliates:
ρ˜I,t =
σ
σ − 1
w∗t
Z∗t z˜I,t
(B.13)
ρ˜∗I,t =
σ
σ − 1
wt
Ztz˜I,t
∗
(B.14)
• Total average profits:
d˜t = d˜D,t +
NX,t
ND,t
d˜X,t +
NI,t
ND,t
d˜I,t (B.15)
d˜∗t = d˜
∗
D,t +
N∗X,t
N∗D,t
d˜∗X,t +
N∗I,t
N∗D,t
d˜∗I,t (B.16)
• Average profits from domestically sold goods:
d˜D,t =
1
σ
N
ψ(ω−1)−1
D,t ρ˜
1−ω
D,t α1Ct (B.17)
d˜∗D,t =
1
σ
N
∗ψ(ω−1)−1
D,t ρ˜
∗1−ω
D,t α1C
∗
t (B.18)
• Average profits from exported goods:
d˜X,t =
1
σ
QtN
ψ(ω−1)−1
X,t ρ˜
1−ω
X,t α
∗
2C
∗
t −
wtfX,t
Zt
(B.19)
d˜∗X,t =
1
σ
1
Qt
N
∗ψ(ω−1)−1
X,t ρ˜
∗1−ω
X,t α2Ct −
w∗t f
∗
X,t
Z∗t
(B.20)
• Average profits from FDI goods produced by foreign affiliate:
d˜I,t = Qt
[
1
σ
N
ψ(ω−1)−1
I,t ρ˜
1−ω
I,t (1− α1 − α2)C∗t −
w∗t f
∗
I,t
Z∗t
]
(B.21)
d˜∗I,t =
1
Qt
[
1
σ
N
∗ψ(ω−1)−1
I,t ρ˜
∗1−ω
I,t (1− α1 − α2)Ct −
wtfI,t
Zt
]
(B.22)
• Free-entry conditions:
v˜st = wt
fE,t
ZE,t
(B.23)
v˜s∗t = w
∗
t
f ∗E,t
Z∗E,t
(B.24)
• Optimal labor supply:
χL
1
ψ
t = wtC
−γ
t (B.25)
χL
∗ 1
ψ
t = w
∗
tC
∗−γ
t (B.26)
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• Labor market clearing:
Lt =
(σ − 1)
wt
[
ND,td˜D,t +NX,td˜X,t +N
∗
I,tQtd˜
∗
I,t
]
+
σ
Zt
[
NE,tfE,t
σ
+NX,tfX,t +N
∗
I,tfI,t
]
(B.27)
L∗t =
(σ − 1)
w∗t
[
N∗D,td˜
∗
D,t +N
∗
X,td˜
∗
X,t +NI,tQ
−1
t d˜I,t
]
+
σ
Z∗t
[
N∗E,tf
∗
E,t
σ
+N∗X,tf
∗
X,t +NI,tf
∗
I,t
]
(B.28)
• Share of exporters:
NX,t
ND,t
= (zmin)
k(z˜−kX,t − z˜−kI,t ) (B.29)
N∗X,t
N∗D,t
= (zmin)
∗k(z˜∗−kX,t − z˜∗−kI,t ) (B.30)
• Share of FDI firms:
NI,t
ND,t
= (zmin)
k(z˜I,t)
−k
(
k
k − (σ − 1)
) k
σ−1
(B.31)
N∗I,t
N∗D,t
= (zmin)
∗k(z˜I,t)∗−k
(
k
k − (σ − 1)
) k
σ−1
, (B.32)
• Zero-profit export cutoff:
d˜X,t =

O

(
fX,t
α∗2
) k−σ+1
1−ω −
[
(TOLt)
ω
τ1−ωt
(
f∗I,t
1−α∗1−α∗2
)(
NX,t
NI,t
)(ψ(ω−1)−1)] k−σ+11−ω
(
fX,t
α∗2
) k
1−ω −
[
(TOLt)
ω
(
f∗I,t
1−α∗1−α∗2
)
τ1−ωt
(
NX,t
NI,t
)(ψ(ω−1)−1)] k1−ω


ω−1
σ−1
α∗2 − fX,t

wt
Zt
(B.33)
d˜∗X,t =

O

(
f∗X,t
α2
) k−σ+1
1−ω −
[
(TOLt)
−ω
τ1−ωt
(
fI,t
1−α1−α2
)(
N∗X,t
N∗I,t
)(ψ(ω−1)−1)] k−σ+11−ω
(
f∗X,t
α2
) k
1−ω −
[
(TOLt)
−ω
(
fI,t
1−α1−α2
)
τ1−ωt
(
N∗X,t
N∗I,t
)(ψ(ω−1)−1)] k1−ω


ω−1
σ−1
α2 − f∗X,t

w∗t
Zt
∗
(B.34)
• Zero-profit FDI cutoff:
d˜I,t = Qt
(
O 1−ω1−σ − 1
) w∗t
Z∗t
f ∗I,t (B.35)
d˜∗I,t =
1
Qt
(
O 1−ω1−σ − 1
) wt
Zt
fI,t (B.36)
• Law of motion of domestic firms:
ND,t+1 = (1− δ)(ND,t +NE,t) (B.37)
N∗D,t+1 = (1− δ)(N∗D,t +N∗E,t) (B.38)
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• Terms of Labor:
TOLt =
(
wt
ZtQt
)−1(
w∗t
Z∗t
)
(B.39)
• Definitions of returns:
rsh,t = (1− δ)
v˜st + d˜t
v˜st−1
(B.40)
rsf,t = (1− δ)
v˜s∗t + d˜
∗
t
v˜s∗t−1
Qt
Qt−1
(B.41)
rbh,t =
vbt + d
b
t
vbt−1
(B.42)
rbf,t =
vb∗t + d
b∗
t
vb∗t−1
Qt
Qt−1
(B.43)
• Euler Home and Foreign:
C−γ−νt Et
[
C−γt+1
]
= C∗−γ−νt Et
[
∗C−γt+1
Qt
Qt+1
]
(B.44)
• Euler Home and Foreign:
1 = β¯Cγ−νt Et{(Ct+1)−γrsh,t+1} (B.45)
1 = β¯Cγ−νt Et{(Ct+1)−γrsf,t+1} (B.46)
1 = β¯Cγ−νt Et{(Ct+1)−γrbh,t+1} (B.47)
1 = β¯Cγ−νt Et{(Ct+1)−γrbf,t+1} (B.48)
• Expected Excess Returns:
rshx,t = r
s
h,t − rbh,t (B.49)
rsfx,t = r
s
f,t − rbh,t (B.50)
rbfx,t = r
b
f,t − rbh,t (B.51)
• Definitions of income:
Yt = wtLt +ND,td˜t −NE,tv˜st (B.52)
Y ∗t = w
∗
tL
∗
t +N
∗
D,td˜
∗
t −N∗E,tv˜s∗t (B.53)
• Net exports:
NXt =
1
2
[(Yt −QtY ∗t )− (Ct −QtC∗t )] (B.54)
• Net foreign assets:
NFAt+1 = NXt +NFAtr
b
h,t + af,t−1r
s
fx,t − a∗sh,t−1rshx,t + abf,t−1rbfx,t (B.55)
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For the case of welfare indexed bonds bond dividends are dbt = d
∗b
t = 1, the bond
returns become:
rbh,t =
vbt + 1
vbt−1
(B.56)
rbf,t =
vb∗t + 1
vb∗t−1
Qt
Qt−1
(B.57)
B.2 Steady state
I define the following shares:
SEDO = α1ρ¯H
1−ω (B.58)
SEXP = α2ρ¯F
1−ω (B.59)
SEDI = (1− α1 − α2) ¯ρFDI1−ω. (B.60)
As well as the following ratios of steady state variables to consumption
SD =
N¯Dd¯
C¯
(B.61)
SDD =
N¯Dd¯D
C¯
(B.62)
SX =
N¯X d¯X
C¯
(B.63)
SI =
N¯I d¯I
C¯
(B.64)
SE =
N¯E v¯
C¯
(B.65)
SFX =
N¯Xw¯fX
C¯
(B.66)
SFI =
N¯Iw¯fI
C¯
(B.67)
SW =
w¯
C¯
. (B.68)
B.2.1 Solving for the Steady State
We derive the symmetric steady state similarly to the technical appendix of Ghironi
and Melitz (2005). First, we seek a way to pin down the average productivity of FDI
firms, then we aim to find expressions for the other steady state values based on the
average productivity levels. Since the steady state is symmetric all foreign variables
are equal to their domestic counterpart, thus there are no asterisks. Furthermore,
variables without a time subscript denote steady state values and in steady state
Z = ZE = Q = TOL = 1
As Ghironi and Melitz (2005) we fix the share of exporters to be NX
ND
= 0.21 and
to simplyfy the steady state derivation, we also fix the share of FDI firms to be
NX
ND
= 0.10.
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B.2.2 Step 1: Deriving z˜X only in terms of z˜I
The first expression on our way comes from the Euler equation for share holdings:
C−γ = Υ(C)C−γ[rbf,t+1]
1 = Υ(C)[rsh]
1 = Υ(C)[(1− δ) v˜
s + d˜
v˜s
]
v˜s = Υ(C)(1− δ)(v˜s + d˜)
v˜s −Υ(C)(1− δ)v˜s = Υ(C)(1− δ)d˜
v˜s =
Υ(C)(1− δ)
1−Υ(C)(1− δ) d˜
Using the definition of total profits d˜ = d˜D +
NX
ND
d˜X +
NI
ND
d˜I , we get
v˜s =
Υ(C)(1− δ)
1−Υ(C)(1− δ)
(
d˜D +
NX
ND
d˜X +
NI
ND
d˜I
)
.
And combining this equation with the free entry condition v˜s = wtfE yields(
d˜D +
NX
ND
d˜X +
NI
ND
d˜I
)
=
1−Υ(C)(1− δ)
Υ(C)(1− δ) wtfE. (B.69)
The second expression is derived from the zero profit export cutoff condition:
d˜X =

O

(
fX
α2
) k−σ+1
1−ω −
[
τ 1−ω
(
fI
1−α1−α2
)(
NX
NI
)(ψ(ω−1)−1)] k−σ+11−ω
(
fX
α2
) k
1−ω −
[(
fI
1−α1−α2
)
τ 1−ω
(
NX
NI
)(ψ(ω−1)−1)] k1−ω


ω−1
σ−1
α2 − fX
w
which can be written as
d˜X = Aw (B.70)
withA =

O
( fXα2 ) k−σ+11−ω −
[
τ1−ω
(
fI
1−α1−α2
)(
NX
NI
)(ψ(ω−1)−1)] k−σ+11−ω
(
fX
α2
) k
1−ω−
[(
fI
1−α1−α2
)
τ1−ω
(
NX
NI
)(ψ(ω−1)−1)] k1−ω


ω−1
σ−1
α2 − fX
. The
steady state zero-profit FDI cutoff becomes
d˜I = (O− 1)wfI
=
(
k
k − (σ − 1) − 1
)
wfI
=
(
k − k + (σ − 1)
k − (σ − 1)
)
wfI
d˜I =
(
σ − 1
k − (σ − 1)
)
wfI . (B.71)
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From the steady state profits,
d˜D =
1
σ
N
ψ(ω−1)−1
D ρ˜
1−ω
D α1C
d˜X =
1
σ
N
ψ(ω−1)−1
X ρ˜
1−ω
X α2C − wfX
d˜I =
1
σ
N
ψ(ω−1)−1
I ρ˜
1−ω
I (1− α1 − α2)C − wfI
the second equation implies
d˜X =
1
σ
N
ψ(ω−1)−1
D ρ˜
1−ω
D
(
NX
ND
)ψ(ω−1)−1(
ρ˜X
ρ˜D
)1−ω
α2C − wfX .
As
(
NX
ND
)ψ(ω−1)−1(
ρ˜X
ρ˜D
)1−ω
=
N
ψ(ω−1)−1
X ρ˜
1−ω
X
N
ψ(ω−1)−1
D ρ˜
1−ω
D
=
ND
NX
(
N−ψX ρ˜X
N−ψD ρ˜D
)1−ω
=
ND
NX
(
ρ˜F
ρ˜H
)1−ω
=
ND
NX
α1
α2
SEXP
SEDO
,
we have that
d˜X =
1
σ
N
ψ(ω−1)−1
D ρ˜
1−ω
D
ND
NX
SEXP
SEDO
α1C − wfX
=
SEXP
SEDO
1
σ
N
ψ(ω−1)−1
D ρ˜
1−ω
D
ND
NX
α1C − wfX
=
ND
NX
SEXP
SEDO
d˜D − wfX .
And using (B.70), we obtain
d˜D =
NX
ND
SEDO
SEXP
(A+ fX)w. (B.72)
Similarly, the steady state equation for FDI profits implies
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d˜I =
1
σ
N
ψ(ω−1)−1
I ρ˜
1−ω
I (1− α1 − α2)C − wfI
=
(
NI
ND
)ψ(ω−1)−1(
ρ˜I
ρ˜D
)1−ω
1
σ
N
ψ(ω−1)−1
D ρ˜
1−ω
D (1− α1 − α2)C − wfI .
As
(
NI
ND
)ψ(ω−1)−1(
ρ˜I
ρ˜D
)1−ω
=
N
ψ(ω−1)−1
I ρ˜
1−ω
I
N
ψ(ω−1)−1
D ρ˜
1−ω
D
=
ND
NI
(
N−ψI ρ˜I
N−ψD ρ˜D
)1−ω
=
ND
NI
(
ρ˜FDI
ρ˜H
)1−ω
=
ND
NI
α1
1− α1 − α2
SEDI
SEDO
we have that
d˜I =
ND
NI
α1
1− α1 − α2
SEDI
SEDO
1
σ
N
ψ(ω−1)−1
D ρ˜
1−ω
D (1− α1 − α2)C − wfI
=
ND
NI
SEDI
SEDO
1
σ
N
ψ(ω−1)−1
D ρ˜
1−ω
D α1C − wfI
=
ND
NI
SEDI
SEDO
d˜D − wfI .
And using (B.71), we obtain
d˜D =
NI
ND
SEDO
SEDI
(
k
k − (σ − 1)
)
wfI . (B.73)
Recalling the pricing equations in steady state
ρ˜D =
σ
σ − 1
w
z˜D
(B.74)
ρ˜X = τ
σ
σ − 1
w
z˜X
(B.75)
ρ˜I =
σ
σ − 1
w
z˜I
, (B.76)
the coefficient ratios can be written in terms of the average productivity levels z˜D,
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z˜X and z˜I as follows
SEDO
SEXP
=
α1N
−ψ(1−ω)
D ρ˜
1−ω
D
α2N
−ψ(1−ω)
X ρ˜
1−ω
X
=
α1
α2
(
ND
NX
)−ψ(1−ω)(
ρ˜D
ρ˜X
)1−ω
=
α1
α2
(
ND
NX
)−ψ(1−ω)( σ
σ−1
w
z˜D
τ σ
σ−1
w
z˜X
)1−ω
=
α1
α2
(
ND
NX
)−ψ(1−ω)(
z˜X
τ z˜D
)1−ω
SEDO
SEDI
=
α1N
−ψ(1−ω)
D ρ˜
1−ω
D
(1− α1 − α2)N−ψ(1−ω)I ρ˜1−ωI
=
α1
1− α1 − α2
(
ND
NI
)−ψ(1−ω)(
ρ˜D
ρ˜I
)1−ω
=
α1
1− α1 − α2
(
ND
NI
)−ψ(1−ω)( σ
σ−1
w
z˜D
σ
σ−1
w
z˜I
)1−ω
=
α1
1− α1 − α2
(
ND
NI
)−ψ(1−ω)(
z˜I
z˜D
)1−ω
.
Thus,
d˜D =
α1
α2
(
ND
NX
)ψ(ω−1)−1(
z˜X
τ z˜D
)1−ω
(A+ fX)w (B.77)
d˜D =
α1
1− α1 − α2
(
ND
NI
)ψ(ω−1)−1(
z˜I
z˜D
)1−ω (
k
k − (σ − 1)
)
wfI . (B.78)
Combining the two yields
α1
α2
(
ND
NX
)ψ(ω−1)−1(
z˜X
τ z˜D
)1−ω
(A+ fX)w
=
α1
1− α1 − α2
(
ND
NI
)ψ(ω−1)−1(
z˜I
z˜D
)1−ω (
k
k − (σ − 1)
)
wfI
z˜X = τ
(
α2
1− α1 − α2
k
k − (σ − 1)
) 1
1−ω
(
NX
NI
)ψ(ω−1)−1
1−ω
(
fI
A+ fX
) 1
1−ω
z˜I
which directly relates z˜X to z˜I and depends only on parameters once
NX
ND
and NI
ND
are fixed, as in our calibration.
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B.2.3 Step 2: Deriving z˜I only in terms of parameters
The steady state share of exporting and FDI firms in the total number of domestic
firms is:
NX,t
ND,t
= (zmin)
k(z˜−kX,t − z˜−kI,t ) (B.79)
NI,t
ND,t
= (zmin)
k(z˜I,t)
−k
(
k
k − (σ − 1)
) k
σ−1
. (B.80)
Using
z˜D = O
1
σ−1 zmin =
[
k
k − (σ − 1)
] 1
σ−1
zmin (B.81)
we derive an expression that implicitly defines z˜X in terms of parameters.
From (
d˜D +
NX
ND
d˜X +
NI
ND
d˜I
)
=
1−Υ(C)(1− δ)
Υ(C)(1− δ) wtfE
(
α1
1− α1 − α2
(
ND
NI
)ψ(ω−1)−1(
z˜I
z˜D
)1−ω (
k
k − (σ − 1)
)
wfI
)
+
(
(zmin)
k(z˜−kX,t − z˜−kI,t )
)
Aw
+
(
(zmin)
k(z˜I,t)
−k
(
k
k − (σ − 1)
) k
σ−1
)((
σ − 1
k − (σ − 1)
)
wfI
)
=
1−Υ(C)(1− δ)
Υ(C)(1− δ) wfE
(
α1
1− α1 − α2
(
ND
NI
)ψ(ω−1)−1(
z˜I
z˜D
)1−ω
OfI
)
+
(
(zmin)
k(z˜−kX,t − z˜−kI,t )
)
A
+
(
(zmin)
k(z˜I,t)
−kO kσ−1
)
((O− 1) fI) = 1−Υ(C)(1− δ)
Υ(C)(1− δ) fE.
Using z˜D = O
1
σ−1 zmin and z˜X = τ
(
α2
1−α1−α2O
) 1
1−ω
(
NX
NI
)ψ(ω−1)−1
1−ω
(
fI
A+fX
) 1
1−ω
z˜I we
obtain(
α1
1− α1 − α2
(
ND
NI
)ψ(ω−1)−1(
z˜I
O 1σ−1 zmin
)1−ω
OfI
)
+
(zmin)k
(τ ( α2
1− α1 − α2O
) 1
1−ω
(
NX
NI
)ψ(ω−1)−1
1−ω
(
fI
A+ fX
) 1
1−ω
z˜I
)−k
− z˜−kI,t
A
+
(
(zmin)
k(z˜I,t)
−kO kσ−1
)
((O− 1) fI) = 1−Υ(C)(1− δ)
Υ(C)(1− δ) fE.
which in essence determines z˜I in terms of parameters once
NX
ND
and NI
ND
are fixed,
as in our calibration.
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B.2.4 Step 3: Solving for prices
The law of motion of the number of domestic firms in the symmetric steady state
implies
NE =
δ
1− δND. (B.82)
From aggregating individual budget constraints in a symmetric steady state, we
obtain
C + v˜sNE = wL+NDd˜.
Using v˜s = wfE,t this becomes
C + wfE,tNE = wL+NDd˜.
From step 1 above we have
d˜ =
1−Υ(C)(1− δ)
Υ(C)(1− δ) wfE
C + wfENE − wL = 1−Υ(C)(1− δ)
Υ(C)(1− δ) NDwfE.
Using the law of motion
C + wfE
δ
1− δND − wL =
1−Υ(C)(1− δ)
Υ(C)(1− δ) NDwfE
C =
1−Υ(C)(1− δ)
Υ(C)(1− δ) NDwfE − wfE,t
δ
1− δND + wL
C =
(
1−Υ(C)(1− δ)
Υ(C)(1− δ) −
δ
1− δ
)
NDwfE + wL
C =
(
1−Υ(C)
Υ(C)(1− δ)
)
NDwfE + wL.
In a final step this can be written as
C
w
= L+
(
1−Υ(C)
Υ(C)(1− δ)
)
NDfE. (B.83)
Additionally, from the zero-profit FDI cutoff (B.71) and the steady state expression
for FDI profits, we have
d˜I =
(
σ − 1
k − (σ − 1)
)
wfI
1
σ
N
ψ(ω−1)−1
I ρ˜
1−ω
I (1− α1 − α2)C − wfI =
(
σ − 1
k − (σ − 1)
)
wfI
1
σ
N
ψ(ω−1)−1
I ρ˜
1−ω
I (1− α1 − α2)C =
(
1 +
σ − 1
k − (σ − 1)
)
wfI
C
w
=
σ
1− α1 − α2N
1−ψ(ω−1)
I ρ˜
ω−1
I OfI .
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Similarly, from the zero-profit export condition (B.70) and the steady state expres-
sion for export profits, we have
d˜X = Aw
1
σ
N
ψ(ω−1)−1
X ρ˜
1−ω
X α2C − wfX = Aw
1
σ
N
ψ(ω−1)−1
X ρ˜
1−ω
X α2C = (A+ fX)w
C
w
=
σ
α2
N
1−ψ(ω−1)
X ρ˜
ω−1
X (A+ fX) .
Now, from the price index equation in steady state
α1ρ
1−ω
H + α2ρ
1−ω
X + (1− α1 − α2)ρ1−ωFDI = 1
we write
(1− α1 − α2)(N−ψI ρ˜I)1−ω = 1− α1(N−ψD ρ˜D)1−ω − α2(N−ψX ρ˜X)1−ω
(1− α1 − α2)(
(
NI
ND
)−ψ
ρ˜I)
1−ω =
(
1
N
−ψ(1−ω)
D
)
− α1(ρ˜D)1−ω − α2(
(
NX
ND
)−ψ
ρ˜X)
1−ω
(
NI
ND
)−ψ(1−ω)
ρ˜1−ωI =
1
(1− α1 − α2)
((
1
N
−ψ(1−ω)
D
)
− α1(ρ˜D)1−ω − α2(
(
NX
ND
)−ψ
ρ˜X)
1−ω
)
ρ˜
(ω−1)
I
N
−ψ(1−ω)
D
= (1− α1 − α2)
(
NI
ND
)−ψ(1−ω)
+ α1
(
ρ˜D
ρ˜I
)1−ω
+ α2
(
NX
ND
)−ψ(1−ω)(
ρ˜X
ρ˜I
)1−ω
.
Using the ratios
ρ˜I
ρ˜D
=
z˜D
z˜I
ρ˜X
ρ˜D
= τ
z˜D
z˜X
ρ˜I
ρ˜X
=
z˜X
τ z˜I
as well as,
NX,t
ND,t
= (zmin)
k(z˜−kX,t − z˜−kI,t )
NI,t
ND,t
= (zmin)
k(z˜I,t)
−kO kσ−1 ,
we obtain
ρ˜
(ω−1)
I
N
−ψ(1−ω)
D
= (1− α1 − α2)
(
(zmin)
k(z˜I,t)
−kO kσ−1
)−ψ(1−ω)
+ α1
(
z˜D
z˜I
)ω−1
+ α2
(
(zmin)
k(z˜−kX,t − z˜−kI,t )
)−ψ(1−ω)( z˜X
τ z˜I
)ω−1
. (B.84)
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As zmin is a parameter and we have already determined z˜D, z˜X and z˜I , we can
summarize the right-hand side of the equation as
BB = (1− α1 − α2)
(
(zmin)
k(z˜I,t)
−kO kσ−1
)−ψ(1−ω)
+ α1
(
z˜D
z˜I
)ω−1
+ α2
(
(zmin)
k(z˜−kX,t − z˜−kI,t )
)−ψ(1−ω)( z˜X
τ z˜I
)ω−1
and simplify the whole equations to
ND =
(
ρ˜
(ω−1)
I
BB
) 1
−ψ(1−ω)
=
 ρ˜ (ω−1)ψ(ω−1)I
BB
1
−ψ(1−ω)
 = ρ˜ 1ψI
BB
1
ψ(ω−1)
. (B.85)
From the equations above, we obtain
L+
(
1−Υ(C)
Υ(C)(1− δ)
)
NDfE =
σ
1− α1 − α2N
1−ψ(ω−1)
I ρ˜
ω−1
I OfI .
With ND =
ρ˜
1
ψ
I
BB
1
ψ(ω−1)
and NI,t = (zmin)
k(z˜I,t)
−kO kσ−1ND,t, we get
L+
(
1−Υ(C)
Υ(C)(1− δ)
) ρ˜ 1ψI
BB
1
ψ(ω−1)
 fE
=
σ
1− α1 − α2
(zmin)k(z˜I,t)−kO kσ−1 ρ˜ 1ψI
BB
1
ψ(ω−1)
1−ψ(ω−1) ρ˜ω−1I OfI .
L =
σ
1− α1 − α2
(
(zmin)
k(z˜I,t)
−kO kσ−1
)1−ψ(ω−1)
BB
ψ(ω−1)−1
ψ(ω−1) ρ˜
1
ψ
I OfI
−
(
1−Υ(C)
Υ(C)(1− δ)
)
BB−
1
ψ(ω−1) ρ˜
1
ψ
I fE.
ρ˜I = [
σ
1− α1 − α2
(
(zmin)
k(z˜I,t)
−kO kσ−1
)1−ψ(ω−1)
BB
ψ(ω−1)−1
ψ(ω−1) OfI
−
(
1−Υ(C)
Υ(C)(1− δ)
)
BB−
1
ψ(ω−1)fE]
−ψ
(
1
L
)−ψ
. (B.86)
This equation implicitly define ρ˜I in terms of parameters. Using a similar approach,
we can derive an expression for ρ˜X in terms of parameters. Again starting from the
price index equation in steady state
α1ρ
1−ω
H + α2ρ
1−ω
X + (1− α1 − α2)ρ1−ωFDI = 1
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we write
α2
(
N−ψX ρ˜X
)1−ω
= 1− α1
(
N−ψD ρ˜D
)1−ω
− (1− α1 − α2)
(
(N−ψI ρ˜I
)1−ω
α2
((
NX
ND
)−ψ
ρ˜X
)1−ω
=
(
1
N
−ψ(1−ω)
D
)
− α1 (ρ˜D)1−ω − (1− α1 − α2)
((
NI
ND
)−ψ
ρ˜I
)1−ω
((
NX
ND
)−ψ
ρ˜X
)1−ω
=
1
α2
( 1
N
−ψ(1−ω)
D
)
− α1 (ρ˜D)1−ω − (1− α1 − α2)
((
NI
ND
)−ψ
ρ˜I
)1−ω
(
NX
ND
)−ψ(1−ω)
=
1
α2

 1(
N−ψD ρ˜X
)(1−ω)
− α1( ρ˜D
ρ˜X
)1−ω
− (1− α1 − α2)
((
NI
ND
)−ψ
ρ˜I
ρ˜X
)1−ω
ρ˜ω−1X
N
−ψ(1−ω)
D
= α2
(
NX
ND
)−ψ(1−ω)
+ α1
(
ρ˜D
ρ˜X
)1−ω
+ (1− α1 − α2)
((
NI
ND
)−ψ
ρ˜I
ρ˜X
)1−ω
Again using the ratios
ρ˜I
ρ˜D
=
z˜D
z˜I
ρ˜X
ρ˜D
= τ
z˜D
z˜X
ρ˜I
ρ˜X
=
z˜X
τ z˜I
as well as,
NX,t
ND,t
= (zmin)
k(z˜−kX,t − z˜−kI,t )
NI,t
ND,t
= (zmin)
k(z˜I,t)
−kO kσ−1 ,
we obtain
ρ˜ω−1X
N
−ψ(1−ω)
D
= α2
(
(zmin)
k(z˜−kX − z˜−kI )
)−ψ(1−ω)
+ α1
(
z˜X
τ z˜D
)1−ω
+ (1− α1 − α2)
((
(zmin)
k(z˜I)
−kO kσ−1
)−ψ z˜X
τ z˜I
)1−ω
(B.87)
As zmin is a parameter and we have already determined z˜D, z˜X and z˜I , we can
summarize the right-hand side of the equation as
CC = α2
(
(zmin)
k(z˜−kX − z˜−kI )
)−ψ(1−ω)
+ α1
(
z˜X
τ z˜D
)1−ω
+ (1− α1 − α2)
((
(zmin)
k(z˜I)
−kO kσ−1
)−ψ z˜X
τ z˜I
)1−ω
and simplify the whole equations to
ND =
(
ρ˜
(ω−1)
X
CC
) 1
−ψ(1−ω)
=
 ρ˜ (ω−1)ψ(ω−1)X
CC
1
−ψ(1−ω)
 = ρ˜ 1ψX
CC
1
ψ(ω−1)
. (B.88)
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From the equations above, we obtain
L+
(
1−Υ(C)
Υ(C)(1− δ)
)
NDfE =
σ
α2
N
1−ψ(ω−1)
X ρ˜
ω−1
X (A+ fX) . (B.89)
With ND =
(
ρ˜
1
ψ
X
CC
1
ψ(ω−1)
)
and NX,t =
(
(zmin)
k(z˜−kX,t − z˜−kI,t )ND
)
, we get
L+
(
1−Υ(C)
Υ(C)(1− δ)
) ρ˜ 1ψX
CC
1
ψ(ω−1)
 fE
=
σ
α2
(zmin)k(z˜−kX,t − z˜−kI,t )
 ρ˜ 1ψX
CC
1
ψ(ω−1)
1−ψ(ω−1) ρ˜ω−1X (A+ fX)
=
σ
α2
(
(zmin)
k(z˜−kX,t − z˜−kI,t )
)1−ψ(ω−1) ρ˜ 1−ψ(ω−1)ψX
CC
1−ψ(ω−1)
ψ(ω−1)
 ρ˜ω−1X (A+ fX)
=
σ
α2
(
(zmin)
k(z˜−kX,t − z˜−kI,t )
)1−ψ(ω−1) ρ˜ 1ψX
CC
1−ψ(ω−1)
ψ(ω−1)
 (A+ fX)
Which simplifies to
L =
=
 σ
α2
(
(zmin)
k(z˜−kX,t − z˜−kI,t )
)1−ψ(ω−1) ρ˜ 1ψX
CC
1−ψ(ω−1)
ψ(ω−1)
 (A+ fX)− ( 1−Υ(C)
Υ(C)(1− δ)
) ρ˜ 1ψX
CC
1
ψ(ω−1)
 fE

=
[
σ
α2
(
(zmin)
k(z˜−kX,t − z˜−kI,t )
)1−ψ(ω−1) (
CC
ψ(ω−1)−1
ψ(1−ω)
)
(A+ fX)−
(
1−Υ(C)
Υ(C)(1− δ)
)(
CC−
1
ψ(ω−1)
)
fE
]
ρ˜
1
ψ
X
(B.90)
or
ρ˜X = [
σ
α2
(
(zmin)
k(z˜−kX,t − z˜−kI,t )
)1−ψ(ω−1) (
CC
ψ(ω−1)−1
ψ(1−ω)
)
(A+ fX)
−
(
1−Υ(C)
Υ(C)(1− δ)
)(
CC−
1
ψ(ω−1)
)
fE]
−ψ
(
1
L
)−ψ
(B.91)
This equation implicitly define ρ˜X in terms of parameters and variables we have
solved for before.
B.2.5 Step 3: Solving for other steady state variables
We then have solutions for z˜D, z˜X , z˜I , ρ˜X , ρ˜I and can determine the rest of the steady
state values.
ND =
ρ˜
1
ψ
X
CC
1
ψ(ω−1)
(B.92)
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NX =
(
(zmin)
k(z˜−kX − z˜−kI )ND
)
(B.93)
NI = (zmin)
k(z˜I)
−kO kσ−1ND (B.94)
ρ˜D =
z˜I ρ˜I
z˜D
(B.95)
ρ˜D =
z˜I ρ˜I
z˜D
(B.96)
From ρ˜X = τ
σ
σ−1
w
z˜X
, we have
w =
σ − 1
τσ
ρ˜X z˜X . (B.97)
C =
[
L+
(
1−Υ(C)
Υ(C)(1− δ)
)
NDfE
]
w (B.98)
NE =
δ
1− δND (B.99)
• Price indices - Domestic Components:
ρH = N
−ψ
D ρ˜D (B.100)
• Price indices - Imported Components:
ρX = N
−ψ
X ρ˜X (B.101)
• Price indices - FDI Components:
ρFDI = N
−ψ
I ρ˜I (B.102)
• Average profits from domestically sold goods:
d˜D =
1
σ
N
ψ(ω−1)−1
D ρ˜
1−ω
D α1C (B.103)
• Average profits from exported goods:
d˜X =
1
σ
N
ψ(ω−1)−1
X ρ˜
1−ω
X α2C − wfX (B.104)
• Average profits from FDI goods produced by foreign affiliate:
d˜I =
1
σ
N
ψ(ω−1)−1
I ρ˜
1−ω
I (1− α1 − α2)C − wfI (B.105)
• Total average profits:
d˜ = d˜D +
NX
ND
d˜X +
NI
ND
d˜I (B.106)
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B.3 Log-linearized system
• Price indices:
α1pH,t + α2pF,t + (1− α1 − α2)pFDI,t = 0 (B.107)
α1p
∗
H,t + α2p
∗
F,t + (1− α1 − α2)p∗FDI,t = 0 (B.108)
• Price indices - Domestic Components:
pH,t = p˜D,t − ψND,t (B.109)
p∗H,t = p˜
∗
D,t − ψN∗D,t (B.110)
• Price indices - Imported Components:
pF,t = p˜
∗
X,t − ψN∗X,t (B.111)
p∗F,t = p˜X,t − ψNX,t (B.112)
• Price indices - FDI Components:
pFDI,t = p˜
∗
I,t − ψN∗I,t (B.113)
p∗FDI,t = p˜I,t − ψNI,t (B.114)
• Firm level pricing - Domestically sold goods:
p˜D,t = wt − Zt (B.115)
p˜∗D,t = w
∗
t − Z∗t (B.116)
• Firm level pricing - Exported goods:
p˜X,t = wt − Zt − zX,t − Qt (B.117)
p˜∗X,t = w
∗
t − Z∗t − z∗X,t + Qt (B.118)
• Firm level pricing - FDI goods sold by foreign affiliates:
p˜I,t = w
∗
t − Z∗t − zI,t (B.119)
p˜∗I,t = wt − Zt − z∗I,t (B.120)
• Total average profits:
SDd˜t = SDDd˜D,t + (SDD − SD)ND,t + SX
(
NX,t + d˜X,t
)
+ SI
(
NI,t + d˜I,t
)
(B.121)
SDd˜
∗
t = SDDd˜
∗
D,t + (SDD − SD)N∗D,t + SX
(
N∗X,t + d˜
∗
X,t
)
+ SI
(
N∗I,t + d˜
∗
I,t
)
(B.122)
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• Average profits from domestically sold goods:
d˜D,t = (ψ(ω − 1)− 1)ND,t + (1− ω)p˜D,t + Ct (B.123)
d˜
∗
D,t = (ψ(ω − 1)− 1)N∗D,t + (1− ω)p˜∗D,t + C∗t (B.124)
(B.125)
• Average profits from exported goods:
SX
SX + SFX
d˜X,t +
SFX
SX + SFX
(wt − zt) = Qt + (ψ(ω − 1)− 1)NX,t + (1− ω)p˜X,t + C∗t
(B.126)
SX
SX + SFX
d˜
∗
X,t +
SFX
SX + SFX
(w∗t − z∗t ) = −Qt + (ψ(ω − 1)− 1)N∗X,t + (1− ω)p˜∗X,t + Ct
(B.127)
• Average profits from FDI goods produced by foreign affiliate:
SI
SI + SFI
d˜I,t +
SFI
SI + SFI
(Qt + w
∗
t − z∗t ) = Qt + (ψ(ω − 1)− 1)NI,t + (1− ω)p˜I,t + C∗t
(B.128)
SI
SI + SFI
d˜
∗
I,t +
SFI
SI + SFI
(−Qt + wt − zt) = −Qt + (ψ(ω − 1)− 1)N∗I,t + (1− ω)p˜∗I,t + Ct
(B.129)
• Free-entry conditions:
v˜st = wt − ZE,t (B.130)
v˜∗st = w
∗
t − Z∗E,t (B.131)
• Optimal labor supply:
Lt = ψ (wt − γCt) (B.132)
L∗t = ψ (w
∗
t − γC∗t ) (B.133)
• Labor market clearing:
L¯Lt =
(σ − 1)
SW
[
SDD(ND,t + d˜D,t) + SX(NX,t + d˜X,t) + SI(Qt + N
∗
I,t + d˜
∗
I,t)− SDwt
]
+ σ
[
N¯EfE
σ
NE,t + fX,tN¯XNX,t + fI,tN¯
∗
IN
∗
I,t − (
N¯E,tfE
σ
+ fXN¯X + fIN¯I)Zt
]
L¯L∗t =
(σ − 1)
SW
[
SDD(N
∗
D,t + d˜
∗
D,t) + SX(N
∗
X,t + d˜
∗
X,t) + SI(−Qt + NI,t + d˜I,t)− SDw∗t
]
+ σ
[
N¯EfE
σ
N∗E,t + fXN¯XN
∗
X,t + fI,tN¯INI,t − (
N¯EfE
σ
+ fXN¯X + fIN¯I)Z
∗
t
]
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• Share of exporters:
N¯X,t
N¯D,t
(NX,t − ND,t) = k(zmin)k(z¯−kI,t z˜I,t − z¯−kX,tz˜X,t) (B.134)
N¯X,t
N¯D,t
(
N∗X,t − N∗D,t
)
= k(zmin)
k(z¯−kI,t z˜
∗
I,t − z¯−kX,tz˜∗X,t) (B.135)
• Share of FDI firms:
NI,t − ND,t = −kz˜I,t (B.136)
N∗I,t − N∗D,t = −kz˜∗I,t (B.137)
• Zero-profit export cutoff:
SX
SX + SFX
(
d˜X,t − wt + zt
)
=
ω − 1
σ − 1
(
N¯X d¯X + N¯XfXw¯
)− σ−1
ω−1[
(ψ(ω − 1)− 1) ¯MM(NI,t − NX,t) + ωN¯NTOLt
]
SX
SX + SFX
(
d˜
∗
X,t − w∗t + z∗t
)
=
ω − 1
σ − 1
(
N¯X d¯X + N¯XfXw¯
)− σ−1
ω−1[
(ψ(ω − 1)− 1) ¯MM(N∗I,t − N∗X,t)− ωN¯NTOLt
]
with
¯MM =
k
[
O¯O
1+k−σ
1−ω
(
P¯P
k
1−ω − O¯O k1−ω
)
+ OO¯O
k
1−ω
(
P¯P
1+k−σ
1−ω − O¯O 1+k−σ1−ω
)]
(1− ω)
(
P¯P
k
1−ω − O¯O k1−ω
)2
N¯N =
k
[
−O¯O 1+k−σ1−ω
(
P¯P
k
1−ω − O¯O k1−ω
)
+ OO¯O
k
1−ω
(
P¯P
1+k−σ
1−ω − O¯O 1+k−σ1−ω
)]
(1− ω)
(
P¯P
k
1−ω − O¯O k1−ω
)2
O¯O =
f ∗I,t
1− α∗1 − α∗2
(
N¯X,t
N¯I,t
)(ψ(ω−1)−1)
τ 1−ω
P¯P =
w¯
α2
• Zero-profit FDI cutoff:
d˜I,t = Qt + w
∗
t − Z∗t (B.138)
d˜I,t = −Qt + wt − Zt (B.139)
• Law of motion of domestic firms:
ND,t+1 = (1− δ)ND,t + δNE,t (B.140)
N∗D,t+1 = (1− δ)N∗D,t + δN∗E,t (B.141)
• Terms of Labor:
˜TOLt = Qt − wt + w∗t + Zt − Z∗t (B.142)
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• Definitions of real returns:
rsh,t = β(1− δ)v˜st + (1− β(1− δ))d˜t − v˜st−1 (B.143)
rsf,t = β(1− δ)v˜∗st + (1− β(1− δ))d˜
∗
t − v˜∗st−1 (B.144)
rbh,t = βv˜
b
t + (1− β)d˜
b
t − v˜bt−1 (B.145)
rbf,t = βv˜
∗b
t + (1− β)d˜
∗b
t − v˜∗bt−1 (B.146)
• Euler Home and Foreign:
(Ct − C∗t ) =
γ
γ − νEt
[
Ct+1 − C∗t+1 + Qt − Qt+1
]
(B.147)
• Euler Home and Foreign:
0 = (γ − ν)Ct+1 − γEt
[
Ct+1 + r
s
h,t+1
]
(B.148)
0 = (γ − ν)Ct+1 − γEt
[
Ct+1 + r
s
f,t+1
]
(B.149)
0 = (γ − ν)Ct+1 − γEt
[
Ct+1 + r
b
h,t+1
]
(B.150)
0 = (γ − ν)Ct+1 − γEt
[
Ct+1 + r
b
f,t+1
]
(B.151)
• Expected Excess Returns:
Et
[
rsx,t+1
]
= Et
[
β(1− δ)vst+1 + (1− β(1− δ))dst+1 − βvbt+1 − (1− β)dbt+1
]− vst + vbt
Et
[
r∗sx,t+1
]
= Et
[
β(1− δ)v∗st+1 + (1− β(1− δ))d∗st+1 − βvbt+1 − (1− β)dbt+1 + Qt+1
]
− vst + vbt − Qt
Et
[
r∗bx,t+1
]
= Et
[
βv∗bt+1 + (1− β)d∗bt+1 − βvbt+1 − (1− β)dbt+1 + Qt+1
]− v∗bt + vbt − Qt
• Definitions of income:
Y¯ Yt = w¯L¯(wt + Lt) + N¯Dd¯(ND,t + d˜t)− N¯E v¯(NE,t + v˜st) (B.152)
Y¯ Y∗t = w¯L¯(w
∗
t + L
∗
t ) + N¯Dd¯(N
∗
D,t + d˜
∗
t )− N¯E v¯(N∗E,t + v˜∗st ) (B.153)
• Net exports:
NXt =
1
2
[
Y¯ (Yt − Y∗t )− C¯(Ct − C∗t ) + (C¯ − Y¯ )Qt
]
(B.154)
• Net foreign assets:
NFAt+1 = NXt +
1
β
NFAt + a˜
s
f r
s
fx,t+1 + a˜
s∗
h r
s
hx,t+1 + a˜
b
f r
b
fx,t+1 (B.155)
with
a˜sf = a˜
∗s
h =
asf
βC¯
and a˜bf = −a˜bh =
asf
βC¯
. (B.156)
Chapter B Moritz A. Roth 119
Three Essays in International Macroeconomics
For the case of welfare indexed bonds bond dividends are dbt = d
∗b
t = 1, the bond
returns become:
rbh,t = βv
b
t − vbt−1 (B.157)
rbf,t = βv
b∗
t − vb∗t−1 + Qt − Qt−1 (B.158)
Expected Excess Returns:
Et
[
rsx,t+1
]
= rsh,t − rbh,t = β(1− δ)Et
[
vst+1 + (1− β(1− δ))dst+1 − βvbt+1
]− vst + vbt
Et
[
r∗sx,t+1
]
= rsf,t − rbh,t = Et
[
β(1− δ)v∗st+1 + (1− β(1− δ))d∗st+1 − βvbt+1 + Qt+1
]
− vst + vbt − Qt
Et
[
r∗bx,t+1
]
= rbf,t − rbh,t = Et
[
βv∗bt+1 − βvbt+1 + Qt+1
]− v∗bt + vbt − Qt
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Appendix Chapter 3
C.1 Net wealth distribution in the EMU
Figure C.1 – Net wealth distribution in surveyed EMU countries (ECB,2013)
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C.2 The model without default and log-utility
Home country has a representative household while there are two types of households
in Foreign. Only the Home government is assumed to be able to issue debt, while
households in both countries can save using government bonds.
In this version of the model I assume a deterministic world with commitment by the
Home government to repay its debt.
Furthermore, as D’Erasmo and Mendoza (2016) I concentrate on equilibria in which
the low-type foreign household does not save in government bonds, i.e. bL∗1 = 0.
This depends on the parameterization of the model and has to be checked in the
theoretical and numerical exercises.
C.2.1 Households
The preferences of the Home representative household are given by
ln(c0) + βln(c1) (C.1)
with
c0 = y0 − τ0 + b0 − qb1
c1 = y1 − τ1 + b1.
The preferences of the Foreign households are
ln(ci∗0 ) + βln(c
i∗
1 ) for i = L,H. (C.2)
With bL∗1 = 0 the budget constraints of the L-type are
c∗0 = y
∗
0 − τ ∗0
c∗1 = y
∗
1 − τ ∗1
and the ones for the H-type households are
c∗0 = y
∗
0 − τ ∗0 + bH∗0 − qbH∗1
c∗1 = y
∗
1 − τ ∗1 + bH∗1 .
The savings problem of the Home household given an amount of government debt
B1 is
L = maxb1ln(y0 − τ0 + b0 − qb1) + βln(y1 − τ1 + b1).
The first-order condition is given by
∂L
∂b1
: − q
c0
+ β
1
c1
= 0.
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Thus, the Euler equation for the Home household is
q = β
c0
c1
. (C.3)
The savings problem of the Foreign H-type household given an amount of govern-
ment debt B1 is
L = maxbH∗1 ln(y∗0 − τ ∗0 + bH∗0 − qbH∗1 ) + βln(y∗1 − τ ∗1 + bH∗1 ).
The first-order condition is given by
∂L
∂bH∗1
: − q
cH∗0
+ β
1
cH∗1
= 0.
Thus, the Euler equation for the Foreign H-type household is
q = β
cH∗0
cH∗1
. (C.4)
For the Foreign L-type household, the parameterization has to be chosen such that
it is ’credit constraint’, i.e. given its income stream it would like to borrow, but
bond holdings are restricted to bL∗1 ≥ 0. This is the case if for a given equilibrium
price
q > β
cH∗0
cH∗1
(C.5)
holds, stating that the marginal cost of buying a unit of government bonds is strictly
greater than the marginal benefit to shift consumption from t = 0 to t = 1.
C.2.2 Government
Home government’s budget constraints are
τ0 = g0 +B0 − qB1
τ1 = g1 +B1.
The Foreign government cannot issue debt and therefore, its budget constraints are
τ ∗0 = g
∗
0
τ ∗1 = g
∗
1.
C.2.3 Bond market equilibrium
The bond market is in a competitive equilibrium if for a given amount of Home
government debt, the following market clearing condition is fulfilled
b1 + γb
L∗
1 + (1− γ)bH∗1 = B1. (C.6)
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As I concentrate on equilibria in which the Foreign L-type does not hold debt, this
reduces to
b1 + (1− γ)bH∗1 = B1. (C.7)
Still there is the possibility that in equilibrium only one of the two households holds
all the debt supplied by the Home government.
Starting with the Euler equation of the Home household and plugging in the budget
constraints, the government budget constraints and the Home household’s holdings
of initial debt b0 = ηB0, I obtain
q = β
y0 − g0 − (1− η)B0 + qB1 − qb1
y1 − g1 −B1 + b1 . (C.8)
For the Foreign H-type household a similar expression can be derived with bH∗0 =
(1−η)B0
1−γ
q = β
y∗0 − g∗0 + 1−η1−γB0 − qbH∗1
y∗1 − g∗1 + bH∗1
. (C.9)
From these expressions, the bond prices are
q = β
y0 − g0 − (1− η)B0
y1 − g1 − (1 + β)B1 + (1 + β)b1 (C.10)
from the Home household’s Euler equation and
q = β
y∗0 − g∗0 + 1−η1−γB0
y∗1 − g∗1 + (1 + β)bH∗1
. (C.11)
for the Foreign H-type household.
Now there are different cases for equilibrium bond holdings:
Case 1: Only Home households hold bonds
If the equilibrium price is such that
q = β
c0
c1
> β
cH∗0
cH∗1
, (C.12)
only the Home household will want to hold bonds, and from market clearing the
demand of the Home household would be b1 = B1. Therefore, the planner’s problem
is
L = maxB1ln(y0 − g0 − (1− η)B0 + qB1 − qb1) + βln(y1 − g1 −B1 + b1)
= ln(y0 − g0 − (1− η)B0) + βln(y1 − g1)
which shows that welfare is independent of B1 and the government cannot influence
intertemporal consumption by issuing debt. For the purpose of this paper, this case
is not of interest.
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Case 2: Both the Home and the Foreign L-type households hold Home
government bonds
If the equilibrium price is such that
q = β
c0
c1
= β
cH∗0
cH∗1
, (C.13)
both the Home household and the Foreign H-type household want to hold Home
government debt. The market clearing condition in the bond market for this case is
given by b1 + (1− γ)bH∗1 = B1.
Using this in the price expression for the Home household, I obtain
q = β
y0 − g0 − (1− η)B0
y1 − g1 − (1 + β)B1 + (1 + β)b1
= β
y0 − g0 − (1− η)B0
y1 − g1 − (1 + β)B1 + (1 + β)(B1 − (1− γ)bH∗1 )
= β
y0 − g0 − (1− η)B0
y1 − g1 − (1 + β)(1− γ)bH∗1
.
Note that this is independent of B1 again. Since in this equilibrium the marginal
benefit from holding Home government bonds is equal for Home and Foreign H-type
household, it holds that
y0 − g0 − (1− η)B0
y1 − g1 − (1 + β)(1− γ)bH∗1
=
y∗0 − g∗0 + 1−η1−γB0
y∗1 − g∗1 + (1 + β)bH∗1
.
Solving for bH∗1 yields
b∗1 =
(y0 − g0 − (1− η)B0)(y∗1 − g∗1)− (y∗0 − g∗0 + 1−η1−γB0)(y1 − g1))
(y∗0 − g∗0 + 1−η1−γB0)(1 + β)(1− η)− (y0 − g0 − (1− η)B0)(1 + β)
. (C.14)
One can see that the demand for Home government debt by the Foreign H-type
household does not depend on the level of debt issued by the Home government B1.
It is solely determined by the parameters of the model. This demand pins down the
equilibrium price of debt to
q = β
y∗0 − g∗0 + 1−η1−γB0
y∗1 − g∗1 + (1 + β)bH∗1
(C.15)
which is then independent of B1 as well. The bond demand of the Home household
is derived from the market clearing condition as
b1 = B1 − (1− γ)bH∗1 . (C.16)
Since the demand of the Foreign H-type household is independent of B1, in the case
that Home households and Foreign H-type households hold debt and bondholdings
cannot be negative, the debt level issued by the government has to be at least
B1 > (1−γ)bH∗1 . Otherwise the Home household will not buy government bonds. For
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the case that B1 > (1−γ)bH∗1 , the Home household will buy all residual government
debt above (1− γ)bH∗1 . Therefore, the Home government will be indifferent between
issuing B1 = (1− γ)bH∗1 and any other amount B1 > (1− γ)bH∗1 . The intertemporal
consumption levels of the Home household, and therefore its welfare, is not altered
by issuing any B1 > (1− γ)bH∗1 .
This case plays a role, if welfare is maximized by an amount of debt larger or equal
to the full demand for government bonds by the Foreign household. Interestingly,
the potential welfare gain from issuing debt even under commitment in this model
is limited by the Foreign H-type household’s demand for these bonds. In this case,
the government can issue even more debt, without influencing the Home household’s
welfare, as the Home household will just hold the residual government debt, keeping
its consumption levels the same.
Case 3: Only Foreign H-type holds debt
If the equilibrium price is such that
q = β
cH∗0
cH∗1
> β
c0
c1
, (C.17)
only the Foreign H-type household is saving in Home government bonds. The market
clearing condition in the bond market for this case is given by (1− γ)bH∗1 = B1, so
the bond demand of the Foreign H-type household is bH∗1 =
B1
(1−γ) .
Using this in the price expression for the Foreign H-type household yields
q = β
y∗0 − g∗0 + 1−η1−γB0
y∗1 − g∗1 + (1 + β)bH∗1
q(B1) = β
y∗0 − g∗0 + 1−η1−γB0
y∗1 − g∗1 + (1 + β) B1(1−γ)
where the equilibrium bond price varies with the level of debt issued by the Home
government. In particular,
q′(B1) =
−q(B1)1+β1−γ
y∗1 − g∗1 + 1+β(1−γ)B1
. (C.18)
Given that the bond price in equilibrium is positive, it holds that
q′(B1) < 0. (C.19)
In summary, in this deterministic model where I assume the Foreign L-type house-
hold to be borrowing constraint, there is an optimal amount of savings the Foreign
H-type household would like to carry over from period t = 0 to t = 1, while at the
same time, given our parameterization, there is an optimal amount of government
debt the Home government issues in order to allow the Home household to borrow
and shift consumption from t = 1 to t = 0. In the case that the debt level optimally
issued by the Home government is lower than the amount the Foreign H-type desires
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optimally, i.e. the amount at which the Foreign governments demand is fully satis-
fied and the Home household starts saving in government bonds, only the Foreign
H-type household will hold Home debt and the price will fall in the amount issued. If
the Home government starts saving, case 2, the price will fully be determined by the
demand of the Foreign H-type household, and at this price the Home household will
buy all the debt in excess of the Foreign H-type household’s demand. The Foreign
H-type household’s demand determines a maximum level of consumption that the
Home government can transfer to the Home household in period t = 0, if it issues
more than this amount there will be no additional welfare gains.
Optimal debt choice
The Home government chooses the optimal amount of debt it issues to maximize
the Home household’s welfare. Its objective function is
maxB1ln(y0 − g0 −B0 + qB1 + b0 − qb1) + βln(y1 − g1 −B1 + b1) (C.20)
The first-order conditions depend on the different cases of which household types
hold bonds. If B1 ≥ (1− γ)bH∗1 both household want to save in government bonds,
q is not dependent on B1, but b1(B1). It actually moves one-to-one with B1, so the
government is indifferent between issuing exactly B1 = (1 − γ)bH∗1 or any greater
amount.
If B1 < (1− γ)bH∗1 , only the Foreign H-type household demands government bonds,
the equilibrium bond price depends on B1 and the maximization problem becomes
maxB1ln(y0 − g0 −B0 + q(B1)B1 + b0) + βln(y1 − g1 −B1) (C.21)
The first-order condition is
q′(B1) + q(B1)
y0 − g0 −B0 + qB1 + b0 =
β
y1 − g1 −B1 . (C.22)
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